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Abstract
WHEN HUMAN-LEOPARD CONFLICT TURNS DEADLY: A CROSS-COUNTRY
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
by
Julie S. Viollaz

Adviser: Dr. Michael G. Maxfield
Habitat destruction and pollution are two of the main causes for the decline of the planet’s
biodiversity. Yet environmentalists are now recognizing that illegal wildlife killings, both
poaching and retaliatory killings due to human-wildlife conflict, are perhaps the next major
threat. Biologists have researched illegal killings and their effect on species conservation, but
few researchers have applied criminological principles of crime reduction to them. This research
will explore the situational factors that drive retaliatory leopard killings in parts of South Africa,
Kenya, and India. These factors, human and environmental, include local expectations from
wildlife, sensitivity to environmental issues, communication between conservation actors,
leopard abundance, land-use overlap between humans and leopards, and poor leopard habitat
conditions. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (interview and media article
content analysis and logistic regression and non-parametric tests) are used to understand which
factors best predict where human-leopard conflicts will arise and deteriorate into retaliatory
leopard killings. Strategies to reduce the incidence of retaliatory leopard killings are suggested
based on the 25 techniques of situational crime prevention.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Problem Statement

Human-encroachment on wilderness and pollution from industrial activities are two of
the main causes for the rapid decline of the planet’s biodiversity. Yet, environmentalists are now
recognizing that illegal wildlife killings, including poaching, are perhaps the next major threat to
biodiversity (Al-Johany, 2007, p. 1; Clarke & de By Rolf, 2013; Ghoddousi, Hamidi, Ghadirian,
Ashayeri, & Khorozyan, 2010; The Huffington Post, 2012, January 24; Wikramanayake et al.,
1998). Accurate figures on how much illegal wildlife and wildlife products are smuggled
internationally are hard to come by because of the secretive nature of the trade, but a 2011
estimate by the Center for International Policy suggests these products bring in $7.8 to $10
billion U.S. dollars annually (Haken, 2011, February).
Biologists have researched illegal killings and their effect on species conservation, but
few researchers have applied criminological principles of crime reduction to them (Green, 2011;
Mfunda & Roskaft, 2010; Pires & Moreto, 2011). The few criminologists who have studied
illegal wildlife killings have tended to focus on the markets for poached goods, arguing that
stopping the demand for such goods would take away the incentive for illegal killings
(Schneider, 2008). Unfortunately, this framework only applies to offenders wishing to sell or
trade the animal they illegally kill.
Illegal leopard killings do not entirely fit this profile. Although leopards are illegally
killed for the traditional medicine trade and trophy hunting (where leopard parts end up on a
market), human-wildlife conflict (H-WC) appears to drive the majority of leopard killings. For
1

H-WC cases, the goal is to get rid of a “problem” leopard and destroy any evidence a kill took
place.
This research will explore the situational factors that drive retaliatory leopard killings in
parts of Kenya, South Africa, and India and determine whether the majority of these killings in
the study areas are a result of H-WC. These situational factors, human and environmental,
include local expectations from wildlife, sensitivity to environmental issues, communication
between conservation actors, leopard abundance, land-use overlap between humans and
leopards, and poor leopard habitat conditions. They have ecological significance for leopards and
represent human and environmental conditions under which human-leopard conflicts (H-LCs)
are likely to occur. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (interview and media
article content analysis and logistic regression, spatial analysis, and non-parametric tests) are
used to understand which factors best predict where H-LCs will arise and deteriorate into
retaliatory leopard killings. This study will use small-scale collared leopard data from a local
conservation non-profit organization (NPO) for its spatial and statistical modeling, one of the
few reliable and systematic records of unnatural leopard deaths. The ultimate goal of this
research is to use the techniques of situational crime prevention (SCP) to reduce the number of
illegal leopard killings driven by H-WC in the study areas.

2

Table 1.1. Table of abbreviations and acronyms
Phrase or organization
Case-control design
Community-based conservation
Human-leopard conflict
Human-wildlife conflict
International Union for the Conservation of Nature
Kenya Wildlife Service
Non-profit organization
Situational Crime Prevention
South African National Biodiversity Institute
The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species
The National Vegetation Map of South Africa
Project
The Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 (India)
World Wildlife Fund

Abbreviation or acronym
CCD
CBC
H-LC
H-WC
IUCN
KWS
NPO
SCP
SANBI
CITES
VEGMAP
WPA
WWF

Defining illegal killings

Illegal killings are part of the broader category of environmental crime just beginning to
be recognized within the field of criminology (Pires & Moreto, 2011). Interpol defines
“environmental crime” as “any breach of a national or international environmental law or treaty
that exists to ensure the conservation and sustainability of the world's environment, biodiversity,
or natural resources" (Interpol, 2010-2011). This type of crime includes the illegal wildlife trade,
illegal logging or fishing, environmental degradation through pollution and negligence, and theft
of natural resources.
Within environmental crime, the term “illegal killings” refers to two separate phenomena:
poaching and retaliatory killings. Although the two words refer to the same action, killing
wildlife illegally, they represent different reasons for the behavior.
The New Oxford American Dictionary (2007) defines poaching as “illegally hunting or
3

catching (game or fish) on land that is not one’s own, or in contravention of official protection.”
This definition does not include whether the killing or catching is for profit, but the word’s
connotation suggests the poacher benefits financially from the behavior (hence the motivation to
kill). The term can also be applied to flora, as is the case for illegal cacti trading for xeriscaping
in the Chihuahuan Desert regions of the United States (U.S.) and Mexico (Green, 2011; Robbins
& Barcenas, 2003, January).
The definition originates from the first recorded discussion of poaching which took place
in feudal England under the early Saxon Kings (Farnsworth, 1980). At the time, landowners
owned the wildlife passing on their land. The King owned any remaining non-cultivated land and
its wildlife. Wealthy merchants living in town could not hunt because they did not own large
rural lands on which to do so. Discussions and on-going rebellions eventually led to rule changes
to accommodate the hunting needs of the more powerful urban political and economic figures of
the time (Farnsworth, 1980).
Although this definition provides a basic understanding of the word, it overlooks
different forms of poaching. The term “poaching” can be applied to a range of behaviors, from a
tourist buying an ivory figurine in a country where ivory sales are illegal, to a smuggler carrying
hundreds of live reptiles in his suitcase through customs with the intent to sell them to collectors.
Lin (2005) groups poaching behaviors into four categories:


(1) Low volume, low value tourist poaching cases



(2) High volume, low value opportunistic poaching/smuggling




Example: parrot poaching by local residents in Bolivia (Pires & Clarke, 2011)

(3) High volume, high value poaching/smuggling by organized crime syndicates
4



Example: abalone poaching in South Africa (Wildlife warden 1, personal
communication, August 4, 2011)



(4) Low volume, high value “poaching to order” cases for collectors


Example: the exotic “status pet” trade for big cats in the Middle East (Warchol,
Zupan, & Clack, 2003)

Retaliatory killings are illegal wildlife killings undertaken in retaliation for some form of
H-WC, generally animal attacks on livestock or people or destruction of crops. Some examples
of retaliatory killings include crop farmers who attack elephants that trample their fields or
livestock farmers who illegally kill wolves in North America or leopards in Asia or Africa when
they eat their livestock (Bakano, 2011; Bjorge & Gunson, 1985; Ogra, 2008). Retaliatory killings
also take place after animal attacks on humans, including leopard attacks on humans in Indian
villages (Gupta Kashyap, 2012, March 6).
In contrast to “poaching”, retaliatory killings are not done for profit. Individuals who
engage in these H-WC driven killings do not consider themselves poachers because they kill to
get rid of a problem animal (or “pest,” as they call them), not to profit from its carcass (NPO
worker 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). Most often they dispose of the animal’s
carcass in the bush to get rid of any evidence of the killing. Their objective tends to be selfpreservation, to avoid future crippling losses of farm animals, and/or anger at being attacked or
having their property attacked (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). Some
NPOs suggest that leopards killed in retaliation are trafficked for profit, but these cases remain
anecdotal (NPO worker 2, personal communication, September 2013) (World Wildlife Fund &
Global Species Program, N.d.).
5

The impact of illegal killings

Illegal killings tend to have large measurable economic costs for communities and
countries because of lost revenue from natural resources (Gettleman, 2012b; Interpol, 20102011; Lin, 2005). Environmental impacts, though, are also a major concern, especially as
citizens, governments, and industries are now coming to the conclusion that “it is impossible to
separate economic development from the environment and that environmental degradation can
undermine economic development” (U.S. Geological Survey, 2007, p. 1). A simple example of
this is that decreasing numbers of leopards due to illegal killing results in less tourism revenue as
fewer tourists go on safari and visit reserves where wild animal populations are dwindling. Less
tourism means fewer job opportunities for local residents while tourism profits cannot be used to
build up the nation’s economy. The following section describes some of the economic costs of
poaching, which have been measured in the literature (while the costs of retaliatory killings have
not), and then moves on to the less tangible environmental costs of both poaching and retaliatory
killings.

How much does poaching bring in?

The trade in wildlife and wildlife products is, first of all, a legal trade (TRAFFIC, 2012c).
In the 1990s, TRAFFIC (2012c) calculated the value of legal wildlife products imported globally
to be around $160 billion U.S. dollars, but, as of 2009, it had grown to over $323 billion.

6

It is difficult to accurately estimate of how much poaching takes place worldwide
because it is an underground economy. Even when estimates are made, they tend to differ
widely. A 2011 estimate by the Center for International Policy suggests that the sale of illegal
wildlife and wildlife products (excluding timber and fisheries) brings in between $7.8 and $10
billion U.S. dollars in annual profits (Haken, 2011, February). Other estimates put that number at
anywhere between $5 billion U.S. dollars and $20 billion U.S. dollars a year (Wyler & Sheikh,
2008) and $30 billion U.S. dollars a year (Bauerlein, 2005, August/July).

Illegal leopard killings and species conservation

The current main threats to leopards are habitat loss and fragmentation through human
encroachment and illegal killings, primarily retaliatory killings, both of which are intrinsically
linked since encroachment contributes to H-WCs that trigger retaliatory killings (Al-Johany,
2007; Ghoddousi et al., 2010; Wikramanayake et al., 1998). As with many other species, the
impact of these threats on leopard populations is difficult to assess because they often occur
conjointly and aggravate each other (Pires, 2011; Poudyal, Rothley, & Knowler, 2009).
Studies of the consequences of illegal leopard killing have long overlooked its broader
ecosystem impact. These broader ecosystem impacts include infanticide1 and less successful
breeding (Balme, Hunter, & Slotow, 2007; Chapron et al., 2008; Packer et al., 2009). Leopards
depend on stable long-term inter-leopard relationships to maintain their territories and insure
1

The killing of a female leopard’s litter by an incoming and non-related male. This behavior
ensures that only a dominant male’s genes will be passed on to the next generation. After an
episode of infanticide, female fertility drops until they are sure no new male take-over will occur
(Balme & Hunter, 2013).
7

their own survival. The poaching of a male (or female) leopard leaves a territory vacuum that
increases strife among surrounding leopards and can have serious consequences for population
survival (partly because of infanticide) (Balme, Slotow, & Hunter, 2009).
Illegal leopard killing can also impact the survival of co-dependent species in the food
web and ecosystem (Packer et al., 2009). Current research has only looked at single predatorprey dyads to determine the ecological consequences of poaching within the food chain
(Graham, Beckerman, & Thirgood, 2005), but Graham et al. (2005) suggest that poaching likely
has consequences for trophic2 and symbiotic3 species that researchers should explore.
Adding to the biological difficulties of determining the impact of illegal killings on
leopards and their ecosystem is the lack of reliable leopard population counts (Al-Johany, 2007;
Liberg et al., 2011). A few researchers, including Ghoddousi et al. (2010) & Hussain (2003),
have documented leopard densities in specific areas, but accurate leopard population estimates
do not exist for many other locations, including South Africa (NPO worker 3, personal
communication, July 2011). The International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN)
Red List of Threatened Species currently rates the leopard (Panthera pardus) as “near
threatened” with population numbers “decreasing,” but their evaluation dates from 2008 and is
based on population counts from existing research studies (Henschel, Hunter, Breitenmoser,
Purchase, et al., 2008).

2

Trophic species eat the same prey and are eaten by the same predators (Martinez & Dunne,
n.d.).
3
Symbiotic species are species that need to interact with each other to survive. Symbiotic
relationships can include mutualism (where both species gain something), parasitism (where only
one species gains something and the other is harmed), neutralism (where neither species gains or
loses anything) and commensalism (one species benefits and the other is not harmed) (Meyer,
1998; Theme, 2011).
8

Beyond ecosystem impacts though, researchers are now realizing that concern for the fate
of species and their ecosystems, on which society relies for resources, is no longer limited to
earth scientists and environmentalists (U.S. Geological Survey, 2007, p. 1). Governments are
now realizing that the flow of poached goods between nations has serious economic and social
consequences beyond localized degradation of ecosystems (Gettleman, 2012b; Interpol, 20102011; Lin, 2005). For example, Security Council members officially recognized “the harm
caused by wildlife poaching and trafficking to conservation efforts, rule of law, governance and
economic development” at the United Nations’ General Assembly in September 2012
(TRAFFIC, 2012b, p. 1).

Where do illegal killings occur?

The majority of poaching occurs in third-world countries where biodiversity is high and
enforcement of export laws is low (Duffy, 2010; Lin, 2005). Yet, more than half of poached
wildlife then ends up in large industrialized countries and regions like Europe, Japan, and the
U.S., which account for 60% of the market (Bauerlein, 2005, August/July). Another 25% of
market is in Southeast Asia because of the region’s strong reliance on animal and plant-based
traditional medicine and its large population (Bauerlein, 2005, August/July; Lin, 2005). In
addition, many wildlife rich countries also have their own national trade, such as the illegal
parrot trade for pets in Bolivia (Pires, 2011).
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Retaliatory killings also tend to occur primarily in third-world countries where wild land
is rapidly being developed because of industrialization and population growth (Schaller, 2011).
In these countries, wild animals are being pushed out of their natural habitat and rural
populations are ill equipped for living with these displaced animals (Alexander & Winter, 2011).
With no or little infrastructure in place to deal with H-WCs and limited law enforcement
resources to enforce environmental laws, retaliatory killings can become commonplace.

Where do illegal leopard killings occur?

Leopard poaching and retaliatory killings occur throughout the leopard’s range in mid to
southern Africa, parts of the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (see figure 1.1) (Henschel, Hunter,
Breitenmoser, Pruchase, et al., 2008; Kurvits et al., 2011). In parts of this range, leopard killings
are opportunistic and clustered in areas of H-WCs between farmers/villagers and leopards (J. C.
Ray, Hunter, & Zigouris, 2005, December). Seizure information compiled by the wildlife trade
monitoring network TRAFFIC suggests that there is a commercial trade for leopard skins and
parts, especially in Southeast Asia, but also in parts of Africa (Henschel, 2008; Henschel,
Hunter, Breitenmoser, Pruchase, et al., 2008; Roberts, 2010, October 10; TRAFFIC, 2011). In
the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa, religious groups like the Shembe, use leopard
skins for religious ceremonies (Roberts, 2010, October 10). For example, in Eastern Africa,
military personnel are known to buy leopard skins and illegally import them into Europe
(Henschel, Hunter, Breitenmoser, Pruchase, et al., 2008).

10

Figure 1.1. Leopard (Panthera pardus) range (Panthera, 2015)

Chapter summary

Illegal killings are currently one of the major threats to this planet’s biodiversity. The
term “illegal killings” refers to two separate phenomena with different objectives: poaching and
retaliatory killings. Poaching generally refers to the illegal killing or catching of fauna and flora
for profit. Its severity can range from opportunistic poaching of a few parrots by local residents
to organized crime syndicates smuggling 40 rhino horns through customs. Retaliatory killings
are not for profit and take place in retaliation for some type of H-WC, like wildlife attacks on
crops, livestock, or humans.
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Illegal leopard killings occur throughout the leopard’s range but not all these cases fit the
traditional “poaching to sell model.” A large part of illegal leopard killings are retaliatory
killings for livestock predation where the leopard carcass is destroyed to avoid prosecution. This
study will focus on identifying the human and environmental factors that influence where
retaliatory leopard killings occur and propose SCP measures to reduce their occurrence.
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Chapter 2: Factors contributing to illegal killings generally and illegal leopard killings

The following chapter is separated into sections based on the main motivations for
poaching versus retaliatory killings. The latter part of the chapter then discusses how these
motivations play a role in illegal leopard killings.

Motivations for poaching
Bushmeat hunting

Rural populations illegally hunt a number of species to eat and sell. This phenomenon is
mainly documented for Africa and Southeast Asia (Bikya Masr, 2012; Mfunda & Roskaft, 2010;
Watson, Becker, McRobb, & Kanyembo, 2013). The meat of wild ungulates is less fatty than
that of domestic livestock and its annual weight varies less. It therefore provides a richer and
more stable food source for rural populations (Carpaneto & Fusari, 2000). For some local agropastoralists, the number of livestock they own is a token of wealth and they invest any money
they make into buying more livestock. These families would never kill their livestock for food
and obtain all their protein from bushmeat (Mfunda & Roskaft, 2010).
Fuller and Johnson (2005) also found that Zambians consume bushmeat as a show of
status and respect for tradition, much like westerners will pay extra for free-range chicken. In
Zambia, bushmeat is surreptitiously sold door-to-door to trusted customers (along with ivory)
(Fuller & Johnson, 2005). Depending on the location and the cultural practices of its population,
bushmeat hunting can therefore be a strong motivator for poaching.
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The pet trade

Certain species are illegally harvested primarily for the pet trade. These include a large
number of reptiles and amphibians destined for collectors, but also a range of other species that
are sold as part of the exotic pet trade (Webster, 1997, February 7). For example, a 2011 seizure
at Los Angeles International Airport revealed 55 turtles hidden in snack food boxes in two men’s
carry-ons and meant to be sold in the United States (Ng, 2011). Certain species, like the
Mangshan pit viper, are even exclusively poached for the pet trade because they are such a hot
commodity among collectors, bringing in about $1800 to $3250 U.S. dollars per specimen
(TRAFFIC & IUCN, 2008). During CITES’ 40th anniversary meeting in March 2013, delegates
increased the protection of a number of turtle species illegally caught for the pet trade, noting
that the demand for exotic pets is on the rise and that this trade involves more species than the
traditional medicine trade and bushmeat hunting (Bottollier-Depois, 2013).

The traditional medicine trade

The traditional medicine trade drives a large demand for poachers’ illegal wildlife
products in many countries. Traditional healers view health issues as being related to
supernatural forces, social relationships, and relationships with ancestors and use traditional
medicine to cure both medical and symbolic4 ailments (Bye & Dutton, 1991; Whiting et al.,
2011). It is this faith in supernatural forces and the lack of reliable access to Western medicine in
4

Symbolic ailments include ancestral conflicts, relationship problems, poor fortune etc. (Bye &
Dutton, 1991; Whiting, Williams, & Hibbitts, 2011).
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many areas that guarantees a continuous and lucrative demand for poached wildlife (Interpol,
2010-2011). About 80% of the world’s population relies on traditional medicine (Akerele, 1993;
Botha, Witkowski, Shackleton, & Fairbanks, 2004), 27 million of which live in South Africa
(Botha et al., 2004; Mander, 1998), and that number is increasing (Botha, 1998).
What animal species are poached for the trade depends on the beliefs of local
populations. At least 232 species of wild vertebrates and several species of marine mollusks are
used in South Africa for the traditional medicine trade (Whiting et al., 2011). Rhino horn thefts
in Africa, Asia, and in European museums, for example, are driven by the Asian belief that
powdered rhino horn can cure cancer, as well as act as an aphrodisiac and increase men’s sex
drive (Agence France Presse, 2011c; BBC News, 2011, July 25; Lyall, 2011, August 26;
Thomet, 2011). This belief is especially difficult to dispel as it has existed in Asian culture for
more than 1,000 years (Agence France Presse, 2011b). Currently, the price of a pound of rhino
horn powder is higher than the price of gold and cocaine.

The pelt trade

A number of animal species are poached for their pelts. These include alligators, big cats,
otters, and snakes, among others. Some are hunted for the fashion industry while others are
hunted for traditional costumes used in religious or cultural rituals, or as signs of status. Tibetans,
for example, use otter pelts as trim on traditional costumes and also make a warm jacket called a
“bhatta” out of them (TRAFFIC, 2011). Crocodiles, on the other hand, are primarily poached to
make crocodile handbags and other derivative products, but their numbers in the wild have
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stopped declining since the creation of legal crocodile farms that raise the species solely to sell
its skin to the fashion industry (Santini, 2013).

Trophy hunting

Trophy hunting is another reason for poaching. Many big game “status species” that
hunters get a thrill out of shooting are now endangered (IUCN, 2012). Game farm owners must
therefore find creative and illegal ways to continue these hunts. A recent South African scandal,
for example, revealed that a game farm owner was buying rhinos and other wild animals from
zoos, auctions, and private owners for poachers and tourists to shoot on his game farm (Agence
France Presse, 2011d; Bangkok Post, 2011, September 25). Captive lion breeding is common in
South Africa where 60% of lions live in captivity to be released into the wild for trophy hunts
(Liou, 2012). Although this constitutes a much smaller threat to species because of stricter
regulations for hunting permits and trophy exports, illegal trophy hunting still exists as game
farms and hunters find loopholes to circumvent enforcement (Bangkok Post, 2011, September
25; CITES Secretariat, n.d.; Service & Authority, 2003).

Motivations for retaliatory killings
Human-Wildlife Conflict

Perhaps the most problematic motivation for illegal wildlife killings is H-WC. These
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conflicts can result in retaliatory killings that endanger species’ survival. Population growth and
expanding industrial activities bring humans and wildlife into increasing contact, sparking
competition between them for limited natural resources, including land (Graham et al., 2005).
The most common types of H-WC include human encroachment on or destruction of wildlife
habitat and the destruction of crops or the killing of humans or livestock by wildlife. Elephants,
for example, cause extensive damage to crops when they trample fields looking for food and
become aggressive when approached or chased off, sometimes killing or injuring villagers
(Bakano, 2011; Watts, 2013).
Previous management of these conflicts has been heavily biased towards the social and
economic needs of humans, with little regard for its impact on wildlife (Graham et al., 2005). For
example, the logging of rainforests, which has benefited local human populations financially, is
also causing numerous wildlife species to become extinct (Polidoro et al., 2010, April). Some
other examples include the hunting of bears in New Jersey when they stray near human houses to
eat garbage (Petty, 2012) or the killing of sharks after shark attacks or sightings near touristladen beaches in Australia (Coots, 2012).
In the past, H-WCs have been limited to small geographic regions and therefore have
only had localized impacts on global biodiversity. The growing expansion of human activities
means that these conflicts are now occurring all over the world and, if managed incorrectly, have
the potential to wipe out a much larger number of species (Secretariat of the Convention on
Biological Diversity & United Nations Environment Programme, n.d.). The retaliatory killing of
“problem animals” could become one of the biggest causes of species extinction given its
geographical scope and the number of species it affects.
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Factors that contribute to H-WC and retaliatory leopard killings

Several factors increase the likelihood that humans will enter into conflicts with wildlife.
These include ecological factors that shape animals’ behavior so they are more likely to
encounter humans and human factors where humans behave in ways that increase contact with
wildlife. Human factors include habitat destruction and fragmentation, economic strain, and
misguided expectations of predation losses. Ecological factors include the large home ranges of
carnivores, their opportunistic hunting patterns, and fluctuations in natural prey.

Habitat destruction and fragmentation

The first way in which humans can exacerbate H-WC is through direct habitat
destruction5 (Al-Johany, 2007). For example, in a study in the Annapurna Conservation Area of
Nepal, local residents caused damage to the fauna by cutting firewood in the area, making it
harder for the snow leopard to find cover when it hunts6 (Oli, Taylor, & Rogers, 1994). By
cutting firewood, local Nepalese reduced the size of functional snow leopard habitat. As a result,
more snow leopards have to successfully hunt food in a smaller geographical area with less prey,
since a smaller habitat supports less prey. Furthermore, a reduction in habitat size makes it easier

5

There are multiple components to wildlife habitat integrity: these include the size of habitat, the
degree of degradation, fragmentation, and the connectivity to other habitat blocks
(Wikramanayake et al., 1998). Human activity and high human densities can affect every one of
these aspects of habitat integrity.
6
Although the focus of this research is on leopards (Panthera pardus), snow leopard (Panthera
uncia) research is included because the two species are genetically very similar and suffer from
the same H-WC and conservation issues (Yu & Zhang, 2005).
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for poachers to find snow leopards because they have less ground to cover, putting an added
strain on the species (Henschel, 2008).
If Nepalese snow leopards are not able to find enough food in their new reduced habitat,
they will choose one of two options. One, they will move to another more suitable habitat, if it
exists, or two, they will start roaming human-inhabited areas in search of food. For leopards, the
problem with moving to a more suitable habitat is that they are running out of them. Recent
evidence from researchers with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) shows that changing weather
patterns due to climate change are pushing forests further into the mountains and causing alpine
habitat losses for leopards (this added to the existing losses from human destruction) (Agence
France Presse, 2012a; Forrest et al., 2012).
Direct destruction, though, is not the only thing reducing the leopard’s habitat. The world
is experiencing large amounts of indirect habitat loss through human encroachment and
disturbance (Gill, Norris, & Sutherland, 2001). Al-Johany (2007) describes how, in Saudi
Arabia, leopards have left several areas where they once used to live because of human
influences like roads and the continuous hunting of ibex and hyrax (their prey) by local residents.
The effect of such indirect habitat destruction can be seen in Kenya. The “critical human
density” for leopards is the human density at which there is a 50% probability of leopard
extinction. For Kenyan areas with no bushmeat hunting, this number is 900 inhabitants per
square kilometer. Having more than 900 human inhabitants per square kilometer in those areas
will drive out leopards because there will not be enough resources to sustain both. This “critical
human density” value is even lower in areas where residents depend on bushmeat for protein and
thereby dip into the leopard’s prey population (Woodroffe, 2000 in (Henschel, 2008)).
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Moving to another habitat to avoid human disturbance also has a higher cost for species
like leopards that feed on migratory prey because their prey species may not move with them
(Gill et al., 2001). Different species have different “critical human density” values. Wildebeest
for example, might be able to survive in an area with more than 900 humans per square kilometer
when leopards cannot. If the leopard moves to avoid human disturbance, it will no longer have
access to the wildebeest population it usually feeds on. With less food, a leopard has lower
chances of both survival and reproductive success. Interference competition7 only aggravates
these problems when, for example, tigers living in the same areas as leopards also depend on the
same food source (Odden et al., 2010).
Furthermore, a leopard that moves to a new habitat because of habitat destruction or
encroachment (assuming such a habitat is both suitable and available) has to carve itself a new
territory by fighting territorial battles with current leopard residents or rival species (i.e. tigers or
lions) (du Preez, Loveridge, & Macdonald, 2014). Although rival species can live in the same
habitat with sufficient cover to avoid each other, they can also force leopards to move to
marginal and less suitable habitat (Hamilton, 2014). The stress of human disturbance, less
suitable habitat, and fighting for new territory can have severe fitness costs for a leopard. These
costs include reduced prey intake, increased vigilance levels, higher risk of falling ill, and
reduced levels of parental care, all of which can contribute to less reproductive success and
possibly death (Gill et al., 2001).
Habitat fragmentation also has direct implications for population health. The more
fragmented leopard habitat is, the higher the risk of patch distribution, where leopard populations
7

A form of resource competition between species where “one species imposes a cost on another
by limiting its foraging ability” (Odden, Wegge, & Fredriksen, 2010, p. 875).
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exist in different areas without any contact with each other because no corridors remain between
habitats (Zeller, Nijhawan, Salom-Perez, Potosme, & Hines, 2011). This leaves a leopard
population even more vulnerable to extinction through illness, environmental disaster, or simple
genetics because of a lack of genetic diversity (Yiming, Zhongwei, Qisen, Yushan, & Niemela,
2003; Zeller et al., 2011). Leopard populations in the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces of
South Africa are already at risk of extinction because of this lack of genetic diversity (McManus,
Dalton, et al., 2015).
If a leopard cannot move to a less fragmented and disturbed habitat, it must turn to
alternative prey. Unfortunately, fragmented and disturbed habitats support smaller amounts of
wild prey because of size constraints and the out migration of prey species that can find
alternative habitat. Since human encroachment is a common reason for habitat fragmentation,
and humans often bring livestock and pets with them, a leopard stuck in a disturbed habitat will
often turn to those animals for food (Athreya & Belsare, 2007). Livestock and pets make
excellent prey because they have limited survival instincts; these were bred out of them after
generations of human dependence (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). By
introducing livestock and pets into the leopard’s shrinking habitat, humans have engineered the
main reason for H-WC, livestock predation.

Economic strain

Livestock predation, although a problem, would not aggravate agro-pastoralists as much
as it does if it was not for the economic strain under which they live (Butler, 2000; Erasmus,
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2011, January 21). In agro-pastoralist communities, the loss of even a small number of livestock
a year to carnivores can have serious economic consequences8 and can result in negative
attitudes toward wildlife and conservation in general (Mishra, 1982; Upreti, 1986 in (Oli et al.,
1994)).9 Near Serengeti National Park in Tanzania the mean annual livestock loss per affected
household was 5.3. The cash value for this amount of livestock is about two-thirds of the local
average annual income (Holmern, Nyahongo, & Roskaft, 2007). In Zimbabwe, the average
livestock loss for households was $13 U.S. dollars or 12% of a family’s annual income (Butler,
2000). In Nepal, that same value for the winter months, the harshest for subsistence livelihoods,
represented a quarter of the average Nepalese’ annual income (Oli et al., 1994). This level of
economic impact is not limited to carnivores: elephants in Uttarakhand, India, cause crop farmers
to lose an average of 20 to 50% of their anticipated crop yield (Ogra, 2008).
Unfortunately, leopards tend to kill some of the most expensive livestock, like cattle and
donkeys (Butler, 2000), meaning agro-pastoralists resent them even more than other conflictcausing species. Hill (2004) notes that people’s perception of how much danger a species poses
depends on the species’ visibility (i.e. size), the degree to which it is dangerous to humans, and
the degree of control that people feel they can have over its activities. Leopards invite resentment
from farmers on all these levels because they are larger animals, can easily kill a human, and are

8

Losses to wildlife, though, are not just economic. They can include loss of education for
children who end up having to guard their parents' fields or livestock, or loss of life or health if
one is attacked by wildlife or develops a disease like malaria from increased night work to guard
crops or livestock (Hill, 2004; Ogra, 2008).
9
Surprisingly, in Sweden and Norway, attitudes towards carnivores were not related to carnivore
abundance or experience of livestock losses but rather to the country’s environmental policies
and local resident’s trust in government authorities. The more suspicion of government
authorities, the more anthropogenic the attitudes (Gangaas, Kaltenborn, & Andreassen, 2015).
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hard to track and hard to control because wildlife officials are often unwilling to cull them
because of their protected status.

Belief that predation should not occur

The economic strain that livestock losses from carnivores place on farmers causes them
to develop a “leopard or I” survival mentality that fosters their belief that retaliatory killings are
legitimate (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). Agro-pastoralists’ belief that
livestock predation by carnivores should not occur fosters this mentality and increases the
motivations for retaliatory leopard killings. Even though carnivore livestock killings represent a
small percentage of stock losses compared to those from disease (especially tick fever in South
Africa) (Hemson, Maclennan, Mills, Johnson, & Macdonald, 2009), livestock owners emphasize
that they are a true bane to their livelihood and should not occur (Farmer 2, personal
communication, August 5, 2011; Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011).
Part of the reason for this rancor is farmers’ belief that the government should do more to
stop “its” animals from killing their livestock. This feeling is especially strong in communities
with no farming subsidies (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). When
conservation policies stop farmers from taking direct action against crop-raiding species, they
expect that the government will step in and prevent H-WCs (Hill, 2004). The fact that hunting
permits are now required to hunt animals in many countries reinforces this belief that the
government “owns” the local wildlife (Hemson et al., 2009). For example, Hill (2004)
documented that farmers believed that “the Ugandan government behaves like an irresponsible
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livestock owner" when it does nothing to prevent wildlife from destroying their crops and does
not compensate them for damage, because if a domestic animal were to do the same, its owner is
lawfully required to compensate the injured party (Hill, 2004, p. 282).
Expectations of how leopards should or should not behave often do not take into account
basic ecological principles. To expect no livestock losses to carnivores is unrealistic knowing
that livestock are easy prey and new husbandry methods require less direct supervision of
animals, giving a leopard the opportunity to catch one (Graham et al., 2005). Similarly, agropastoralists are often so enraged by livestock losses that they fail to distinguish signs of leopard
predation from signs of other predators (Government wildlife official 1, personal
communication, July 31, 2011) or make no distinction between the between proximate and
ultimate cause of livestock death (i.e. leopards will often go after sick or weak animals that
would have died anyways) (Butler, 2000; Graham et al., 2005; Oli et al., 1994).

Large home ranges of carnivores

Leopard ecology is partly responsible for making their retaliatory killings more likely.
Their large home ranges (also true for most carnivores) guarantee overlap with human activities
(Graham et al., 2005). The leopard’s adaptable nature also increases the likelihood that it will
come into conflict with humans. Examples of this uneasy co-habitation include leopard attacks
on humans in India when villagers enter the jungle just outside their village to defecate or collect
firewood (Nayak, 2013; Raina, 2011).
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Opportunistic hunting by leopards

The leopard’s opportunistic hunting also makes it more likely to conflict with humans
because humans have introduced livestock, an opportunistic hunters’ dream prey, into the
ecosystem while refusing to recognize that this may result in livestock predation. Leopards will
look to expend the least amount of energy to catch their prey when hunting for the 3 kg of daily
meat they eat (Al-Johany, 2007). Livestock provide an easier food source than wild prey because
they have few instincts to flee (cattle huddle in a pack to protect themselves from predators) and
are usually corralled with no means of escape. Leopards in a location with livestock will
therefore choose it over wild prey. This penchant only increases during the dry and/or winter
season when lack of vegetation cover and decreased availability of seasonal prey can result in
lower hunting success for leopards (Butler, 2000; Oli et al., 1994).
Furthermore, humans have accelerated this prey shift to livestock by hunting the
leopard’s wild prey for bushmeat and legal hunting (Schaller, 2011). Kurvits et al. (2011) state
that the loss of natural prey due to poorly managed hunting is one of the primary threats to snow
leopards and Graham et al. (2005) & Henschel (2008) note that this same problem exists for
leopards. Leopards require medium and large-sized ungulates to eat, types of species that are
often poached for bushmeat in densely populated areas (Henschel, 2008). They cannot subsist on
small-bodied prey alone, although they will shift their prey choice and size when their preferred
prey is not available (Butler, 2000; Henschel, 2008). Part of this shift in prey choice involves
eating non-wild species (i.e. livestock and pets) if this is the next best thing to their preferred
prey (Graham et al., 2005).
25

Introducing livestock into the leopard’s habitat can change predator-prey activity patterns
because the leopard will sync its behavior to mirror that of livestock instead of wild prey to
increase its foraging efficiency (Eriksen et al., 2011). This choice of food can then be passed on
to future generations when raising cubs. In Zimbabwe and Namibia, Stander (1990) (in Butler
(2000)) documented the existence of such “rogue individuals” that consistently attack livestock
rather than wild prey once they have discovered livestock as a food group10. To date, there is no
conclusive evidence that only a small number of rogue leopards attack and kill livestock. When
farmers introduce livestock into an area, leopards will start to eat livestock, especially if wild
prey numbers are declining. Killing leopards in retaliation for livestock losses is ineffective
because solving the problem would require killing the entire leopard population and all other
carnivore populations in the area (Linnell et al., 1999).

Surplus killing

Surplus killing is, for example, when a leopard enters a sheep corral and kills 10-15 sheep
but eats only one or two (Al-Johany, 2007). Farmers in the Western Cape Province of South
Africa describe this phenomenon by saying leopards are thirsty for blood and go into a killing
frenzy at the sight/smell of it (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). Linnell et
al. (1999), though, suggests that this behavior is adaptive and occurs in other large carnivore
species like wolves, cougars, and grizzly bears, and among small carnivores that cache carcasses

10

Stander (1990) (in Butler (2000)) and Linnell, Odden, Smith, Aanes, and Swenson (1999)
suggest that these individuals tend to be males but find no evidence that these individuals have
less hunting skill because they are young, injured, or old.
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for later. This behavior is not often seen in the wild for lack of opportunity because wild prey
rarely cluster together when attacked (unlike livestock). Agro-pastoralists, though, are further
angered by the waste and high cost such surplus killings cause (Al-Johany, 2007). Surplus
killings foster a deep resentment of leopards among affected farmers, which can then degenerate
into retaliatory killings.

General illegal killings versus species-specific illegal killings

The main problem with looking at illegal wildlife killings as a general phenomenon is
that each species is illegally killed for very specific reasons. Looking at illegal killings as a
whole is therefore ineffective in coming up with a targeted solution to the problem. For example,
rhinos are primarily killed for the traditional medicine trade, with the profits from this trade
going towards all sorts of organized crime activities (Gettleman, 2012a). Although rhino
poaching is, theoretically, a subset of general poaching, looking at it from this perspective is
simply too broad, resulting in general solutions that are ill suited to rhinos. Solutions like
preemptively dehorning rhinos or covering their horns in fluorescent dye that shows up at
customs checkpoints (Agence France Presse, 2011a; Gerardy, 2010), are not transferable to say,
Mangshan Pit Viper poaching, which is done primarily for the pet trade and where the whole
snake is smuggled out of China alive (TRAFFIC & IUCN, 2008).
Even among animals illegally killed for the same reason, like H-WC, the solutions for
each species are different. Compare, for example, retaliatory elephant killings where farmers kill
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elephants that trample their crops11 (Bakano, 2011; Chadwick & Winter, 2010; K. Ray, 2012;
Watts, 2013) and retaliatory lion killings in Kenya where livestock owners shoot livestock-eating
lions (Hunter, 2012; Lion Guardians, 2012). For the elephants, the Kenya Wildlife Service
(KWS) chose to remove them from the Narok region, which could no longer support such a large
pachyderm population, and transport them to a wilder location, Maasai Mara National Park
(Bakano, 2011). For the lions, an NPO chose to train local Maasai warriors to monitor lion
movements using radio-collars and educate their fellow villagers about how to prevent livestock
losses using predator proof corrals and better husbandry techniques (Hunter, 2012; Lion
Guardians, 2012).
The choice to relocate the elephants but not the lions stems from the difference in the
ecology of each species. Lions are territorial while elephants are not (African Elephant Specialist
Group, Species Survival Commission, & IUCN, 2011; Funston, Mills, & Biggs, 2001).
Relocating lions to a different habitat is fraught with risk because of the high chance of death and
stress from fighting for a new territory with the current lion residents of that area (Dloniak,
2012). Second, there are two different ecological phenomena driving the H-WCs here. H-WC
can occur when a species’ population is too large to survive in a particular habitat, like with the
elephants in Kenya (Bakano, 2011), but it can also occur because humans introduce an easier
prey into an ecosystem, like with lions and livestock in Kenya (Al-Johany, 2007). Each scenario
requires a different response. Although the motivation to illegally kill lions and elephants
appears to be the same (i.e. H-WC), the complexity of the environment in which these killings
take place requires different solutions for each species.
11

In Sumatra, elephants knock down palm trees to eat heart of palm, a favorite food and end up
destroying farmers’ palm oil plantations (Watts, 2013).
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Even among carnivore-human conflicts, the ecology of each carnivore species makes
cross-species comparisons difficult and questionable without studying each individual carnivore
first. Leopards, for example, are some of the most versatile big cats in terms of habitat (Bailey,
2005; Panthera, 2015). This makes them more likely to adapt to human encroachment on their
territory than lions, for example. As a result, you would expect leopards to move, if possible,
before they remain near humans and resort to eating their livestock from lack of wild prey.
Lions, on the other hand, may have a harder time finding an alternate appropriate habitat and so
may resort to eating local pastoralists’ livestock earlier than leopards. Female lions also tend to
hunt in packs (Funston et al., 2001), while leopards hunt alone. An incident of lion predation can
therefore result in more dead livestock and can have a larger impact on local livestock operations
than a case of leopard predation.
All these ecologically driven differences in carnivore-human conflicts are hypothetical
because no comparison studies have yet been done. Given this lack of research, though, it seems
unwise to group carnivore-human conflicts together. In fact, previous research suggests that
extrapolation of solutions from one species to another is often ineffective (Chapron et al., 2008).
Furthermore, SCP, the framework on which this study is based, emphasizes the need to look at
specific crimes when coming up with crime prevention techniques to better target the prevention
methods (Clarke, 1983; Cornish & Clarke, 1987). As such, a researcher using SCP would
differentiate between burglaries of retail establishments vs. burglaries of single-family houses
(Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2013). Given all of the above, this research will focus
only on illegal leopard killings.
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Motivations for illegal leopard killings

Although illegal leopard killings occur across the leopard’s range, many motivations for
illegal killings are locally driven either because the motivation only exists in a small
geographical area or because offenders only kill a limited number of leopards. As such, the
following section separates motivations into minor threats to leopard conservation versus major
threats. A minor threat is any threat that is geographically limited or affects such a small number
of leopards that it does not seriously threaten the species. This assessment of the scope of leopard
poaching is based on the current literature from the fields of biology, anthropology, criminology,
and agricultural studies.

Small-scale threats to leopards by illegal killing motivation
Bushmeat hunting (Africa and India)

Although leopards live in areas where bushmeat hunting is documented (Africa and
India) and they would provide adequate lean meat for consumption (Bikya Masr, 2012;
Carpaneto & Fusari, 2000; Mfunda & Roskaft, 2010), they tend not be sought after for bushmeat.
Carpaneto and Fusari (2000) found that most hunters in central-western Tanzania ate or sold
about 73% of their catch while the remaining 27% of their catch were from animals they hunted
to protect their crops or livestock and was not meant for human consumption. Carnivores tended
to fall into the latter category. They are rarely killed for bushmeat because of cultural taboos
associated with eating them and the fact that many local residents do not like the taste of their
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meat. The only exception is the African civet (Civettictis civetta), eaten by local residents in
Tanzania (Carpaneto & Fusari, 2000). Thus, leopards are not directly at risk from bushmeat
hunting, but they are indirectly hurt when hunters kill their prey species.

The pet trade (Middle East)

Big cat poaching for the exotic pet trade does exist but is of limited conservation impact
for leopards because of the small numbers of animals involved. Warchol et al. (2003) found
evidence of a “status pet” market for large cats and reptiles in the Middle East. This trade also
seems to exist in New York City, where a Harlem man was arrested in 2003 for keeping a fullgrown tiger in his apartment that he had raised from a cub (CNN, 2003). Occasional stories like
this crop up in the news, but no comprehensive study has been done to determine the extent and
locations of this trade. Given how impractical it is to keep an aggressive large cat as a pet,
though, this motivation for poaching leopards is probably limited.

The traditional medicine trade (Africa and Southeast Asia: primary receiving countries)

Some leopards may be illegally hunted for the traditional medicine trade. Leopard skins
and body parts are traded for traditional medicine because users believe owning these items will
provide them with the animal’s strength (Whiting et al., 2011). Henschel (2008) described a
regional market in the Congo Basin for leopard skins, claws, and canine teeth for the traditional
medicine trade, as did Al-Johany (2007) in Saudi Arabia. John (2014) also found this to be true
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for leopard claws, skulls, canine teeth, and pelts in Southeast Asia. Reports of search and seizure
by government authorities suggest that middlemen in Southeast Asia smuggle leopard parts for
the traditional medicine trade to countries where demand is high.
Several pieces of information, though, suggest that leopard poaching for the traditional
medicine trade is limited and may not be a major threat to leopard survival. Whiting et al.
(2011)’s study of the Faraday market in South Africa found that most of the 32 traders who
offered leopard products sold small pieces of leopard skin or bones/claws/teeth, rather than
whole carcasses. These traders tended to run small cash-strained businesses where their ability to
obtain leopard products depended on proximity to leopard habitat or available disposable income
to buy inventory or travel to hunt a leopard (Botha, 1998; Botha et al., 2004; Whiting et al.,
2011). Furthermore, not all leopard parts they sold came from illegally killed leopards, some
came from animals that died of natural causes (Whiting et al., 2011).
This suggests that the number of leopards being poached specifically for the traditional
medicine trade may be relatively small, as hundreds of small pieces of leopard skin could have
come from one carcass. In addition, most traders indicated that, although they knew of
commercial gatherers for traditional medicine ingredients (an inevitable by-product of its
lucrative profits), they generally did not buy from them, because they were unsure their products
were genuine and/or purified according to traditional rituals (Botha, 1998). Since most traders do
not have the financial resources to travel long distances to collect specimens (Botha, 1998; Botha
et al., 2004), it appears that traditional healers are only a small-scale threat to leopards.
Traditional healers’ belief that they are conservationists meant to “carry the medicinal plants and
animals into the future” reinforces this (Botha, 1998, p. 631).
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The pelt trade (Southeast Asia and South Africa)

Poaching for pelts is perhaps one of the more common motivations for illegal leopard
killings given the numbers of pelts intercepted by law enforcement authorities, primarily in
Southeast Asia (TRAFFIC, 2011). Large numbers of leopard pelt seizures have taken place in
India, China, Thailand, and Nepal with smaller numbers occurring in select African countries
(see table A1 in the Appendix) (Tsabedze, 2011, November 25). Poaching for pelts is common in
large parts of India and Myanmar for leopards (Deccan Chronicle, 2012, January 6; John, 2014;
Platt, 2012) and in Baltistan, Pakistan, in winter for snow leopards (Hussain, 2003). Snow
leopards are caught in leg snares and clubbed to death or starved so their pelt is not damaged.
The pelts are then taken to a market in Peshawar for domestic buyers and in the Arab Gulf states
and Europe for foreign buyers. A well-kept snow leopard pelt can fetch $400 U.S. dollars in
Skardu, Pakistan, an amount equal to a year's cash income for most local families (Hussain,
2003). Tibetans also collect snow leopard skins to use as trim or be sown into the backs of
traditional costumes worn in Sichuan Province, China (TRAFFIC, 2011). In India, leopards are
killed in similar ways to snow leopards but are also poisoned with over-the-counter pesticides
like carbofuran (Hindustan Times, 2013). Their pelts can sell for $10,000 to $14,000 U.S. dollars
(Platt, 2012).
Members of the Shembe religious group in the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa
also kill leopards illegally to wear their skins during religious ceremonies as a sign of their love
of nature (Roberts, 2010, October 10). They do not believe they are diminishing leopard
populations because their leader, Isaiah Shembe, has the power to create more leopards. Since
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leopard skins cost about 6,000 South African Rand (about $730 U.S. dollars), owning one is
viewed as a sign of wealth and respect, increasing their demand (Roberts, 2010, October 10).
Members of the Zulu tribe also wear leopard pelts as a symbol of power, as do Congolese rebel
army military officers (Roberts, 2010, October 10; Salopek & Olson, 2005). These traditions
present a threat to leopard populations in areas with Shembe and Zulu tribesmen, but this threat
is decreasing as NPOs are successfully working with these communities to replace leopard pelts
with alternatives, including dyed kudu hide (Dickerson, 2011; Mabuse & Ko, 2012; Panthera,
2012).

Trophy hunting

There are two ways in which trophy hunting can contribute to leopard poaching: 1) when
a hunter wants to “bag a leopard”, 2) when a game farm owner shoots a leopard to protect his
legal trophy hunting species. The first is less documented, but a few researchers found evidence
that the historical practice of leopard trophy hunts continues today on a small-scale. Al-Johany
(2007) found that local residents in Saudi Arabia organize hunting parties to kill leopards as a
source of personal pride/honor and to gather their pelts. The CITES leopard export permit
quotas, 150 permits for South Africa in 2012 for example, also suggest that leopards are still
subject to trophy hunting (CITES Secretariat, n.d.; Mabuse & Ko, 2012; Quammen, 2005).
Warchol et al. (2003) found that a small number of adult African cheetahs and leopards are
actually caught alive and sold to game farms for trophy hunting.
The second is a by-product of species-focused conservation policies for the promotion of
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trophy hunting (Hussain, 2003). Part of wildlife tourism revolves around trophy hunting on
commercial game farms or through government-regulated hunts, where legislation conserves
certain species to guarantee thriving game populations for hunts. These ventures attract hunters
based on how easily they can shoot wild game, mainly large ungulates. This gives game farm
owners and local community members, who benefit from the proceeds of a hunt, a reason to
shoot leopards or other carnivores on their property to stop them from eating wild game that
customers/hunters can hunt (Graham et al., 2005; Hussain, 2003). The fact that most large
carnivores are not legal to hunt or are almost impossible to obtain hunting permits for reinforces
this behavior because leopards have no cash value in the eyes of game farm owners.

Large-scale threats to leopards by illegal killing motivation
H-WC and retaliatory killings

The biggest current threat for leopards in Africa and Southeast Asia appears to be
retaliatory killings triggered by H-WC12. This phenomenon is recognized as one of the biggest
threats to wildlife conservation because of the cost preserving wildlife imposes on people in rural
areas (Hill, 2004; Holmern et al., 2007; Wikramanayake et al., 1998). For example, local
residents living near a national park or prime leopard habitat are more likely to experience
livestock losses from leopards or risk being killed by them. A May 2012 newspaper article in
The Star of Kenya described how residents of Gilgil vowed to kill a leopard that killed 24 sheep

12

Retaliatory killings are illegal unless the shooter obtains a permit from the relevant wildlife
authority to kill the “problem leopard.”
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and injured 6 others during a midnight attack (Murage, 2012, May 13). Another article published
in The Tribune of India discussed how a shopkeeper from the Chopda area of Didihat was killed
by a leopard who was later found clutching his body by the neck not far from his shop (Khanna,
2012, January 26). The outcome of these types of incidents can be retaliatory leopard killings. A
March 2012 article in The Indian Express, for instance, reported on a series of leopard killings in
the Assam area where residents, angry after a series of leopard attacks on humans, retaliated by
killing two leopards and eating their meat (Gupta Kashyap, 2012, March 6).

Livestock predation as triggers of retaliatory killings

The main type of H-WC that triggers retaliatory leopard killings is leopard predation on
livestock, which causes serious economic losses for small-scale meat farms (Athreya, Odden,
Linnell, & Karanth, 2010; Kgathi, Mmopelwa, Mashabe, & Mosepele, 2012; King, 2006;
Kurvits et al., 2011; Snow, 2006) (see table 2.1a below for a summary of the events and
conditions necessary for retaliatory leopard killings motivated by leopard livestock predation).
Butler (2000) found that leopards are responsible for 12% of livestock killings in areas bordering
wildlife reserves in Zimbabwe, mainly by jumping into fortified kraals (enclosures) at night. In
South Africa, “Farmers Weekly” magazine (the oldest agriculture magazine in the country)
reported that sheep farms lose 9% of their flock to predators (compared to 6% in the U.S.), while
90% of sheep losses are due to predation (37% for the U.S.) (Bezuidenhout, 2010, August 20).
Agro-pastoralists’ retaliatory behavior can range from direct retaliation by killing a
suspected “problem animal” to indirect retaliation by opposing the creation of wildlife
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sanctuaries or the implementation of other conservation initiatives (Graham et al., 2005). Some
illegal leopard killings fall into the former category of direct retaliatory killings (Kurvits et al.,
2011; Oli et al., 1994). Agro-pastoralists sometimes poison the carcasses of dead livestock to kill
any returning predators. This method is particularly effective for most carnivores because almost
all species return to their kill within 24 hours, and if not, there is always another
predator/scavenger willing to eat the remains (Al-Johany, 2007).
Agro-pastoralists, though, will often not care what animal killed their livestock and will
retaliate against whatever species or individual animal they believe, rather than know, is at fault
(Government wildlife official 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). In the Western Cape
Province of South Africa, some farmers that have experienced stock losses to predators shoot
any leopard that comes onto their property. Since leopards are stealthy and hard to catch, these
farmers will call upon a local community member with specially trained hunting dogs to
organize a leopard hunt (Government wildlife official 1, personal communication, July 31,
2011). In Gabon, local residents resort to snaring leopards on the edges of national parks, where
leopard livestock predation is common. (Henschel, 2008). Both arbitrarily shooting and snaring
leopards are ineffective responses to livestock predation because they indiscriminately target all
leopards. They do not guarantee that the problem leopard has been dealt with and can have
strong negative consequences for leopard population survival (Henschel, 2008).
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Table 2.1a. Summary of events and conditions necessary for an illegal leopard killing driven by
leopard predation on livestock

Pre-leopard
shooting

Leopard

Cattle Farmer

Environment

Roaming far distances
for food

Struggling to make a
living

Seasonality of vegetation
cover

Shooting small prey for
bushmeat

Human encroachment
destroying habitat

Leaving cattle to graze
unsupervised in fields

Overlap of foraging area
with cattle

Trying to avoid human
activity

Small corridors with no
buffer near human
activities
Struggling to find food
because of low wild
prey numbers

Believes should have 0
losses from predators

Wants to expend the
least energy to eat

Kills cattle

Presence of cattle with
no wild instincts (easy
prey)
Feels abandoned by
government

Feeding frenzy and kills
more than eats
The shooting

Leopard returns to kill
within 24 hours

Creation of national
parks sparking H-WC at
park boundary

Wildlife service too
slow or has no
resources to respond

Cornered by farmer

No trust in methods of
wildlife service

Reacts defensively and
attacks

Knows of other farmer
who shot a leopard
without consequence
Knows farmer with
leopard hunting dogs

Female leopard
struggling to stay/get
pregnant because of
malnutrition

Leopard behavior
guarantees return to kill

Leopard’s mountainous
habitat makes it harder to
kill after it discards cattle
carcass permanently
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Shoots leopard
Post-leopard
shooting

N/A

Dumps carcass in bush
to destroy evidence

Loss of breeding female
affects breeding for that
season and/or results in
death of her current cubs
Loss of alpha male
means new male comes
in and kills previous
offspring

N/A

Sells carcass to middle
man (Shembe
tribesman, traditional
medicine user, or
smuggler)

N/A

Profits off leopard kill
if carcass sold

Increase in “pest
species” until food chain
balance is restored

No prosecution /
occasional small fine

New leopard moves into
open territory

Leopard attacks on humans as triggers of retaliatory killings

A different retaliatory killing problem exists in India where leopards attack humans in or
near rural villages (see table 2.1b below for a summary of events and conditions necessary for
retaliatory killings of leopards motivated by leopard attacks on humans). In March 2012, in the
town of Kamrup, villagers killed a leopard that attacked 8 people in a local field (Gupta
Kashyap, 2012, March 6). Not all these cases of human attacks, though, have resulted in the
death of the leopard. A surprising number ended with local residents calling the Indian wildlife
service for help removing the leopard to more remote wilderness (Khanna, 2012, January 26).
The reality of a growing world population and industrialization is that untouched wilderness is
growing scarce, making it more common for humans and animals to co-exist in semi-wild
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terrain. Learning to manage these interactions in non-lethal ways for both humans and leopards
will ensure that H-WC does not result in widespread species extinction.

Table 2.1b. Summary of events and conditions necessary for an illegal leopard killing driven by
a leopard attack on a human

Pre-leopard
shooting

Leopard

Villagers

Environment

Roaming far distances
for food

Living without running
water or indoor
plumbing

Seasonality of vegetation
cover

Travel into forest for
water and
urination/defecation

Overlap of foraging area
with human habitation

Human encroachment
destroying habitat

Trying to avoid human
activity
Travel into forest to
shoot small prey for
bushmeat or collect
firewood

Struggling to find food
because of low wild
prey numbers

Wants to expend the
least energy to eat

Roams near villages
because of stray animal
concentration

Small corridors with no
buffer near human
activities
Nearby national park
with higher
concentration of leopards

Feel abandoned by
government resources
Presence of easy prey
like cattle (no wild
instincts) and feral dogs
(no guardianship) near
villages

Encounters human
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The killing

Startled by human
encounter

Reacts defensively,
attacks and/or kills
human

Wildlife service too
slow or has no
resources to respond

Territorial nature of
leopards guarantees
human perceived as
threat

No trust in methods of
wildlife service
Know of others who
killed a leopard without
consequence

Leopard aggression
towards crowd and
human presence fuels
villagers’ anger

Crowd’s anger at
leopard fuels urge to
kill
Crowd beats or shoots
leopard to death

Post-leopard
shooting

N/A

Crowd feasts on
leopard meat, celebrates

Loss of breeding female
affects breeding for that
season and/or results in
death of her current cubs
Loss of alpha male
means new male comes
in and kills previous
offspring

N/A

Dump carcass in bush
to destroy evidence

N/A

Profit off leopard kill if
carcass sold

Increase in “pest
species” until food chain
balance is restored

No prosecution /
occasional small fine

New leopard moves into
open territory
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Chapter summary

Studying illegal wildlife killing as a broad phenomenon is misguided because the reasons
for illegally killing each species are so specific. Illegal killings require targeted solutions that are
non-transferable between species. Some motivations for illegally killing leopards are locally
driven and affect only a small geographical area or number of leopards. These minor threats to
leopard survival include bushmeat hunting, the pet trade, traditional medicine, the pelt trade, and
trophy hunting.
Major threats to leopard survival include retaliatory killings for livestock predation and
human attacks. These H-LCs are exacerbated by leopard ecology, such as large home ranges and
opportunistic hunting patterns, and human behaviors, like habitat destruction and misguided
expectations of predation losses.
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Chapter 3: Attempts to reduce illegal leopard killings

Prevention methods for illegal leopard killings take many forms and can be tailored to
specific killing motivations. For example, international treaties forbidding the trade in certain
species are primarily meant to control poaching and illegal wildlife trafficking by stopping the
import and export of wildlife. National laws, though, outlaw the catching or killing of wildlife
irrespective of the perpetrator’s motivation, targeting both poaching and retaliatory killings.
Tourism initiatives fulfill the same purpose by giving wildlife value in the eyes of local residents
and dis-incentivizing both poaching and retaliatory killings. Only predation prevention methods
focus solely on limiting H-WC, the immediate precursor event to retaliatory killings.
Few evaluations exist of these prevention methods for illegal killings (Pires & Moreto,
2011). Nevertheless, it is possible to describe some of the successes and failures of wildlife
crime legislation, law enforcement responses, and grass-roots prevention internationally. The
following section begins by describing the prevention efforts that currently exist, then goes on to
explain their pros and cons. Special emphasis is placed on measures that prevent H-WC induced
retaliatory leopard killings because, as discussed in chapter 2, this is deemed to be the biggest
threat to leopard survival.

Legal protection of wildlife

Several basic laws regulate the trade in leopards and their parts and prohibit hunters from
killing leopards without a permit. These laws exist both on the international and the
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national/provincial level. Below is a brief description of the main international agreement,
CITES, and the country-specific laws relevant to this work:

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)

CITES is an international treaty between willing countries that regulates the movement of
wild flora and fauna to prevent the extinction of these species from international trade (CITES
Secretariat, n.d.). All species that are part of CITES (over 30,000) are subject to certain controls
and require specific licenses when they are imported, exported, re-exported, and introduced from
member nations either alive, dead, or as derivative products.
These species are listed in three appendices based on the amount of protection needed.
Appendix I species are at high risk of extinction and cannot be traded barring exceptional
circumstances. In such cases, an export and an import permit are required and the importer must
prove the import will not be detrimental to the survival of the species. Appendix II species are
not necessarily threatened by extinction but their trade needs to be monitored to avoid
unsustainable use. Appendix III species are protected in at least one member country that has
requested the help of other nations in controlling the species’ trade (CITES Secretariat, n.d.).
Each member country is responsible for creating the management structure needed within their
borders to provide these licenses and monitor what effects the trade has on species population
levels.13 This is perhaps one of the major weaknesses of CITES: its enforcement is only as good
as the amount of effort a country puts into creating and monitoring this infrastructure. The

13

South Africa joined CITES in July 1975, India in July 1976, and Kenya in December 1978.
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leopard is part of Appendix I and has been since January 7th, 1975.14 The following countries
have obtained permission to export a select number of leopards in 2012 and 2015 (UNEPWCMC & CITES Secretariat, 2015):

Table 3.1. Number of leopard export permits by country for 2012 and 2015 (no CITES exports
permits given for leopards in 2014)
Country
Botswana
Democratic Republic of
Congo
Central African Republic
Ethiopia
Kenya
Malawi
Mozambique
Namibia
United Republic of
Tanzania
Uganda
South Africa
Zambia
Zimbabwe

2012 export
quota*
130
5

2015 export
quota*
0
0

What products can be exported

40
10
80
50
120
250

0
50
0
0
0
250

500

500

Trophies & skins
Trophies
Trophies & skins
Trophies & skins
Trophies & skins
Trophies (2012, 2015) & skins as
personal effects (2012)
Trophies (2012, 2015) & skins (2012)

28
150
300
500

0
0
0
0

Trophies & skins
Trophies & skins
Trophies & skins
Trophies & skins

Trophies & skins
Skins

* # of specimens.

The National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act of 2004: Threatened or
Protected Species Regulations (South Africa)

The National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act of 2004 consolidated existing
14

This does not mean poaching prevention measures have been successful overall. The IUCN
Red List of Threatened Species explains that, although the leopard is highly adaptable compared
to other big cats and remains widespread in certain parts of its habitat (sub-Saharan Africa), in
other areas (North Africa), leopard subpopulations are on the verge of extinction. There is a
general decline in leopard numbers since 1986 (Henschel, Hunter, Breitenmoser, Purchase, et al.,
2008).
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South African biodiversity legislation and created national standards for how the country’s
different wildlife management authorities should deal with wildlife (Endangered Wildlife Trust
& South African National Biodiversity Institute, 2008). Its provisions for damage causing
animals (including leopards) require the provincial conservation department to decide between
capturing and relocating the animal or culling it. Either option can be carried out by the
department or by an individual to whom they issue a permit for the procedure15. The holder of
this permit can then choose to hunt the damage causing animal using the following methods:
poison, bait and traps (including gin traps), dogs, darting, or shooting (Southern African Legal
Information Institute, 2007). The skins of leopards killed using a damage causing animal permit
cannot be exported outside South Africa (Balme et al., 2009).
Under this legislation, leopards can also be legally hunted for trophies if a hunter
possesses a CITES permit issued by the Province’s conservation department. Only a limited
number of these permits are issued based on how vulnerable the local leopard population is to
extinction (Balme et al., 2009; UNEP-WCMC & CITES Secretariat, 2015). In South Africa,
leopards may not be killed without a permit unless killed in self-defense (where there is an
immediate threat of death) (Southern African Legal Information Institute, 2007).

The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2013 (Kenya)

The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2013 is the long awaited major

15

“In principle, destruction permits are issued only to landowners who demonstrate that a
leopard represents a threat to life or property, and that no alternative non-lethal solutions is
available” (Balme et al., 2009, p. 2683).
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overhaul of the original act of 1976 (Kahumbu, 2013; National Council for Law Reporting,
2013). The act came into effect on January 10th, 2014 (Republic of Kenya, 2013). Its major
revisions include stringent penalties for poaching and restructured governance of wildlife
resources where the regulation and management functions are separate from research (World
Wildlife Fund, 2014).
Under this law, no wildlife can be killed in Kenya without a valid permit, unless in selfdefense. A problem animal, one causing harm to human life or property, can only be killed by a
KWS official with permission from the land owner on which the animal resides (Republic of
Kenya, 2013). If a family experiences a death, an injury, or loss of property as a result of H-WC
and they have taken reasonable measures to protect themselves, they can submit a compensation
claim to the county wildlife conservation authority. The authority will then award fair market
value for damaged property or anywhere from 2 to 5 million Kenyan shillings in death or injury
cases (about $22,000 to $55,000 U.S. dollars) (Republic of Kenya, 2013).
Penalties for illegal hunting, possession of illegal wildlife products, or wildlife trafficking
range from 2 years to life in prison or fines of 1 million to 20 million Kenyan shillings (about
$11,000 to $220,000 U.S. dollars) depending on the conservation status of the animal killed
(Republic of Kenya, 2013). Killing black and white rhinoceros, African elephants, and critically
endangered species results in the harshest penalties. Leopards are a category below this group as
“endangered mammals” (category B). Penalties for killing a leopard without a permit are a fine
of 5 million Kenyan shillings (about $55,000 U.S. dollars) or imprisonment of five years or both
(Republic of Kenya, 2013). The law establishes an inter-agency security team with members of
KWS and the Police Service to apprehend poachers in protected areas. It requires that any KWS
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official conniving with poachers be sacked and property obtained through poaching proceeds be
seized (Kahumbu, 2013).
This act also outlaws livestock grazing in protected areas and bushmeat/subsistence
hunting without a permit, although the penalties for both these offenses are much lighter than for
poaching, usually a fine of up to 100,000 Kenyan shillings (about $1000 U.S. dollars) or
imprisonment for up to 6 months (Republic of Kenya, 2013).

The Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 (India)

The Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 (WPA) was the first piece of wildlife and
environmental conservation legislation passed in India after its independence from British
colonial rule (Misra, 2005). It prohibits the hunting and trafficking of wild animals and their
parts (including trophies), except in cases where the Chief Wildlife Warden believes a wild
animal is dangerous to human life or disabled or diseased beyond recovery (Indian Ministry of
Environment, 1972). The WPA also appoints authorities to manage national parks and wildlife
sanctuaries and prevent illegal killings. Protected species are separated into “schedules,” with
schedules I and II focusing on endangered species (Misra, 2005).
The WPA has been revised multiple times since 1972 to keep pace with changing times
(1982, 1986, 1991, 1993, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013). Revisions included adding more species to
protected lists as they become endangered. India banned all exports of wildlife from the country
in 2000, making its regulations even stricter than that of CITES (Misra, 2005). In 2002, India
upped the penalties for wildlife crimes from 1 to 7 years in prison and a 5000 rupee minimum
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fine (about $80 U.S. dollars) to 3 to 7 years with increased fines based on the severity of the
offense (Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2015). The majority of wildlife trafficking
offenses now require a 5 to 7 year prison sentence (Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests,
2013).
Although public awareness of the legislation has increased, the specifics of what is legal or
illegal under the WPA are poorly understood among the general public (Misra, 2005).
Enforcement is still sporadic with little inter-agency communication, consultation, or joint action
against offenders between the forestry, police, customs, and judiciary departments (Misra, 2005).
Training of enforcement personnel is also limited, especially when it comes to species
identification.16

The effectiveness of laws

Although these laws exist, their effectiveness is highly dependent on how well they are
applied by local law enforcement. Many countries have lacked the political will and public
pressure for enforcing them (Schaller, 2011). For example, a study of ivory trading by Martin
(2010, July-December) found that even though laws prohibit the sale of all ivory in Ghana (even
antique pieces), you still frequently find ivory carvings for sale at markets. Only when law
enforcement actively raided markets for illegal ivory, did sellers stop selling it (Martin, 2010,
16

Another challenge posed by this legislation is how to manage animal species whose
populations have recovered and are now beginning to cause H-WCs where they have surpassed
their habitat’s carrying capacity. This is complicated because some of these animals, like
leopards, are problem animals in certain locations but are also victims of widespread poaching in
other parts of the country.
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July-December).
Previous studies have identified several factors hampering the proper implementation of
wildlife protection laws. Firstly, law enforcement agents must be knowledgeable enough about
these laws and have the proper skills to determine when they have been broken. For example,
customs officials must be able to identify if a species is protected under CITES or local
legislation (Warchol et al., 2003). It can sometimes be very difficult to differentiate between
protected versus non-protected species, especially when few customs officials have the
biological knowledge to do so. The ASEAN-WEN Wildlife Enforcement Network and the
Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network TRAFFIC have created “Identification sheets for wildlife
species traded in Southeast Asia” (see figure 3.1 for an example). These give detailed illustrated
instructions on how to identify each protected species (or their byproducts) and differentiate
them from their non-protected counterparts (TRAFFIC & ASEAN-WEN, 2012).
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Figure 3.1. Example of an identification sheet for the oriental rat snake produced by ASEANWEN and TRAFFIC

Second, many wildlife laws lack legitimacy or importance in the eyes of both the public
and the courts. As a result, the public feels no moral obligation to obey the laws and courts
impose light if any punishment, reinforcing the public’s behavior. For example, in rural Pakistan,
illegal leopard killings occur with the consent of the whole village, despite its illegality. This
collusion makes it all the more difficult to eradicate the custom (Hussain, 2003). In Nepal, the
village elder in a small Gurung village has overruled the countries’ ban on killing leopards and
bears after a leopard killed 21 goats in a day (Adhikari, 2012). Since the government has no
presence in this part of Nepal, retaliatory leopard killings are likely to continue among villagers.
Law enforcement and NPO efforts at the local level should focus on changing mentalities in such
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areas, so local residents understand the importance of abiding by environmental laws for their
region’s economic and biological survival (Pires & Moreto, 2011; K. Ray, 2012).
Even if an offender is reported and caught, most courts do not impose harsh sentences for
wildlife crimes because judges are often unfamiliar with environmental law or are unwilling to
prosecute neighbors in rural areas (Martin, 2010, July-December; Warchol & Johnson, 2009).
For example, an elephant poacher in Ghana received only a small fine and had his rifle
confiscated for killing two elephants in Kakum National Park in 2003 (Martin, 2010, JulyDecember). A farmer who illegally killed two brown hyenas in the Barrydale region of South
Africa (a very rare species) received only a $115 U.S. dollar fine for the killing because the
presiding judge empathized with his stock losses (Government wildlife official 2, personal
communication, August 19, 2011). This sort of behavior from the courts only bolsters local
belief that obeying wildlife laws is unnecessary and opens the door for organized poaching
operations. These operations are more than willing to accept such mild penalties as “the cost of
doing business” because the profits from their hunts generally far outweigh their potential costs
if caught (Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland, 1993).
Thirdly, there is a lack of coordinated effort between actors in law enforcement at the
local, national, and international level that hampers proper implementation and enforcement of
wildlife laws (Kurvits et al., 2011; Lin, 2005). Since illegally poached species often travel across
state lines to their buyers, international cooperation is essential to stop the wildlife trade
(Schaller, 2011). Many countries are already collaborating to stop the illegal trade in endangered
species. Vietnam and South Africa, for example, recently signed a Memorandum of
Understanding pledging to work closely on biodiversity management, conservation, law
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enforcement, and compliance with CITES and other relevant legislation and conventions
(TRAFFIC, 2012a). This agreement primarily came about because of the voluminous illegal
trade in rhino horn from South Africa to Vietnam (TRAFFIC, 2012a).
Yet, regardless of how well countries are able to block the import or export of illegally
poached species, it is important to remember that a domestic market can still exist (Lemieux &
Clarke, 2009). To tackle the illegal trade in wildlife effectively, countries must strengthen their
local and national enforcement of laws while also increasing international law enforcement
cooperation. Preventing poaching is in large part about safeguarding the world’s biodiversity,
which is essential to all species’ survival, including humans’. The best way to meet this goal is to
prevent species from being killed in the first place. Species that are not traded live are dead by
the time they reach international borders (Hussain, 2003; TRAFFIC, 2011). Even for live trade
specimens, a large percentage of them will have died in transit by the time they reach the border
(Pires, 2011). Preventing wildlife killings is therefore best done on the local level at the point of
capture. Working at the local level also has the added advantage of targeting retaliatory killings
because efforts focus on preventing the taking or killing of wildlife regardless of motive, not on
preventing their transport.
Some local enforcement efforts have proven to be effective at reducing wildlife crime.
Several studies have shown that higher game warden to land mass ratios have reduced illegal
killings as have better monitoring of patrol efforts that promote increased ranger time in the field
(Ghoddousi et al., 2010; Martin, 2010, July-December). Better international cooperation will
make it easier for countries to share these local successes with other nations so that they may
improve their own law enforcement efforts.
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Reactive versus preventive responses to illegal leopard killings

Based on the previous section, current laws often seem to fall short of preventing wildlife
crime. Local prevention efforts may be more effective because they have the potential to prevent
wildlife deaths and tackle the root beliefs and habits that facilitate illegal killings in rural
communities. In fact, some researchers are suggesting that the reactive-policing model is not
effective for wildlife crime and that law enforcement responses should focus on prevention
rather than response (Pires & Moreto, 2011).
Prevention methods have obvious advantages when trying to stop wildlife deaths, but it is
important to note that market raids (a reactive rather than preventive method) have shown some
promise in reducing ivory trading in Ghana and that similar methods may prove useful in
reducing wildlife killings for profit (Martin, 2010, July-December). The key to successfully
implementing such reactive methods is knowing when and where to use them instead of
preventive action.
This research focuses on H-WC driven leopard killings, which, unlike poaching, do not
result in a wildlife byproduct (like pelts or bones) being sold. A reactive method is ill suited to
this type of illegal killing since there is no market to shut down or raid. For retaliatory killings,
prevention methods are far more useful than reactive ones for two reasons: 1) the ultimate goal is
finding a non-lethal outcome to the conflict to prevent the killing of the problem animal and 2)
the perpetrators are too focused on the immediate survival of their flock (and livelihood) to
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consider the long-term outcomes of their actions17.
The sections below describe two types of preventive response to retaliatory leopard
killings that are currently used internationally. The first is predation reduction methods that
attack the root cause of retaliatory leopard killings: leopard livestock predation. The second is
green tourism whose goal is to convince local residents that live leopards have a monetary value
because they bring in tourist dollars that benefit the community.

Predation reduction methods
Selective removal and relocation

One of the main approaches to preventing retaliatory leopard killings has been to reduce
leopard predation on livestock thereby eliminating agro-pastoralists’ reason to kill leopards.
Predation reduction methods tend to focus on controlling predator abundance18, but Graham et
al. (2005) suggest that this approach is misguided because losses appear unrelated to predator
density but related to prey availability.
Selective removal and relocation is one of the methods used to reduce predator
abundance in an area and spread predator numbers out more evenly over the landscape. One of
17

Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland (1993)’s research explains that in developing countries,
where the future is uncertain and so valued less than the present, concentrating on
detection/prevention is better than increasing penalties since most citizens are not thinking about
hypothetical future penalties.
18
An exception to this is diversionary feeding, but this option has many downsides. It can only
be used short-term because of the cost and effort involved. It also encourages leopards not to
hunt and so decreases their ability to survive in the wild (Graham et al., 2005; Kurvits et al.,
2011).
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the only evaluations of this method by Athreya et al. (2010) in India, though, seems to support
Graham et al. (2005)’s claims that controlling predator abundance is ineffective at reducing
leopard predation on livestock. Athreya et al. (2010) found that translocating leopards led to a
sharp increase in the number of leopard attacks on humans and a 56% increase in livestock
predation events. Their findings indicated that leopards did not remain where they were
translocated. These researchers suggested that the leopards’ increased aggression towards both
humans and livestock was due to the stress of the translocations and return through unfamiliar
landscapes back to their home territory, as well as a loss of fear of humans from their constant
proximity during the translocation. These findings support those of Dr. Craig Packer, director of
the Serengeti Lion Project, who found that, in Kenya, moving livestock-killing lions only shifted
the problem to another area, because translocated lions were forced to the human-dominated
boundaries of translocation areas by their existing lion population (Dloniak, 2012).

Selective culling

Selective culling of “problem leopards” is another popular solution in many areas, but it
assumes that only certain leopards are prone to eating livestock and that these individuals can be
successfully removed without other leopards taking their place as livestock eaters19 (Linnell et
al., 1999). As this has yet to be proven (Linnell et al., 1999) and as there have been cases of
farmers and even governments abusing laws that sanction the removal of problem animals
(Coniff, 1999 in (Hussain, 2003)) (Geldenhuys, 2011, December 4; Hussain, 2003), this method

19

A process akin to “offender replacement” in the criminological literature.
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remains suspect. Furthermore, the reduction in leopard numbers from poaching makes wildlife
officials wary of issuing cull permits, causing tensions with local people suffering from livestock
predation (Erasmus, 2011, January 21; Liberg et al., 2011).
Another risk with selective culling is the consequences it has for other ecologically
dependent or related species in the food chain. Previous efforts to cull predators through
strychnine poisoning for wolves (Bjorge & Gunson, 1985) and poisoned livestock carcasses for
hyenas (Al-Johany, 2007) ended up killing non-target species and did not stop wolves and
hyenas from attacking livestock. Hunting the jackal to extinction because it preyed on farmers’
livestock also failed because it caused spikes in pest species populations lower in the food chain,
like rabbits (Government wildlife official 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). All three
of these examples show how policies like selective culling can have unforeseen negative effects
on other species because they are poorly thought through. Even now, researchers do not fully
understand all the links between species in an ecosystem (U.S. Geological Survey, 2007).
Selective culling should therefore be used only as a last resort, if used at all, until all of its
consequences are fully understood.
Selective culling also does not encourage community tolerance for predators, which is a
key component to the future conservation of leopards (Packer et al., 2009; K. Ray, 2012).
Culling indirectly reinforces the idea that killing leopards is an acceptable method to reduce
livestock predation. Reinforcing this idea can then lead individuals, like Oli et al. (1994)’s
Nepalese subjects, to try and completely eradicate predators in their area and refuse to consider
other options like selective removal of problem animals and changes in husbandry practices.
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Innovative husbandry techniques

Some of the more promising (although not widely implemented or researched) methods
to combat H-WC induced poaching are innovative husbandry techniques like predator-proof
corrals and Anatolian sheep dogs or donkeys for more effective guardianship (Aryal, Brunton, Ji,
Barraclough, & Raubenheimer, 2014; Gusain, 2014; Linnell et al., 1999; McManus, Dickman,
Gaynor, Smuts, & Macdonald, 2015; Romans, 2014; Snow, 2006; World Wildlife Fund &
Global Species Program, N.d.).
Predator-proof corrals (see figure 3.2) are specially made enclosures that prevent
predators from reaching livestock. Maasais in the Maasai Mara area fortify their livestock
enclosures with two feet of underground wire fencing and six to ten feet high wire walls to
prevent lions from pushing through the fence, leopards from jumping over, and badgers and
hyenas from digging under (Westberg & Westberg, 2012). These types of fortified corrals are a
commonly used husbandry technique to prevent predation. In Botswana, for example, the
government will only compensate livestock farmers for their predation losses if they can prove
they keep their livestock in a predator-proof corral at night (Kgathi et al., 2012).
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Figure 3.2. Example of a predator proof corral in Ulley Village, India (Panthera, 2014)

Bell collars are placed on livestock to scare away predators. They ring when predators
startle livestock, scaring the predator away. Anatolian sheep dogs or donkeys also ward off
leopards from grazing livestock. Once they live with a herd, the dogs bond with it and attack any
predator that tries to eat a member of their flock (Landmark Foundation, n.d.; Stannard, 2006).
Anatolian sheep dogs work well in conjunction with bell collars because the sound from the bell
collars alerts the dog to a problem in the herd.20 In South Africa, donkeys can provide a good
alternative to Anatolians because of their low cost. An adult donkey, if sufficiently angered, can
kill a leopard by kicking it with its hooves (Gusain, 2014; Romans, 2014) (Farmer 1, personal
communication, August 17, 2011).

20

Note that The Landmark Foundation states that innovative husbandry techniques should be
used “holistically as part of an adaptive and dynamic management plan. No single method is
100% effective on its own. They work best when applied in combination” (Landmark
Foundation, n.d., p. 1).
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Figure 3.3. Example of a bell collar (Landmark Foundation, n.d.)

The main problem with these measures has been convincing farmers to try them and
apply them properly. This is even before the hurdle of finding funding to subsidize their
implementation (Kurvits et al, 2011) (NPO worker 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011;
Government wildlife official 3, personal communication, August 23, 2011). Hemson et al.
(2009), for example, found that Botswana cattle post owners were not willing to improve
husbandry techniques to protect their livestock, but were willing to kill lions. Few had attempted
it, but the ones who had killed 20% of the lion population during the study.
Convincing farmers to use innovative husbandry techniques is difficult in South Africa as
well because farmers believe proponents of these new techniques have insufficient animal
farming experience and are basing their recommendations on limited research and isolated
success stories (Bezuidenhout, 2010, August 20). Part of this belief may stem from unrealistic
expectations of what these methods should do. Farmers sometimes believe that innovative
husbandry techniques should eradicate livestock predation completely, which is unrealistic. They
can reduce livestock predation substantially, but are not a miracle cure and come with some
downsides.
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Bell collars, for instance, have had mixed success based on how well they are used (King,
2006; Landmark Foundation, n.d.) (NPO worker 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). To
use them effectively, farmers must commit to putting them on their flock one day, then returning
to the grazing site the next day and removing them, and continue this pattern for several weeks at
a time during periods of livestock vulnerability, like lambing season. Unfortunately, this process
is time consuming and puts added pressure on the farmer (NPO worker 4, personal
communication, August 21, 2011) (King, 2006).
Donkeys require less careful monitoring, but farmers must still check on their flock
regularly because some donkeys never bond with the herd. Donkeys also do not protect animals
that stray from the pack, like pregnant cows that wander away to give birth. One interviewed
farmer reported that that 2 out of 4 of his donkeys never bonded with his livestock, leaving them
unprotected (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). Those that did bond with the
herd were effective guardians, but farmer supervision is still required to determine if a donkey
has bonded with its herd. A guardian animal does not replace the vigilant eye of a shepherd.
As for Anatolian sheep dogs, they must be properly bred and stopped from bonding with
humans. Ideally, a farmer should check on his dog once a day and feed him then to insure
baboons or other opportunistic wild animals do not eat his food. Stolen food can cause dogs to
hunt wild game instead of protecting the herd (Farmer's Weekly, 2009, May 22). Poor breeding
can also result in dogs having a “game hunting drive” that makes them ill suited to guard
livestock (Government wildlife official 3, personal communication, August 23, 2011). Finally,
Anatolian sheep dogs can suffer from tick-borne illnesses that reduce their effectiveness as
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guardians if their owners do not properly groom them (Government wildlife official 3, personal
communication, August 23, 2011).
Despite their defensive attitudes towards innovative husbandry techniques, farmers have
valid reasons for their complaints. The head of the African Large Predator Research Unit at the
University of the Free State (South Africa), H.O. de Waal, argues that little scientific research
has been done on the efficiency of predator management (de Waal, 2009, July 3). Many nonlethal methods of deterring predators, like donkeys and bell collars, have proven to be only
temporarily effective until predators learn to outwit them (de Waal, 2009, July 3). He cites the
example of livestock protection collars21 (also known as “dead stop” or “King collars”, see
figures 3.4a and 3.4b) that have shown some success against carnivore livestock attacks, but
have failed to prevent jackal predation because jackals adapted to the collars and learned to
attack animals from behind instead of at the throat. Instead of automatic death, this resulted in
farmers finding sheep and goats with their abdominal cavities gaping and entrails trailing, left to
die of infection (Landmark Foundation, n.d.).

21

This can either be a hard plastic collar placed around a sheep’s throat or a wire one that looks
like a cage around the throat. The hard plastic version generally contains poison to kill the
predator in addition to stopping its attack on a sheep. See figures 3.4a & 3.4b for photos.
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Figures 3.4a & 3.4b. a) Example of a livestock protection collar with poison inside it (Retrieved
from http://www.livestockprotection.net/collar01.htm); b) example of a dead-stop collar that
protects an animal’s throat from injury (Landmark Foundation, n.d.)

Existing efforts to study the problem of predator management tend to be too fragmented
with resources inefficiently managed, in part because too many actors are involved in the process
(the agricultural department, the environmental affairs department, and numerous provincial
departments) (Bezuidenhout, 2010, August 20; Farmer's Weekly, 2010, October 29). These
departments often have limited research funds (insufficient to sustain large research projects) and
lack experts in predation and livestock management to help research and evaluate effective
solutions to livestock predation.
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In addition, the absence of national norms for dealing with predation issues means that
each province or department implements its own policies without regard for what others have
done and what has worked elsewhere (Farmer's Weekly, 2010, October 29). Coordinating the
efforts of all these parties more efficiently would produce better results. It would also lower the
frustration of livestock farmers trying to work with this bureaucracy and increase their trust in
suggested predation prevention methods (Farmer 2, personal communication, August 5, 2011;
Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011) (Bezuidenhout, 2010, August 20; K. Ray,
2012).
NPOs seem more motivated to research innovative husbandry techniques to prevent
livestock predation by leopards (Landmark Foundation, n.d.). The Landmark Foundation is
currently working on an evaluation of husbandry techniques in the Western and Eastern Cape
Provinces of South Africa (Landmark Foundation, n.d.). Their results, just published in the
journal Oryx, show that non-lethal predator management methods (like Anatolian sheep dogs,
donkeys, and livestock collars) proved cheaper for start-up and running costs per year and more
effective than past lethal methods (McManus, Dickman, et al., 2015).22
One problem with these findings is that NPOs are advocates for leopard conservation
and, as such, are not unbiased evaluators of innovative husbandry techniques. Their research
therefore remains suspect until the academic community does its own assessment. At this point,
the mixed reviews of innovative husbandry techniques, with their intermittent successes, suggest
they have potential but need further assessment before they can be touted as effective for
22

These methods are probably best applied on an individual basis as their effectiveness varies
from farm to farm based on flock size and the location of farm land, hence the preliminary
results’ widespread range of 56 to 97% percent reductions in livestock predation (Moberly,
White, Webbon, Baker, & Harris, 2004).
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predation prevention. Ideally, future evaluation efforts will include government departments and
researchers not affiliated with NPOs. This will bolster the methods’ credibility with farmers and
the research community.

Tourism and “diffusion of benefits” measures

Green tourism and community-based conservation (CBC) programs continue to be
championed for promoting conservation by giving the profits from wildlife viewing back to local
populations (C. Mishra et al., 2003; Pires & Moreto, 2011). The theory behind green tourism is
that this diffusion of benefits helps local people view wildlife as valuable when alive, with a cash
value versus an ecological value, and gives them an incentive to protect local species.
Reviews are mixed as to whether or not CBC programs are effective (Schaller, 2011). A
study by Hemson et al. (2009) of tourist facilities around Botswana’s Makgadikgadi Pans
National Park found that, despite these facilities paying large sums of money to Botswana, few
local residents felt that tourism was valuable and benefited them. The majority of those
interviewed believed that the government, not their communities, saw most of the profits
(Hemson et al., 2009).
Hemson et al. (2009)’s research suggests that tourism brings in large amounts of money
but that its distribution to local communities is flawed or, according to Schaller (2011),
inexistent. One of the ideas behind CBC is that those who suffer the costs of cohabitating with
wildlife should receive the benefits from wildlife tourism, even a non-homogenous sharing of
benefits that is proportional to each family’s loss. Yet, local residents near Makgadikgadi
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exclusively benefited from local tourist ventures through employment, with only 17% of families
benefiting, while 65% of families experienced livestock predation losses (Hemson et al., 2009).
Examples like these confirm the following quote from Botha et al. (2004) that:
"Although there has been limited success in achieving the twin goals of biodiversity
conservation and improving local livelihoods in CBC programs worldwide, most reviews
concur that this is due to the complex local and global environments in which they
operate, rather than the underlying premise being at fault."

Compensation programs

One widely accepted and implemented measure to reduce retaliatory killings is
compensation programs where victims of carnivore predation can file a complaint and receive
money for their dead livestock (Hemson et al., 2009; Hill, 2004; Oli et al., 1994; Schaller, 2011).
Some conservation organizations, like the Corbett Foundation, have even created programs that
disburse funds immediately to local residents while they wait for their compensation claims to
filter through the government bureaucracy. In India, this can take between 16 and 18 months
(World Wildlife Fund, 2010, December). For the Corbett program, the owner must report the kill
within 72 hours and inspect the carcass with a Foundation employee. Cash payment is made
upon inspection and owners keep this cash in addition to the government’s compensation.
Informers who report a kill before an owner are also compensated, incentivizing aggrieved
livestock owners not to poison carcasses in retaliation and to call the Corbett Foundation
themselves (World Wildlife Fund, 2010, December).
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An alternative to this type of compensation is monetary incentive programs where a
conservation organization enters into a contract to buy local handicraft or crops and provide a
cash bonus if no illegal killings occur on community land. Any violation of the no illegal killing
clause, regardless of whether the violator is a community member or an outsider, results in the
loss of the bonus for all participants and the expulsion of community member violators from the
program (C. Mishra et al., 2003). The added benefit of this program is that it encourages local
people to protect wildlife from poachers outside their community.
Although these types of programs are popular with local residents, they have high costs
and generally do not sustain themselves (Schaller, 2011). They are also expensive to expand past
the local level (C. Mishra et al., 2003). Furthermore, unless compensation for livestock losses is
dependent on livestock owners using predation prevention methods on their farms, compensation
programs can lead to neglect of good husbandry practices (Hemson et al., 2009). Incentives to
use predation prevention methods are undermined if a farmer is reimbursed for all livestock
losses regardless of context. Given all this, these programs are probably not the most costeffective or long-lasting solutions for H-WC driven illegal leopard killings.

The importance of community engagement

The mixed success of predation prevention and “diffusion of benefits” measures suggests
that stopping the illegal killing of leopards is fraught with difficulties. Even when the type of
intervention needed is clear, “good science and good laws do not necessarily result in effective
conservation” (Schaller, 2011, p. 91). The wildcard in conservation is the community. To
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achieve continued success according to Schaller (2011, p. 91), “communities must be directly
involved as full partners in conservation by contributing their knowledge, insights, and skills.”
The problem is that communities are not always willing to prevent illegal leopard
killings. Human tolerance for carnivores and H-WC is essential to conservation efforts and must
be developed for wild animals outside of protected areas (K. Ray, 2012). The focus should now
be on creating a “conservation landscape” where you merge protected areas and humandominated land. The reality is that most countries no longer have the space to set up large
conservation areas. Protected areas are small and the isolated populations of big cats in them are
at higher risk of extinction from inbreeding, disease, and natural disasters (Schaller, 2011).
Creating a core set of protected areas within human-dominated land, with wildlife corridors of
viable habitat where animals can travel is essential, but requires human cooperation. Humans
must agree to keep habitat between protected areas viable and shoulder the costs of increased
human-wildlife contact.
Creating these conservation landscapes requires using predation prevention methods
skillfully to reduce H-WC to its absolute minimum, while teaching humans to accept that no
method will be 100% effective and that poaching and retaliatory killings will not produce a
better outcome (Hunter, 2012). To teach this, though, one must understand the cultural context in
the region. A community’s previous experience with wildlife and natural resources informs how
willing they are to conserve them. So do their previous interactions with wildlife conservation
officials and NPOs (Kideghesho, Roskaft, & Kaltenborn, 2007). Building a “conservation
landscape” requires integrating the ecological, economic, and cultural realities of the area
(Hemson et al., 2009; Schaller, 2011).
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South Africa, for example, has a history of not subsidizing local agriculture. Small
farmers, primarily white farmers, have felt slighted by this lack of support in difficult economic
times (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011) (Wilson, 2009). Building a
“conservation landscape” in parts of South Africa would require taking their anti-government
feelings into account and recognizing that farmer-generated conservation efforts rather than
government-dictated conservation requirements will be most effective. Positive incentives will
also be more effective in an area filled with resentment of wildlife and where wildlife generates
little revenue (Farmer 3, personal communication, August 18, 2011). Failure to consider this
cultural subtext can alienate the community when their support is vital to the success of any
long-term conservation effort.
NPOs can help implement a strategy to stop illegal killings, but, ideally, they will then
hand over the running of the operation to the local community for long-term development. For
this to happen seamlessly, the different actors in the process must not act as separate entities but
must believe they are part of a whole (Zahler & Schaller, 2014). Too often, factions develop
within a community because black and white labels are applied: he is a “conservationist”, she is
a “farmer”, he is a “government official.” For example, the passion that drives conservation NPO
workers can sometimes lead them to exclude the value of local farmers’ opinions (NPO worker
4, personal communication, August 21, 2011). Local farmers may distrust conservationists
because, in their minds, they are only there to save the leopards without concern for their
livelihood. Every effort must be made to avoid such splintering. Community empowerment is, in
the long run, the most cost-effective method for conserving local wildlife (Gettleman, 2012b;
Lion Guardians, 2012).
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Next steps

The current trend when dealing with retaliatory killings of leopards and other carnivores
seems to be creating innovative predation reduction methods to reduce the motivation for
killings. Several articles have recently been published in the press about livestock owners who
have created or are using new gadgets to protect their livestock. The French newswire Agence
France Presse, for example, published an article about a South African sheep farmer who
equipped one sheep in each of his herds with a cell phone tracking device that calls him when the
herd runs away from something, usually a sheep stealer or a predator (Agence France Presse,
2012b). CNN also published an article about a 13-year-old boy in Kenya who noticed lions in the
area feared flashing lights like the flashlights shepherds carry to check on their flock. He created
a flashing light display, called a “Lion Light” system, around his livestock corral to prevent lion
predation (Kermeliotis, 2013).
Anecdotal stories like these, in combination with successful efforts by NPOs with bell
collars and livestock protection animals, suggest that future research should focus on bettering
these predation reduction methods. This focus seems particularly appropriate since top-down
initiatives from government entities often fail to gain traction with local residents, while local
inventions like the “Lion Light” system catch on quickly in these areas (Kermeliotis, 2013).
This research will help improve these grass-roots methods for leopard livestock predation
by understanding where retaliatory leopard killings occur and why. Livestock owners can then
more accurately predict where they should implement these predation reduction methods for
maximum effect.
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Chapter summary

The effectiveness of poaching and retaliatory killing prevention methods remains for the
most part in doubt. Laws are only as effective as the efforts to enforce them, which often fall
short. Some researchers suggest that law enforcement should focus on prevention rather than
response. Table 3.2 below summarizes the pros and cons of each method discussed in the
chapter. Further research is needed to determine when and where each method is most effective,
but grassroots predation reduction methods currently seem the best approach to preventing
retaliatory leopard killings.
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Table 3.2. Methods to reduce retaliatory leopard killings and their pros and cons
Method to Reduce Retaliatory Leopard
Killings
Predation reduction methods

Impact

Problems with Method

Translocation of problem leopards

Displaces predation problem to another
location (at least temporarily)

1) Livestock losses unrelated to predator density23
2) Leopards did not remain where translocated24

Selective culling

Quick fix until a new predator takes the
place of culled individual

1) Unknown consequences for other ecologically dependent
species25
2) No proof that new livestock eating leopard does not replace
culled individual26
3) Does not encourage tolerance for predators27

Show more ecologically sound and
promising results than other methods28

1) Convincing local farmers to try these methods difficult29
2) Little research to prove their effectiveness30
3) Some predators learn to outwit bell collars31
4) Requires monitoring to ensure that protection animals bond with
the flock32

Innovative husbandry techniques
Bell collars for livestock (to scare leopards)
Livestock protection animals (donkeys,
Anatolian sheep dogs)
"Diffusion of benefits" measures

23

Graham et al. (2005).
Athreya et al. (2010); Dloniak (2012).
25
U.S. Geological Survey (2007); Bjorge and Gunson (1985); Al-Johany (2007); Government wildlife official 1 (personal communication, July 31, 2011).
26
Linnell et al. (1999); Coniff, 1999 in Hussain (2003); Geldenhuys (2011, December 4); Hussain (2003); Erasmus (2011, January 21);Liberg et al. (2011).
27
Packer et al. (2009); K. Ray (2012); Oli et al. (1994).
28
King (2006); The Landmark Foundation (n.d.); Landmark Foundation (n.d.); Linnell et al. (1999); Cheetah Outreach (2011); Moberly et al. (2004); Farmer 1
(personal communication, August 17, 2011).
29
Kurvits et al. (2011); Hemson et al. (2009); Bezuidenhout (2010, August 20); NPO worker 1 (personal communication, July 31, 2011); Government wildlife
official 3 (personal communication, August 23, 2011).
30
de Waal (2009, July 3); Bezuidenhout (2010, August 20); (Farmer's Weekly, 2009, May 22).
31
de Waal (2009, July 3); Landmark Foundation (n.d.); King (2006); NPO worker 4 (personal communication, August 21, 2011).
32
King (2006); The Landmark Foundation (n.d.); Farmer's Weekly (2009, May 22); NPO worker 1 (personal communication, July 31, 2011), NPO worker 3,
NPO worker 4 (personal communication, August 21, 2011), Farmer 1 (personal communication, August 17, 2011).
24

72

Green tourism

1) Gives monetary value to live wildlife
in the eyes of local residents that benefit33
2) Invests money in local communities34

1) Distribution of tourism revenue to local residents often flawed
and unequal35
2) Proper implementation of schemes highly dependent on local
dynamics36

Compensation programs for livestock losses

Reduces livestock owners’ resentment of
carnivores37

1) High costs to implement38
2) Rarely sustain themselves39
3) Only effective if require use of predation prevention methods for
compensation40

Provide a structure from which to combat
illegal killings once they have already
occurred

1) Law enforcement not always knowledgeable enough to enforce
properly
2) Laws lack legitimacy or importance in the eyes of the public and
courts
3) Lack of coordination between law enforcement actors prevents
effective implementation
4) Localized prevention efforts better than uncertain sanctions for
deterrence

Laws
CITES and others

33

C. Mishra et al. (2003); Pires and Moreto (2011).
C. Mishra et al. (2003); Pires and Moreto (2011).
35 Hemson et al. (2009); Schaller (2011).
36
Botha et al. (2004); Alpert (1996) in Botha et al. (2004); Newmark and Hough (2000) in Botha et al. (2004).
37
Hill (2004); Oli et al. (1994); World Wildlife Fund (2010, December); C. Mishra et al. (2003); Schaller (2011); Hemson et al. (2009).
38
C. Mishra et al. (2003); Schaller (2011).
39
Schaller (2011).
40
Hemson et al. (2009).
34
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Chapter 4: Theoretical framework

The previous chapters described the main motivations for illegal leopard killings,
concluding that H-WC is the most pressing threat. More importantly, they have identified factors
that contribute to retaliatory leopard killings and methods tried to mitigate these factors,
including predation prevention methods. These factors include ecological characteristics that
shape leopard behavior and bring them in contact with humans and human behaviors that
generate conflict with wildlife.
The purpose of this research is to understand where retaliatory leopard killings are most
likely to take place and why. Identifying the situational factors that contribute to retaliatory
leopard killings will help determine where to best target solutions. The following sections will
discuss rational choice theory, choice-structuring properties, SCP, and informal guardians as they
apply to this analysis. Rational choice theory and choice-structuring properties give the context
for understanding where and how retaliatory leopard killings occur. SCP provides a framework
for solving the problem.

Rational Choice Theory

Traditional criminological theories have long focused on what Cornish and Clarke (1986)
call the “initial involvement model” of crime: what personal traits make individuals more likely
to choose to engage in crime. Rational Choice Theory, rather, focuses on an individual’s decision
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to commit a specific criminal act (Felson & Clarke, 1998), what Cornish and Clarke (1986) call
“the criminal event model.” It argues that, although offenders may commit crimes because of
long-seated motivations and predispositions (i.e. low self-control, weak social bonds etc.), their
decision to engage in a particular crime is based on “the opportunities presented to them during
their normal patterns of social and economic life” (Felson & Clarke, 1998; Lilly, Cullen, & Ball,
2007; Petrossian, 2012, p. 24).
According to Rational Choice Theory, when offenders plan a crime, they weigh the costs
and rewards of the crime in a rational manner so as to maximize its rewards and minimize its
costs (Felson & Clarke, 1998). As a result, offenders are more likely to choose crimes that have a
low risk of detection, are easy to commit, and provide what they consider a worthwhile reward.
As stated by Cornish and Clarke (1987, p. 935), “decisions to offend [...] are influenced by the
characteristics of both offenses and offenders, and are the product of interactions between the
two.”

Choice-structuring properties and “bounded” rationality

In their 1987 paper, Cornish and Clarke (1987, p. 935), identify what they call “choicestructuring properties” of offenses that “provide a basis for selecting among alternative courses
of action and […] effectively structure the offender’s choice.” They are the characteristics of a
crime that make it attractive to one offender but not another at different times and based on his or
her goals, character traits, background, and/or expertise. Examples of choice-structuring
properties include the type and amount of payoff, the perceived risks, the skills and resources
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needed, and the availability of targets (see table 4.1 for a list of choice-structuring properties for
thefts involving cash, adapted from Cornish and Clarke (1987)).
Choice-structuring properties are classified into two types: static or variance properties
(Pires, 2011). Static properties explain the opportunity structure of a crime and its potential for
displacement to similar types of crime. Variance properties are the factors that an offender who
decides to commit a crime weighs to select a particular target, modus operandi, and/or location
(Pires, 2011). Some static choice-structuring opportunities for retaliatory leopard killings are the
fact that law enforcement rarely prosecutes individuals for illegal killings and that farmers do not
consider killing a leopard in retaliation for livestock losses a crime. Variance properties include
the availability of over-the-counter pesticides and leopards’ habit of caching their kill and
returning to eat it within 48 hours, both of which make it easy to poison a livestock carcass and
kill a leopard.
Although choice-structuring properties shape the offender’s choices, he or she may not be
fully aware of the range of choice-structuring properties involved in his or her decision or of the
part they play (Cornish & Clarke, 1987). This ties in with Clarke and Cornish (2001)’s belief that
offenders exhibit “bounded rationality” because their cost-benefit analysis for engaging or not
engaging in crime is limited by their cognitive abilities and emotions, the time they have to make
the decision, and the availability of relevant information. The concept of “bounded rationality”
acknowledges that “real world action often has to be taken on the basis of decisions made under
less than perfect circumstances” and that individuals are more or less skillful at interpreting what
information is available prior to committing a crime (Cornish & Clarke, 2008, p. 25).
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Table 4.1. Choice-structuring properties for thefts involving cash (Adapted from Cornish and
Clarke (1987))
Choice-structuring properties for thefts involving cash
Availability (numbers of targets; accessibility)
Awareness of method (i.e. pickpocketing vs. insurance fraud)
Likely cash yield per crime
Expertise needed
Planning necessary (pickpocketing vs. bank robbery)
Resources required (transport; equipment)
Solo vs. associates required
Time required to commit
Cool nerves required (bank robbery vs. computer fraud)
Risks of apprehension
Severity of punishment
Physical danger
Instrumental violence required
Confrontation with victim (mugging vs. burglary)
Identifiable victim
Social cachet (safecracking vs. mugging)
“Fencing” necessary
Moral evaluation

Several criminological studies have used rational choice theory and choice-structuring
properties to understand both the location and target of poaching. Pires (2011) used choicestructuring properties to explain how nearby illegal wildlife trafficking markets and the physical
traits of certain parrot species influenced the likelihood they would be poached for the pet trade.
Marteache, Viollaz, and Petrossian (2015) studied how factors like the concealability of vessels
and illegally caught fish, convenience of ports, strength of fisheries monitoring, control, and
surveillance measures, effectiveness of country governance, and commitment to wildlife
protection regulations influenced illegal fishing vessels’ decision to offload their catch in certain
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countries. Both studies then offered solutions to tackle illegal parrot poaching and fishing using
the SCP framework.

Situational Crime Prevention

Clarke has identified 25 techniques of SCP based on rational choice theory and choicestructuring properties’ assumptions about the offender decision-making process (Clarke, 2008b).
The premise of SCP is to block the opportunities that make the commission of a crime possible.
This framework therefore helps develop targeted solutions that reduce the opportunities to
commit a crime by increasing its risks and difficulties (Clarke, 1995). Understanding the choicestructuring properties involved in an offender’s decision to commit a crime helps devise effective
solutions to dissuade offenders. Since, according to rational choice theory, people choose to
commit crime when and where they are more likely to succeed, they will avoid committing a
crime if the environment is not favorable and they are likely to be caught.
SCP gives equal importance to opportunity and motivation for a crime to occur.
Opportunity is an important cause of crime (Clarke, 2008b). An abundance of opportunities can
lead both criminally predisposed and non-predisposed individuals to commit crime and continue
doing so. The more opportunities for crime, the more it will occur and the more criminally
disposed individuals will seek out other opportunities to commit crime (Clarke, 2005). Clarke
(1983) argues that reducing these opportunities will reduce specific forms of crime. SCP
techniques are meant to achieve this.
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SCP also emphasizes the “situational determinants” of crime, those situational factors
that determine whether or not an offender will commit a crime at a particular location and time
(Clarke, 1983). These situational factors can be part of the physical environment, like the number
of lights in a parking lot when stealing cars, or the way the environment functions, such as
whether or not security guards check bags for stolen items when exiting a museum. Knowing
these factors allows policy makers to predict where crime will occur and prevent it by making
the environment in which it takes place less attractive and rewarding for offenders (Clarke,
2008a). SCP solutions to prevent crime fall under 25 techniques divided into 5 categories: 1)
increasing the effort and 2) the risks to committing the crime, 3) reducing its rewards, 4)
reducing the provocations that motivate someone to commit a crime, and 5) removing the
excuses for carrying it out (Clarke, 2008a) (see figure 7.1 in chapter 7 for a more detailed
description of these techniques).

At the intersection of human-wildlife conflict, retaliatory killings, and poaching: Tolerance for
leopard killing

Although widespread, retaliatory leopard killings are not random; they occur where there
is an opportunity to do so, at specific locations for specific reasons. Rational choice theory
suggests that farmer’s decision to kill a leopard in retaliation for livestock losses will be
influenced by several factors. These factors are the “situational determinants” of the retaliatory
leopard killing. In this case, they can be both human (i.e. cultural) and environmental (see table
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4.2 for examples of each). These situational factors help understand where and why leopard
killings are most likely to occur.

Table 4.2. List of the major situational factors linked to retaliatory leopard killings
Human determinants

Environmental determinants

Expectations from wildlife

Land-use overlap

Sensitivity to environmental issues

Leopard abundance

Local history (colonialism, pastoralism)

Poor leopard habitat

Relationship between local actors

Human-leopard interactions are part of a process that involves H-WC and outcomes like
retaliatory leopard killings and leopard poaching. At each end of this process is the concept of
guardianship (see figure 4.1 below). H-WC is the result of a number of situational factors
discussed in the previous chapters, with habitat loss/fragmentation and increased competition for
resources because of population growth at the forefront. Other ecological characteristics of
leopards and human behaviors contribute to H-WC as well (see section titled “Factors that
contribute to H-WC and retaliatory leopard killings” in chapter 2). A lack of guardianship,
mainly in the form of maladapted husbandry practices and a lack of predation prevention
methods, often results in H-WC like leopard predation on livestock or attacks on humans.
The possible responses to H-WC are three-fold: 1) retaliatory leopard killings, 2) leopard
poaching, and 3) a concerted effort to use and improve husbandry and predation prevention
methods. The latter is about increasing guardianship of livestock and/or humans through target
hardening. The choice of response is based on local residents’ tolerance for leopard killing. In
locations where H-WC has incited anti-conservation feelings, leopard poaching may be common
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because there is no willpower or collective efficacy to prevent illegal leopard killings (lack of
guardianship) (Hill, 2004; St. John et al., 2012). Local residents may not actively hunt leopards,
but they also have no interest in protecting wildlife that attacks their livestock and neighbors. In
places where H-WC has resulted in an active hunting culture, retaliatory leopard killings are
more likely because local residents will take matters into their own hands and kill leopards in
retaliation for livestock losses and/or human attacks (Hill, 2004; St. John et al., 2012). In some
locations, though, H-WC will not result in illegal leopard killings of any kind. Rather, local
residents will strive to increase guardianship of livestock and humans. This is the case, for
example, in Java, Indonesia, where rural communities often suffer from H-WC but rarely resort
to or allow illegal leopard killings (Government wildlife official 4, personal communication,
November 26, 2013).

Figure 4.1. The human-leopard interaction process and the link between poaching and retaliatory
leopard killings
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The link between places where leopard poaching and retaliatory leopard killings occur is
a tolerance for leopard killing (see figure 4.1). This research uses opportunity theories, like
rational choice theory, to explain what situational factors create this tolerance. It is about
determining why H-WC does not always result in a tolerance for leopard killing and, ultimately,
in illegal leopard killings. The situational factors can be the local human context or
environmental characteristics (including a lack of guardianship). They occur at multiple parts of
the human-leopard interaction process, either by increasing the likelihood of H-WC (H-LC
situational factors) or by encouraging tolerance for leopard killing after a H-WC conflict occurs
and the victims have a choice of responses (retaliatory killing situational factors).
The 25 techniques of SCP are helpful in designing interventions to mitigate the H-LC and
retaliatory killing situational factors and come up with additional guardianship solutions in
places where there is tolerance for leopard killing. This research will use SCP for both these
purposes and to ultimately disrupt tolerance for leopard killing. Most governments and
conservation organizations currently focus on preventing poaching (TRAFFIC, 2013), yet HWC, with its possible consequence of tolerance for leopard killing, is one of the main obstacles
to getting local populations to support anti-poaching and conservation efforts (Graham et al.,
2005; Gupta Kashyap, 2012, March 6). This research’s use of SCP to address tolerance for
leopard killing is more valuable for conservation than simply devising poaching or retaliatory
killing interventions, because it targets the root cause of several types of illegal leopard killing.
Reducing tolerance for leopard killing creates opportunities to build informal
guardianship to combat both poaching and retaliatory killings. Informal guardians are non-law
enforcement personnel who can deter crime. According to routine activity theory, crime can only
82

occur if a capable guardian is absent and a suitable target and a likely offender meet (Cohen &
Felson, 1979). The more guardianship is available the less crime takes place (Reynald, 2009).
The concept of informal guardianship suggests that, where law enforcement resources are limited
and cannot be applied everywhere, it is possible to harness the goodwill of the local population
to fight illegal leopard killings. Local residents’ presence as informal guardians increases the
effort and risks required for illegal killings, deterring offenders (Gettleman, 2012b).

Informal guardians according to Reynald (2010)

Reynald (2010) established three conditions for someone to be a strong informal
guardian: 1) availability, 2) knowledge of context, and 3) willingness to intervene. Availability
means guardians must be present in a location to guard it (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The presence
of a guardian is sometimes sufficient to deter an offender. Furthermore, they must be willing to
monitor local activity for illegal behavior (Reynald, 2009, 2010). By doing so, they enhance their
capability as guardians by building their knowledge of context. Knowledge of context is
important because a person’s ability to act as a guardian depends on whether they can identify
who is and is not a threat (Reynald, 2010). This requires knowing a neighborhood well enough to
see who or what is out of place. A person’s ability to recognize this is enhanced if they have a
strong community network because community members tell each other what suspicious activity
to look for (Reynald, 2010).
A key characteristic for a strong informal guardian is the willingness to act if they see a
crime occur. The action can be direct, i.e. physically confronting the offender, or indirect, i.e.
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calling the police (Reynald, 2010). The average guardian is willing to intervene as long as their
personal safety is insured, but most prefer taking indirect action.
A guardian’s willingness to intervene and choice of intervention hinges on four factors
(Reynald, 2010). The first is the guardian’s sense of responsibility toward the target. Guardians
are more willing to protect targets that are theirs or with which they are intimately connected.
The second is the guardian’s physical competence to intervene. The more physically competent a
guardian feels the more likely he or she is to intervene and do so directly. The same applies to
the third factor, the availability of tools for the guardian’s protection. Finally, the more severe the
incident observed, the less likely the guardian is to intervene and the less direct the intervention.

Informal guardians are physically present and have knowledge of the context at most
locations where H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings occur, but the willingness to intervene is
generally missing. That willingness is often missing because of ill feelings toward wildlife or
conservation efforts. Most local residents do not feel any sense of ownership towards wildlife in
their community; they believe it belongs to the government. Laws that tell them they cannot kill
these animals without a license reinforce this belief. Furthermore, H-WCs, especially with
carnivores, create an environment were local people are angry at the cost wildlife imposes on
them. They would rather see these animals killed than conserved so they cannot attack their
livestock. They therefore have no incentive to stop anyone from killing wildlife in their
communities: they tolerate leopard killing. Understanding the situational factors of H-LC and
retaliatory leopard killings helps define this tolerance for leopard killing whereby informal
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guardians are unwilling to intervene and protect leopards. SCP then offers a framework to
reverse tolerance for leopard killing and increase informal guardianship.

Chapter summary

Criminologists have used rational choice theory, choice-structuring properties, and SCP
to understand why poachers target particular parrot species and fish illegally in certain locations.
Few studies, though, have focused on H-WC as a facilitator of retaliatory killings and poaching.
What links both retaliatory leopard killings and leopard poaching is a tolerance for illegal
leopard killing. This tolerance for illegal leopard killing creates an absence of informal guardians
to protect leopards. To reverse this tolerance, one first needs to identify its situational factors,
both human and environmental. These factors occur at multiple parts of the human-leopard
interaction process either by increasing the likelihood of H-LC (H-LC situational factors) or by
encouraging tolerance for leopard killing after a H-LC conflict occurs and the victims have a
choice of responses (retaliatory killing situational factors). This research focuses on
understanding these factors and their relative importance in an individual’s decision to kill a
leopard in retaliation for livestock or human attacks. It then uses the SCP framework to design
solutions that reverse tolerance for leopard killing and increase informal guardianship.
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Chapter 5: Research design and methodology

This research identifies the situational factors that contribute to H-LC and retaliatory
leopard killings and where they occur. It also defines what fosters tolerance for leopard killing by
exploring the relative importance of these situational factors in an individual’s decision to kill a
leopard. The study begins with a broad analysis of illegal leopard killings in three study areas:
the Amboseli and Tsavo West National Parks area in Kenya, the Heidelberg region in the
Western Cape Province of South Africa, and India. This analysis focuses on identifying what the
scope and nature of illegal leopard killings within the study areas is. It also explores what forms
H-WC driven retaliatory leopard killings take in those locations.
Interview data from Kenya and South Africa and media articles from India are used to
learn about the human situational factors of H-LC and retaliatory killings. The next step of the
analysis maps the locations of retaliatory leopard killings in the Heidelberg, Baviaanskloof, and
Greater Addo Elephant National Park regions of South Africa to better understand their
environmental situational factors. The focus here is on what geospatial factors contribute to
retaliatory leopard killings.

Overview of the analyses

This research is divided into 4 separate analyses based on country and whether the
analysis focuses on the human versus environmental situational factors of retaliatory leopard
killings. Table 5.1 gives a brief description of each analysis and the data it uses.
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Table 5.1. Characteristics of the 4 different analyses in this study
Analysis
Data

1
Kenyan interviews

Analysis

Descriptive
statistics,
regression
Amboseli National
Park

Location

Date
# of cases

2006
234 people

2
South African
interviews
Content analysis

3
Google Alert
articles
Content analysis

4
H-LC GPS
locations
GIS mapping, nonparametric tests

Heidelberg

India

2011
16 interviews

2013
68 articles

Heidelberg,
Baviaanskloof,
Greater Addo
Elephant NP
2005-2011
13 GPS points

The reason for 4 analyses is the scarcity of illegal leopard killing data. This lack of illegal
killing data is one of the main problems facing wildlife crime researchers today (Clyne, 2014).
Few published studies have come up with reliable counts of illegal leopard killings (see table A2
in the Appendix for a list of existing studies) and those that have do so in two ways: law
enforcement seizure data or GPS collar and carcass recovery data. Law enforcement seizure data
is often publicly available (TRAFFIC, 2011), while GPS collar and carcass recovery data is
usually not in the public domain. Publicly available data does not capture cases of retaliatory
killings where the animal’s carcass is destroyed or left to decompose in the wild to avoid
retribution. GPS collar and carcass recovery data can sometimes capture this information, if the
researchers are collaring the entire leopard population in an area. In such a case, a missing
leopard would not go unnoticed, especially if the researchers have local informants who tell them
of rumored leopard killings.
This research uses 4 different approaches and data sources to study the situational factors
of H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings. The number of cases for parts 2 and 4 of this study are
small, making it hard to generalize from their results. However, using multiple data sources and
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analytical methods allows for replication of these results, while using data from 3 different
countries has the added benefit of allowing a cross-country comparison of retaliatory leopard
killings.

1. Analysis part 1: Kenyan interviews

The data for part 1 of this research were gathered in April and May 2006 during a field
research project with the School for Field Studies in Kimana, Kenya.41 The project explored how
communities in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem benefited from local wildlife. It also examined
how wildlife was imposing a cost to local farmers and how it affected their attitude towards
current wildlife conservation efforts. The study area was the Loitokitok Division of Kenya’s
Kajiado District, in the area between Amboseli and Tsavo West National Parks, with a focus on
the Kimana, Kuku, and Mbirikani group ranches and the Entonet area (see figure 5.1) (Viollaz,
2006).
The history of this area provides insight into how H-WC develops into an acute problem.
The 6 group ranches in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem42 are essential dispersal areas for the
wildlife found inside the two parks and, as such, are ideal locations for ecotourism ventures and
community conservation initiatives (Hurt, 1999). Currently, the majority of the revenue from
ecotourism comes from the two national parks and is directly appropriated by the Kenyan

41

The project was titled “An assessment of local communities’ perceptions on and expectations
of conservation initiatives in select group ranches and privately owned land in the Amboseli
ecosystem” (Viollaz, 2006). Eight other college students were involved in this project along with
School for Field Studies instructor Salaton Tome.
42
The Kuku, Kimana, Mbirikani, Rombo, Olgulului, and Eseleikei group ranches.
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government. Amboseli National Park alone generates about $3.4 million U.S. dollars each year
from tourism, but only two percent of this money reaches local communities (Lange, 2006). The
region faces an overall lack of government support and also suffers from inadequate health care
and educational facilities.
Meanwhile, human densities and settlements within the six group ranches are increasing
because of population growth and an increase in the migration of agriculturalists to the area,
putting pressure on existing resources and causing shortages in both food and water (Berger,
1993; Makonjio Okello, 2005; Makonjio Okello, Buthmann, Mapinu, & Kahi, 2011). The most
prominent land-uses in the Loitokitok division, pastoralism and small-scale agriculture, are also
add odds with each other for resource consumption, adding to this pressure (Ministry of Planning
and National Development & Republic of Kenya, 2001). Agriculture reduces the amount of
habitat available for wildlife and grazing livestock. Group ranch subdivision into individual land
plots for cultivation also prevents the open grazing necessary for pastoralism (Makonjio Okello
et al., 2011; Poole, 2006). Since local agricultural yield is limited by seasonal changes in rainfall,
agriculturalists artificially irrigate their crops and take scarce water from livestock and wildlife.
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Figure 5.1. Map of the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem showing the group ranch locations (Makonjio
Okello, 2005)

This constant competition for scarce resources pits pastoralists, agriculturalists, and
wildlife against each other, as does the lack of government support. It creates H-WC and
exacerbates existing conflicts. As such, the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem is a place with the
potential for local residents to tolerate leopard killing as a release from resource competition and
a solution to H-LC. Understanding the challenges local farmers face and why they do or do not
support conservation efforts can help characterize what contributes to tolerance for leopard
killing.
Four hypotheses drive both this analysis and parts 2 and 3 of this research.
H1: Individuals who have livestock are vulnerable to H-WC.
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H2: Individuals who experience H-WC and its costs are less likely to support conservation.
H3: Support for conservation is low in areas where distrust among actors is high and government
oversight is poor.
H4: If an individual has previous exposure to conservation initiatives, he is more likely to
support conservation.
The School for Field Studies data consists of 234 interviews of Tsavo-Amboseli
ecosystem residents (Viollaz, 2006). Residents were selected based on a cluster sampling method
to increase the representativeness of the sample. Those interviewed lived in four clusters: two
cluster near and two clusters far from conservation initiatives. The interviewers went door-todoor to interview participants and used semi-structured questionnaires with open-ended
questions to allow some flexibility in questioning them. Translators were used to reduce any
potential error in recording responses as well as to put the interviewees at ease. Translators also
vouched for the researchers so interviewees would be honest about their problems with
wildlife.43
The participants were asked about themselves, including age, sex, tribe, and membership
status in the group ranch in which they lived. They were also asked a series of questions grouped
around three topics:
1) H-WC;

43

Although the reliability of interviewee responses is always a concern in qualitative research,
the circumstances surrounding this project suggest that most responses here are accurate. The
School for Field Studies has a long history of fieldwork in the study area and has developed
strong ties with the local community. They provide jobs for local people at their facilities and the
influx of students they bring is a major source of revenue for local shop owners and farmers.
They also work with local communities to find solutions to H-WC and discuss local farmers’
problems with the KWS on their behalf.
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2) Relationship to wildlife;
3) Beliefs about conservation.
These questions included whether they benefited from local wildlife conservation efforts and
what the nature of those benefits was, what impacts wildlife conservation had on them, and what
their attitudes and perceptions were on the subject (see figure A1 in the Appendix for the full
questionnaire).

Analytical strategy

The responses from the 234 interviewees were formatted into an SPSS database and used
to run descriptive statistics on the following variables: sex, age, level of education (no education,
primary, secondary +), livelihood strategy (agriculture, pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, other), job
satisfaction, and economic status (low, medium, high). Job satisfaction was determined by asking
residents to rate the appropriateness of their primary livelihood strategy as not sufficient,
sufficient or highly sufficient.
The first set of analyses in part 1 creates an overview of the H-WC situation in the TsavoAmboseli ecosystem based on responses to the following questions:
1) In your opinion, what has been the biggest challenge to wildlife conservation in this
region?
2) How do you benefit from the presence of wildlife in the area?
3) How is wildlife beneficial to others?
4) How is wildlife imposing a cost on you?
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5) How is there a public/communal cost to wildlife?
6) If not for economic benefits/incentives, would you still support wildlife conservation?
7) Do you have any suggestions as to how the negative impacts [of H-WC] can be reduced?
A logistic regression was then used to determine what variables influenced respondents’
attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities. The dependent
variable was a respondent’s attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating
activities44, coded as either “positive” or “negative” (N = 226)45. 233 out of 234 interviewees
responded to the question. Six independent variables were included in the model (see table 5.2
for a list of these variables and how they are measured).

44

Note that most, if not all, the conservation initiatives in the study area generate income.
233 interviewees originally responded to this question, but 7 respondents stated they were
ambivalent about wildlife conservation-based income generating activities. Their answers were
excluded from the analysis, resulting in a final sample size of 226.
45
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Table 5.2. List of independent variables for part 1 of this analysis
Variable name
Wildlife cost

Question asked
Is wildlife imposing a cost to
you?

Coding
0 = No
1 = Yes

N
234

Wildlife benefit

Do you benefit in any way from
the presence of wildlife in the
area?

0 = No
1 = Yes

234

Economic status

How do you rate your economic
status?

0 = Low
1= Medium
2 = High

234

Education

What is your level of education?

1 = No education
2 = Primary
3 = Secondary +

233

Exposure to
conservation

Generally, have you been exposed
to issues touching on wildlife
conservation?

0 = No
1 = Yes

233

Mismanagement

Is KWS mismanaging Amboseli
National Park?

0 = Don’t know
1 = Yes
2 = No

233

Wildlife cost quantifies the amount of H-WC a farmer has experienced. Economic status
indicates how much of a financial toll H-WC has taken on his/her life. Wildlife benefit is
included because some farmers are willing to endure H-WC if they receive financial benefits
from wildlife. These benefits include compensation for lost livestock or crops, employment, or
bursaries for their children’s education.
Amboseli National Park is one of the main profit-generating conservation initiatives in
the study area and is run by the KWS, a federal agency. Mismanagement examines local
farmers’ beliefs about how well KWS runs this park and captures the level of trust between them
and government personnel.
A respondents’ level of education suggests how much formal training they have in
biology and environmental science. This form of training can have a positive effect in cases of
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H-WC because a farmer can, for example, understand the biological reasons why a leopard
would attack his livestock and recognize the behavior is natural instead of believing that
predation is a personal affront and requires retaliation. Exposure to conservation measures what
farmers may have learned from simply living near conservation efforts, which can sometimes
replace school learning.

2. Analysis part 2: South African interviews

Part 2 of this research uses data from 16 interviews collected in 2011 in the Western Cape
Province of South Africa. The Landmark Foundation, an NPO focused on leopard conservation,
was managing the reserve at the time and provided the names of local farmers and
conservationists to interview. The goal of these interviews was to understand why leopards were
illegally killed in the area and to obtain contextual information to determine if the H-LC situation
in the Western Cape Province was similar to that of the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem. A total of 7
farmers, 3 conservation NPO workers, and 6 government officials were interviewed.
15 out of the 16 interviews were conducted in proximity to Wildcliff Nature Reserve
(GPS coordinates: -33.96010, 21.03500). The 16th interview was conducted at a private nature
reserve near Hermanus in the Western Cape Province, located about two and a half hours east of
the reserve, but with a similar fynbos habitat.
Wildcliff Nature Reserve is 955 hectares of preserved land adjacent to the Boosmanbos
Wilderness Area in the Langeberg Mountains and is located about 20 minutes from Heidelberg
town center. Most of the land surrounding it is divided into meat and dairy livestock farms with
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some crop farming, while the remainder of the land is devoted to game farms. Most landowners
are white and speak English, while farm hands tend to be black and speak Afrikaans, despite a
recent government initiative to give farmland to black South Africans for cultivation. The roads
outside of Heidelberg town center are dirt with slabs of concrete acting as river bridges, so
flooding is a significant problem during the rainy season.
The area surrounding the reserve is rife with H-LC and lacks government oversight, but
unlike in Kenya, tourism is not a major source of revenue. Local farmers feel that the
government provides little financial support. Reports of retaliatory leopard killings are plentiful
and, as such, it is an ideal location for tolerance of leopard killing (McManus, 2009).
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Figure 5.2. Map of the South African Provinces, cities relevant to this research, and locations of
H-LCs

Individuals recommended by The Landmark Foundation were contacted by phone and
asked if they would be willing to talk about “leopard poaching” in the region; all agreed. The
semi-structured interviews lasted 1-2 hours46. Although a list of interview questions was drawn
up prior to the interviews, the flow of conversation determined the topics covered with
occasional prompts based on the questions (see figure A2 in the Appendix for the list of preprepared interview questions).
46

No notes were taken during interviews to put respondents at ease. Conversations were typed
up from memory immediately following the interview.
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The Landmark Foundation recommended a combination of farmers applying leopardfriendly livestock farming techniques and farmers opposed to their conservation work. Even
those farmers angry with The Landmark Foundation were eager to share their point of view and
many went to great length to describe the challenges they faced from leopards47.
Conservationists came from The Landmark Foundation, a local private wildlife reserve, and the
Western Cape Province government wildlife service, Cape Nature. Emphasis was placed on the
fact that the research was not affiliated with any local actor, that respondents’ identities would be
kept confidential, and that it was meant to be a fact-finding mission to benefit from respondents’
insider knowledge of the situation.
At the end of each interview, participants were asked if they could recommend other
people to talk to. This method of snowball sampling was essential in this tight-knit rural
community. Being vouched for by a community member allowed local farmers to open up about
leopard problems in the area. Ongoing tensions between farmers and The Landmark Foundation
over efforts to conserve leopards and prevent retaliatory killings may have biased the responses
given during the interviews, but the varying opinions and sensitive information shared by the
participants suggest otherwise. Farmers were not shy in admitting they knew who had killed
leopards in the community and sharing names. They also openly criticized The Landmark
Foundation and their methods while, at the same time, working with them.
Government workers were also contacted via email and, when possible, in person, asking
if they knew of leopard poaching cases in their area and had data on them. These email
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In one such case, a farmer took this researcher on his cattle rounds to show her his daily
routine.
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exchanges, from April to September 2011, were also added to the interview data to represent the
government’s perspective (see table 5.3 for government interviewees).

Table 5.3. South African government employees interviewed either in person or via email
Title
Conservation Services Manager
Ecological Coordinator for the Langeberg area

Organization
Cape Nature, Riversdale, Western Cape
Province
Cape Nature, Western Cape Province

Program Manager, Biodiversity Crime Unit

Cape Nature, Stellenbosch, Western Cape
Province

Official for H-WC

Cape Nature, Western Cape Province

Environmental management inspector & acting
deputy director

Department of Economic Development,
Tourism, and Environmental Affairs, Free
State Province

Head, Professional Hunting Division, Wildlife
Protection Services

Tourism and Parks Agency, Mpumalanga
Province

Analytical strategy

A content analysis was conducted of the interview data. A series of codes were generated
inductively to determine what major themes respondents discussed and what attitudes they held.
An inductive method made it possible to look at the data without any preconceptions and allow
novel concepts to emerge (Lewins & Silver, 2007). Open coding generated both descriptive and
conceptual codes by reviewing small segments of the interviews and comparing them to each
other (Lewins & Silver, 2007). These codes were then refined using axial coding where “code
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labels and the data linked to them are rethought in terms of similarity and difference” and only
the codes that best illustrated concepts and relationships found in the data were kept (Lewins &
Silver, 2007, p. 84).
Table 5.4 describes the different codes and how they were conceptualized and
operationalized. The codes are separated into 5 broad categories based on the information they
provide (distrust, ecological beliefs, H-LCs, illegal killings, and solutions).
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Table 5.4. List of codes for content analysis of South African interviews
Code Name
Distrust
Anger
Fear
Distrust

Applied when…

Reason for code

Respondents express anger at leopards, the current state of predation,
the current conservation situation, or actors involved in the area.
Quotations suggesting that local actors live in fear as a result of H-WC.

Shows the general state of mind and tension
existing among local actors.
Shows how H-LC is affecting local actors’
mindset and way of life.
Lack of trust is a major obstacle to the
implementation of solutions. If it exists, it
must be addressed first.

Quotations suggesting that third parties or even farmers themselves do
not trust other farmers when it comes to leopard conservation/illegal
killings.
Quotes suggesting that members of the public do not trust the
government and its personnel when it comes to leopard
conservation/illegal killings.

Corruption

Failure of government
response
Ecological beliefs
Rational for predator
intolerance

Livestock loss expectation

Quotes suggesting that third parties do not trust NPO personnel when it
comes to leopard conservation/illegal killings.
Any reference to corruption as a factor in how leopard livestock
predation and illegal leopard killings are investigated or dealt with in
the area. Quote must include the word “corruption.”
Comments suggesting the government’s current handling of H-LCs and
illegal leopard killings is not working.

Quotes that give reasons why a person dislikes leopards. These include
things such as “leopards have criminal intent” or “leopards kill more
than they can eat; that is unnecessary and wasteful.”

Quotes describing farmers’ beliefs about acceptable losses of livestock.
Quote must include the words “livestock loss” or any of its derivatives
(i.e. “lost livestock”).

Perceived corruption can affect whether or
not suggested H-WC solutions are
embraced and gain legitimacy.
A belief that government actions are not
working can breed distrust, which can then
stop actors from implementing solutions.
For solutions to H-WC to garner
widespread support, people must accept that
they are not 100% effective. This requires
mitigating predator intolerance so people
are willing to accept some level of conflict
with them. Mitigating intolerance requires
understanding why it occurs.
If farmers believe any livestock loss to
leopards is unacceptable, part of the
solution must be to change that belief.
Livestock losses are inevitable and any
solutions offered can only limit losses.
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Natural prey availability

Quotes describing farmers’ beliefs about how much natural prey is
available in the area for leopards to eat. Quote must include the words
“prey” and “available” or any of their derivatives.

Unsustainable land use

Quotes describing unsustainable land uses or practices in the area.

H-LC
Human-wildlife conflict:
Cost
Predation prevention
beliefs
Why & when predation

Illegal killings
Rational for leopard killing

Poaching network
Leopard killing method48
Why & when killed

Solutions
Judicial outcome

48

Farmers often argue that leopards should
not be attacking livestock because there is
enough wild prey to eat. If this mindset is
prevalent, it can stop farmers from
accepting losses. This would need to be
addressed before offering solutions.
Damaging the environment through
unsustainable use is a major contributing
factor for H-WC. If such practices exist,
they must be rooted out for H-WC solutions
to be effective.

Examples of how H-WC imposes a cost on humans. Apply if quote
discusses any interaction between humans and wildlife that is unwanted
and imposes costs on either.
Quotes explaining what methods biologists, NPOs, government
officials, farmers, and the general public believe should be used to
prevent leopard livestock predation.
Quotes describing why and when biologists, NPOs, government
officials, farmers, and the general public believe leopards eat livestock.

Knowing how wildlife imposes a cost is
necessary to come up with ways of stopping
or reversing these costs.
Compare if different actors have the same
beliefs about what predation prevention
methods work.
Compare if different actors have the same
beliefs about why and when predation
occurs.

Justifications individuals provide for why they believe it is acceptable
to shoot a leopard.

Understanding their rational for killings can
help determine how to remove excuses for
their behavior.
Understand if the threat to leopards is
organized or opportunistic.
Help identify the major threats to leopards
(gin traps, poison, hunting dogs, etc.).
Compare if different actors have the same
beliefs about why and when it takes place.

Quotes suggesting that offenders had help or belonged to an organized
group.
Quotations describing how leopards are killed in the area.
Quotes describing why and when biologists, NPOs, government
officials, farmers, and the general public believe leopard poaching and
retaliatory killings take place.
Description of judicial outcomes for prosecutions of leopard
killings/poaching.

Determine if illegal killing cases are being
prosecuted successfully.

All interviews were also coded on whether or not respondents believed leopards were being illegally killed in the region.
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Solutions: Suggested &
attempted
Solutions: Why working

Description of any suggested or attempted solutions to prevent leopard
livestock predation and illegal leopard killings.
Quotes that explain or suggest why certain solutions to poaching and
retaliatory killings are working. These quotes come from the
organizations deploying these solutions or the people they are intended
for.

Compile a list of all solutions to determine
what exists.
Knowing why certain solutions are working
can help in designing new more effective
solutions.

103

3. Analysis part 3: Indian media articles

The data for part 3 of this research comes from a non-traditional data source, Google
Alerts. Google Alerts is a notification system that sends users an email anytime the Google
search engine finds new results for a set of keywords (Google, 2014). The search engine includes
results from Google Web Search, Google Blog Search, and Google News. This analysis used
Google Alerts results to create a database of articles on illegal leopard killings in India to better
understand the human situational factors that motivated these killings.
India has a history of H-LC and tolerance for illegal leopard killings, but its retaliatory
leopard killings have a slightly different modus operandi. Most Indian retaliatory killings are in
response to leopard predation on humans instead of livestock. Leopard attacks on humans and
cattle date back to India’s days as a British colony. Statistics from the British government from
1875-1912 suggest a fluctuating pattern of H-LC conflict as population size grew and
industrialization took hold (see figures 5.3 and 5.4), a pattern that continues today and on which
the local news media commonly report (see figure 5.5) (Athreya & Belsare, 2007; University of
Chicago, 2013).
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Figure 5.3. Number of people killed by leopards in India from 1875 to 1912 based on year and
province (Adapted from University of Chicago (2013))
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Figure 5.4. Number of cattle killed by leopards in India from 1875 to 1912 based on year and
province (Adapted from University of Chicago (2013))
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Table 5.5. Number of people attacked by leopards from 1990 to 2005 in some Indian states
(Adapted from Athreya and Belsare (2007))
Indian state

Conflict location

Type of habitat

Maharashtra

Junnar Forest
Division
Sanjay Gandhi
National Park
Ahmednagar
Forest Division
West & East Duars
Outside Gir
National Park

Sugarcane fields

West Bengal
Gujarat

Uttarakhand

Vadodara Forest
Circle
Garhwal

# of people
attacked
5149

Date
2001-2003

In and around
protected area
Sugarcane fields

9750

2002-2004

10651

1997-2005

Tea gardens
Sugarcane fields
and mango
orchards
Tall crops

12152
2753

1990-1997
1990-1999

85054

1992-2002

Near villages

35255

1991-2003

Analytical strategy

The database articles were collected using two Google Alerts for the keywords “leopard
killing” and “leopard poaching”. No quotation marks were included so that any web content with
the words either separately or together would be included in the results. All results had to be in
English, but were not limited by region56. A trademarked Google algorithm called PageRank
filtered the results by assigning a score to the web page based on the following factors
(Strickland, 2014):
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Athreya, Thakur, Chaudhuri, and Belsare (2004)
Maharashtra Forest Department records.
51
Maharashtra Forest Department records.
52
WWF-India (1997) and Field Director, Buxa Tiger Reserve, personal communication.
53
Vijayan and Pati (2002); Pati, Hirapara, Solanki, and Vijayan (2004).
54
Chaudhuri (2004).
55
Uttarakhand Forest Department records.
56
Google Alerts in French were created on 04/03/14 for similar key words but produced no
results between 04/03/14 and 07/10/14.
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1) the frequency and location of key words within the page;
2) how long the web page has existed;
3) the number of other web pages linked to this one.
Older pages with higher frequencies of key words and more links to the page therefore obtain
higher scores. This filtering and the Google Alerts default setting “only the best results”
produced only high quality results most relevant to the keywords (Google, 2014).
The alerts found 267 pertinent articles from May 28th, 2012 to July 10th, 2014. These
articles met two inclusion criteria:
1) The article discussed leopard poaching or leopard killing either in general terms or cited a
specific event.
2) The main subject of the article did not have to be leopard poaching or killing, as long as it
referenced either.
Of the 267 articles, only those describing events in India during the 2012 calendar year
were included in the final sample, a total of 68 cases. A content analysis of these 68 articles was
performed using the same codes as part 2 of this research. The reason for limiting the number of
cases was two-fold. First, a preliminary analysis of the first 90 of the original 267 articles and
found that their content was very similar. A subsequent comparison of the first 30 articles in the
sample of 68 and the next 38 articles found no difference in their findings, suggesting that
including more cases was unlikely to produce additional information. Second, leopard attacks on
humans and livestock vary seasonally based on rainfall, prey availability, and the mating season
(Butler, 2000; Graham et al., 2005; National Wildlife Research Center, 2010). A full year of
articles was therefore necessary to draw reliable conclusions from the data.
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Media data has several limitations worth noting. First, the H-LCs reported online will not
be representative of all H-LCs that occur. The media tends to focus on more sensational cases so
the sample for this analysis could be biased (Entman & Gross, 2008; Gordon, 2000). This is
especially relevant for India where leopard attacks on humans, rather than livestock, are often
reported (Raina, 2011; Singh, 2014). Second, the PageRank algorithm may rule out web pages in
developing countries, which tend to be relatively new and have fewer links to them (Strickland,
2014). Results might therefore be biased towards western world sources that report on H-LCs in
developing countries (for example, the New York Times published an article on Indian leopard
attacks on humans on August 5th, 2011 (Raina, 2011)).
After looking at the Google Alerts results, there appears to be little western world source
bias, as most of the of the articles come from developing countries in Southeast Asia. The
majority of these stories come from India. As for sensational case bias, a review of the scholarly
and grey literature on Indian H-LCs suggests that these articles capture the different H-LC
scenarios described by Indian researchers and government personnel: leopard attacks on humans
and leopard attacks on livestock (Athreya & Belsare, 2007; Athreya et al., 2010; Chauhan, 2011;
Marker & Sivamani, 2009). Although leopard attacks on humans do get more column inches
than attacks on livestock, both are still reported with enough frequency and diversity of scenarios
that sensational case bias is not a major concern.

109

4. Analysis part 4: GIS analysis of South African illegal leopard deaths

The final part of this research identifies the geospatial factors that contribute to H-LCs
and retaliatory leopard killings by mapping the location of killings, creating a database of
locations’ environmental situational factors, and then running non-parametric tests on the data. A
case-control design (CCD) is used to compare locations with retaliatory leopard killings to two
types of matched controls without.
The retaliatory leopard killings in this analysis took place near Wildcliff Nature Reserve
and the town of Heidelberg (same as part 2, figure 5.2), and around Baviaanskloof conservation
area and the Greater Addo Elephant National Park in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa.
The Baviaanskloof and Greater Addo areas are mountainous, but contain all the major South
African vegetation biomes57 except for desert (McManus, 2009). A large part of the land is split
into fruit orchards and irrigation-based agriculture or sheep and goat livestock farms, with a
small percentage of cattle farms. Numerous reports of leopard predation on livestock and
retaliatory leopard killings in the area suggest that tolerance for leopard killing is widespread
there (McManus, 2009).
The location of retaliatory leopard killings comes from GPS collar and carcass recovery
data from a small-scale NPO, The Landmark Foundation, that focuses on preventing retaliatory
leopard killings in rural communities. This information is in the form of a GPS point where a
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Biomes are groupings of plants based on dominant species and climatic factors (South African
National Biodiversity Institute, 2010).
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conflict was reported or a carcass was found or reported to be58. Research has shown that counts
of observed crimes are not the same as the number of crimes actually occurring (Maxfield &
Babbie, 2008). This is true of H-LCs and retaliatory leopard killings. Known cases probably
reflect a small percentage of the actual number of incidents that take place every year.
Retaliatory leopard killings may be at higher risk of under-reporting because offenders are able
to bury or conceal any evidence. The illegality of leopard killing and the stigma and anger
surrounding it in certain communities make it difficult to bypass this data problem.
One advantage of the data from The Landmark Foundation is that researchers involved
with its work are so embedded in the local community that most cases of illegal leopard killing
eventually surface through informants and gossip (Farmer 1, personal communication, August
17, 2011; NPO worker 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). The Landmark Foundation
researchers live in the area where they protect leopards and, as such, are part of the fabric of the
community, much like beat cops involved in community policing (Lindberg, 2008; Weisheit,
Edward Wells, & Falcone, 1994). As with community policing, non-profits working in rural
communities succeed because they gain the trust of local residents by acting as problem solvers
rather than punitive enforcement agents (Weisheit et al., 1994). Local residents share information
with them on the problems in their area (including leopard poaching) and work with them to find
solutions (Lindberg, 2008; Weisheit et al., 1994) (Government wildlife official 2, personal
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There are multiple ways to know if a leopard has been illegally killed and where this incident
took place: 1) The body of a leopard is discovered showing signs of non-natural death (including
poisoning which can be determined at autopsy). 2) A leopard wearing a radio collar disappears
and the age of the leopard precludes death from old age and the radio collar is too far from its
expiration date to have stopped working.
3) An individual reports that someone has killed a leopard.
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communication, August 19, 2011). The Landmark Foundation therefore provides one of the most
accurate estimates of H-LC and illegal leopard killing counts available.

Analytical strategy

The dependent variable for this analysis is whether or not a 5.5 km x 4.7 km area has
experienced H-LC resulting in a retaliatory leopard killing. The number of cases is 13: 15 cases
of retaliatory leopard killings in 13 different locations from November 1st, 2005 to April 1st, 2011
(see table 5.6 for a list of these cases). In table 5.6, there are four cases where a H-LC occurred
but no leopard died. These cases are included in the analysis as retaliatory leopard killings
because the only reason the leopard lived was that Landmark Foundation employees rescued it
from either a gin trap or a farmer willing to shoot it. Had they not intervened, the leopard would
have died.
All data were aggregated to a 5.5 km x 4.7 km area to map them and create the database
of location characteristics59. This area is referred to in the remainder of the text as a “grid cell”
(see figure 5.5 for a map grid cell distribution). The grid cell size is 5.4 km x 4.7 km for three
reasons:
1) The biggest resolution for the data in the shapefiles is 1 km x 1 km (Arkansas Forest
Resources Center & University of Arkansas, n.d.), requiring that the grid cell be at least
that size.
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The data for this analysis were generally available as GIS shapefiles and, if not, a shapefile
was manually created (see the “data sources” section, below, for more information). The
shapefiles were projected with the geographic coordinate system GCS_WGS_1984 and the
projected coordinate system Africa_Albers_Equal_Area_Conic.
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2) The GPS locations for leopard retaliatory killings were accurate, but not always exact.
They sometimes corresponded to the location of the farm where the conflict or death
occurred. The 5.4 km x 4.7 km size allowed for this amount of error.
3) A 5.4 km x 4.7 km grid cell provided more environmental context when running nonparametric tests.

113

Table 5.6. List of the H-LCs and retaliatory killing cases used for the dependent variable
Date
4/1/11
3/9/11
Early
9/10*
Mid 8/10*
Late 7/10*
6/9/10
6/8/10
10/08
4/13/08
1/29/08
11/28/07
6/19/06
4/1/06
2/1/06
11/1/05

Location
Ladismith area
Potberg/Dehoop
Patensie

Province
Western Cape
Western Cape
Eastern Cape

Conflict
Unknown
Caught ostrich on ostrich farm.
Shot by farmer on his farm.

Outcome
Died
Collared
Died

Leopard sex
Male
Female
Male

Leopard age
Adult
Adult
Sub-adult

Patensie
Patensie
Heidelberg

Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Western Cape

Died
Died
Collared

Male
Male
Male

Adult
Adult
Adult

Winterhoek
Mountains
Cockscomb
Glenconner
Stellenbosch
Baviaanskloof
Kammanasie
Baviaanskloof
Cockscomb
Baviaanskloof
Kouga
Baviaanskloof
Kouga

Western Cape

Shot by farmer on his farm.
Shot by farmer on his farm.
Fell into farm’s water reservoir. Farmer wanted
to shoot.
Caught in gin trap.

Died

Male

Sub-adult

Eastern Cape
Western Cape

Killed.
Caught in gin trap.

Died
Collared

Male
Male

Adult
Adult

Eastern Cape
Western Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape

Shot by farmer on his farm.
Caught in gin trap.
Caught in gin trap and hunted with dogs.
Caught in gin trap.
Hunted with dogs.

Died
Died
Died
Released
Died

Male
Male
Male
Female
Unknown

Adult
Adult
Adult
Adult
Juvenile

Eastern Cape

Hunted with dogs.

Died

Male

Adult

*These three cases occurred at the same geographical location and were therefore treated as one case for the analysis.
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Figure 5.5. Examples of grid cells in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa

To determine what environmental situational factors contribute to retaliatory leopard
killings, it is necessary to compare the characteristics of locations with killings to those without.
Case-control design (CCD) is the best method to do so for three reasons. First, CCD is meant to
generate hypotheses about causal connections when dealing with causal variables that result in a
rare outcome (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002; Stretesky, 2009). The outcome variable in this
analysis, retaliatory leopard killings, is rare (based on sample size) in the study area (N = 13).
Second, CCD is also used in cases when the outcome is rare and cannot be simulated to obtain a
bigger sample size (Shadish et al., 2002). As the purpose of this research is to help determine
where these killings occur, it is premature to try to simulate additional cases. Third, CCD
preserves degrees of freedom necessary for statistical analyses.
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Matched controls were chosen because the analysis’ theoretical framework and
hypotheses suggested the locations of retaliatory leopard killings are linked to environmental
factors found only in these locations and not elsewhere. These matched controls are cells
adjacent to the experimental grid cells where killings occurred. Yet Shadish et al. (2002, p. 129)
state that a common problem with matched controls is that they “still differ from cases in
unobserved ways that can be confounded with the presumed cause and can be the actual cause of
the outcome.” To avoid this type of error, two control groups are used: 1) controls sampled from
an adjacent cell and 2) controls sampled randomly from a buffer zone of cells within 4 grid cells
of the experimental cells and excluding adjacent cells (buffer length = 48.6 km, width = 42.3 km,
diagonal = 64.43 km). The size of the buffer zone was chosen for two reasons:
1) It had to be equal or smaller than the average home range size of a female leopard in the
region, 88.39 km2.60 The female home range size was used because it is smaller than a
male’s (157.27 km2) and the sex of the leopard involved in H-LC in an experimental cell
was not always known.
2) A smaller buffer was more appropriate because it is assumed that leopards were more
likely to be in cells closer to the location of the original H-LC than in cells further away.

Two types of independent variables are used in this analysis: 1) variables relating to
where a H-LC incident took place (i.e. vegetation cover) and 2) variables describing when it took
place (i.e. season). Both types of environmental situational variables are important to this
analysis because the characteristics of a location change over time and leopard predation on
60

The average leopard home range size in the study area is based on research by McManus
(2009).
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either humans or livestock is seasonal (Butler, 2000; Graham et al., 2005; National Wildlife
Research Center, 2010). The weather at a particular time of year affects variables like vegetation
cover and prey availability, which then determine how suitable a location is for leopard survival
and whether or not a leopard will go after non-natural prey.

Land-use overlap and bordering

Leopards generally shy away from human contact, even more so than the average wild
animal (Gates, 2013). Given this, there is little opportunity for H-LC, unless the location of a
leopard’s food and/or its territory is adjacent to or overlaps human settlement (Bailey, 2005).
Previous research has shown that leopards are threatened by habitat loss (Al-Johany, 2007;
Ghoddousi et al., 2010), suggesting that land-use overlap between leopards and humans may be a
growing problem. The hypotheses below describe the expected relationship between humanleopard land-use overlap and retaliatory leopard killings (see table 5.7 at the end of this section
for a list of all the concepts, variables, data sources, and coding methods used in this analysis):

H4.1: Retaliatory leopard killings are more likely to occur where human settlements overlap with
leopard territory or habitat.
H4.2: Retaliatory leopard killings are more likely to occur where human settlements border
leopard territory or habitat.
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The concept of human settlement is measured using the Global Human Influence Index
database (version 2) from the Last of the Wild Project. This database calculates a Human
Influence Index from nine different datasets with four types of data as proxies for human
influence: population density, land transformation, accessibility, and electrical power
infrastructure. It also normalizes this index within geographical biomes to control for how the
type of ecosystem and human histories in different regions influenced human presence
(Sanderson et al., 2002). The source data dates from 1995-2004, with the latest version of the
dataset published in 2005 (National Aeronautics and Space Administration Socioeconomic Data
and Applications Center & Columbia University, 2005). Human Influence Index values vary
between 0 and 100 (0 = no human influence). The human influence score for each grid cell
corresponds to the mean of all the Human Influence Index values found within it (one index
value for each 1km2 of area).
Leopard territory is measured by grid cell proximity to the leopard’s range as determined
by the IUCN Red List of Endangered Species (IUCN, 2012). All the grid cells used in this
analysis are within leopard territory. This territory is also measured by the presence or absence of
protected areas in the grid cell because wildlife in general prefers wild land to semi-wild land.
Grid cells with no protected areas in them are coded as 0, those where less than 50% of the cell is
a protected area as 1, those where 50-90% is a protected area as 2, and those where more than
90% is a protected area as 3. GIS shapefiles indicating the location of government-controlled
national parks and protected areas come from The Landmark Foundation.
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Leopard abundance

Without reliable worldwide estimates of leopard numbers to determine the likelihood of
human-leopard interactions (Al-Johany, 2007; Liberg et al., 2011) (NPO worker 3, personal
communication, July 2011), it is necessary to rely on studies by NPOs that estimate leopard
numbers in small geographical areas. The problem with these estimates is two-fold. First, their
accuracy depends on how pro-active organizations were at collaring leopards and, second, if the
study area is large, they do not assess where leopards are more likely to congregate and conflict
with humans.
Prime leopard habitat (like mountain slopes in South Africa) will attract more leopards
and can also support larger numbers of leopards per square mile than sub-par habitat. As such,
the location of prime leopard habitat is a better proxy measure of leopard abundance than
potentially inaccurate population counts.
Having larger numbers of leopards per square mile increases the chances of humanleopard contact. This increase in human-leopard contact creates a greater potential for livestock
predation or leopard attacks on humans and can trigger larger numbers of retaliatory leopard
killings. Based on this, the following hypotheses is made:

H4.3: Leopards are more likely to be illegally killed in areas of prime leopard habitat, when
controlling for human settlement and road location.
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For this hypothesis, the location of prime leopard habitat is based on vegetation cover and
road and river location. Prime leopard habitat includes sufficient vegetation to stalk prey
successfully and a water source for hydration, where prey also congregate (Bailey, 2005;
Panthera, 2015). It would not include large multi-lane roads, with or without high levels of
traffic, as many large cats avoid going near or crossing roads that are 2 lanes or more (Dickson,
Jenness, & Beier, 2005; Schwab & Zandbergen, 2011; Schwartzstein, 2014).
Vegetation cover data come from the South African National Biodiversity Institute’s
(SANBI) National Vegetation Map of South Africa Project (VEGMAP). SANBI created this
map of South African vegetation types in 2006 using data from 60 individual contributors (South
African National Biodiversity Institute, 2006a, 2006b). It identifies 440 types of vegetation and
11 biomes. The biome type that covers the largest percentage of a grid cell is recorded as the
biome for that cell.
The road and river location data come from The Landmark Foundation. The presence of a
road is coded differently based on the type of road: primary, secondary, or tertiary road, and
other access (i.e. driveways or farm access roads). Two different road variables were created
from the data: total length of all roads in a grid cell and total length of main roads (in
kilometers). Main roads were those classified as “main roads”, “street”, or “national route” in the
shapefiles. The reason for this coding is that the number of roads in a grid cell is less important
to leopard and human movement than the amount of road surface a leopard may have to cross to
get from point A to point B or the amount of road a human can use to travel in that cell. The river
variable is coded as the length of all rivers within a grid cell (in kilometers). Perennial and nonperennial rivers were included in the analysis based on the date of the H-LC for an experimental
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grid cell or the date randomly assigned to a control cell (see the Analytical Strategy section
below for more information on control grid cells). Non-perennial rivers were excluded if the date
associated with a control cell or the date of a H-LC was during the dry season.

Poor leopard habitat

An alternate explanation is that leopards living in poor habitat are more likely than
leopards in prime habitat to resort to livestock predation and, therefore, that livestock owners
living within poor leopard habitat are more likely to kill leopards in retaliation for livestock
predation. Hence, the alternate hypothesis:

H4.3b: Leopards are more likely to be killed in areas that provide poor leopard habitat, when
controlling for human settlement and road location61.

For this hypothesis, the location of poor leopard habitat is based on vegetation cover and
road and river location, but also includes prey availability and prey abundance. Availability and
abundance are important to include because a wider range of available prey species implies more
potential prey to eat, as does larger numbers of individuals per prey species per square kilometer.
Availability is measured as the number of prey species whose range overlaps with a grid
cell, coded as a number from 0 onwards. The list of leopard prey species comes from a meta-

61

H3 and H4 discuss the idea that leopard numbers determine the chance of an interaction and
potential H-LC. H5 and H6 have to do with the ease of catching prey and the chance that a
leopard will resort to livestock predation if it cannot feed itself from natural resources.
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analysis of all leopard prey studies done by Hayward et al. (2006). 96 prey species were selected
after excluding possible prey species that leopards never ate in the meta-analysis studies or that
leopards avoided unless no other prey were available (i.e. prey of last resort). The prey range
shapefiles come from the IUCN Red List of Endangered Species (IUCN, 2012). Shapefiles were
found for 74 out of the 96 prey species. Of these, 47 resided within the study area.
Abundance is measured as the sum of all prey species abundance scores within a grid
cell. For example, if bushbuck abundance is 15 individuals per km2 and hyrax abundance is 30
per km2 for a grid cell, the prey abundance score for that cell is 45. The abundance scores come
from Hayward et al. (2006). They calculated mean percentage abundance scores for all leopard
prey species using data from 29 published and four unpublished studies of leopard diet in 25
conservation areas in 13 countries. Both variables, prey availability and prey abundance, were
tested for spatial auto-correlation since there was a risk that adjacent grid cells would have the
same values.

Weather and poor leopard habitat

Poor habitat conditions are exacerbated by seasonal changes in weather between the dry
and wet season. Certain seasons provide worse hunting conditions for leopards within poor
habitat. There is less foliage, for example, during the dry season, making it more difficult for
leopards to successfully stalk prey. Many prey species also migrate to better habitat during the
dry season, leaving non-migratory leopards living in poor habitat with less prey to hunt. Given
this, the following hypothesis is proposed:
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H4.4: Leopards are more likely to be killed in areas that provide poor leopard habitat during the
dry season, when controlling for human settlement and road location.

The South African Rain Atlas is used to determine whether or not a retaliatory leopard
killing occurred during the dry season (Kratz, Zucchini, & Nenadic, n.d.). It provides simulated
rainfall averages for each week anywhere in South Africa (Kratz et al., n.d.). Each grid cell was
given a date based on when a H-LC occurred there or assigned a random date for control cells.
Dates were classified into wet versus dry season based on whether or not a cell’s monthly rainfall
was above or below the monthly average (calculated using the annual rainfall value divided by
12). Grid cells where a H-LC took place during the dry season received a code of 0. They
received a 1 if the H-LC was during the wet season.

After creating and uploading the shapefiles for all these independent variables into
ArcGIS (see figure 5.6), a dataset of retaliatory leopard killing locations and their characteristics
was produced. It includes independent variable data for the dependent variable grid cells
(experimental cells) and the two types of matched control grid cells.
Non-parametric tests were then run to determine which environmental situational factors
influenced where retaliatory leopard killings took place62. Non-parametric tests were necessary
because all the independent variables were not normally distributed for at least one of the grid
cell types. Non-parametric tests were also better suited to a small sample size (see chapter 6 part

62

Exact significance was used for the non-parametric test results because of the small sample
size (N = 39).
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4 for further justification of the statistical test choices). Correlations were run on the independent
variables to insure that none of them were correlated.
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Figure 5.6. Example of an experimental grid cell with all the environmental factors mapped in
ArcGIS
Legend
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River
Biome: Albany thicket
Biome: Fynbos
Prey range shapefile
Human-leopard conflict

CC
J


Grid cell boundary
Human-influence index
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Table 5.7. List of the concepts, variables, data sources, and coding methods used in part 4
Independent
variable
Human settlement

Concept measured
Land-use overlap &
bordering

Hypothesis

Data source

Data date63

Variable coding

H4.1, H4.2

Last of the Wild Project

1995-2004

The Landmark Foundation

2009

South African National Biodiversity
Institute
The Landmark Foundation

2009

0-100
0 = no human influence
0 = no protected areas
1 = less than 50% of cell is
protected area
2 = between 50-90%
3 = more than 90%
11 biome types

Protected areas

Vegetation

H4.3-H4.4

Roads

Leopard abundance
(proxy: prime leopard
habitat)

Rivers
Prey availability

Poor leopard habitat

H4.3b, H4.4

The Landmark Foundation
IUCN Red List

2009
2006-2011

Prey abundance

H4.3b, H4.4

Hayward et al

2006

Season

H4.3b, H4.4

South African Rain Atlas

NA
(simulation)

63

2009

Two variables (in km):
Length of all roads
Length of main roads
Length of rivers in km
# prey species whose range
overlaps cell
Sum of species abundance
scores for grid cell
0 = rainy season
1 = dry season

Using data from different years can be problematic if there is temporal variation in the values for each variable. This could be the
case, for example, with vegetation if a forest is being logged and no longer exists from one year to the next. Every effort was made to
find data from the same year, but as this research is dependent on publicly available data sources, this was not always possible.
Nevertheless, the data used are from the years during which the dependent variable was collected, 2005-2011, if not all from the same
year.
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Data Sources
H-LC and retaliatory killing data

Table 5.7 summarizes the variables and data sources.

The Landmark Foundation

The dependent variable data come from The Landmark Foundation, an NPO that runs
small-scale leopard conservation programs and fits leopards with GPS collars to track their
movements. The Foundation promotes leopard conservation and leopard-friendly livestock
farming. The Landmark Foundation researcher Jeannine McManus studies the effectiveness and
ecological and economic viability of non-lethal predation prevention methods on livestock farms
(Landmark Foundation, n.d.). The Foundation supplies farmers with bell collars to ward off
leopards and works with them to reduce livestock losses (Farmer 2, personal communication,
August 5, 2011).
Foundation employees record all non-natural leopard deaths in the Heidelberg area and
the areas around Baviaanskloof conservation area and the Greater Addo Elephant National Park
(in the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces of South Africa) (see appendix E for an example of
their data). They learn of these deaths either through informants, government officials, or when a
collared leopard disappears. The Foundation’s records contain the approximate date and location
of death (GPS coordinates), the age and sex of the leopard (juvenile, sub-adult, adult), and the
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method by which it was killed (gin trap, shot by farmer, etc.). They compile GPS movement data
for the leopards they collar. The Foundation provided the GIS shapefiles for local roads, rivers,
and protected areas, based on research done by Jeannine McManus for her Masters thesis at
Rhodes University (McManus, 2009).

Land-use overlap data
Last of the Wild Project

The Last of the Wild Project produced a dataset that calculates a Human Influence Index
for each 1km2 of the earth and gives that location a score from 0 to 100 (0 = no human
influence).64 “The Human Influence Index (version 2) is […] created from nine global data
layers (source data from 1995-2004) covering human population pressure (population density),
human land use and infrastructure (built-up areas, nighttime lights, land use/land cover), and
human access (coastlines, roads, railroads, navigable rivers)” (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center & Columbia University, 2005) (see
Sanderson et al. (2002) for a list of data layers). The Wildlife Conservation Society and the
Columbia University Center for the International Earth Science Information Network produce
the database. It is publicly available in ArcGIS shapefile format.

64

See page 74 for more details on measurement.
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IUCN Red List Spatial Data

The International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) Red List of Threatened
Species has researchers assess the conservation status of species based on published literature,
expert testimony, population trend data, remote-sensing data on habitat loss, and direct
fieldwork. These researchers compile a profile of the species with ecological characteristics,
including range, and submit it to the appropriate Red List Authority for review. This assessment
is done every 5 to 10 years depending on the species (IUCN, 2012). The last assessment for
leopards took place in 2008. For the leopard’s prey species, the assessments date from 2008 to
2011. The IUCN Red List provides publicly available GIS shapefiles of species’ range (map
scale 1:1,000,000). This data is used to map the leopard’s range and that of its prey species to
determine their availability within its range.

Leopard abundance data
National Vegetation Map of South Africa Project

The National Vegetation Map of South Africa Project (VEGMAP) is a collaborative
initiative managed by the South African National Biodiversity Institute and completed in 2006
(South African National Biodiversity Institute, 2006a). It brings together 60 individual
contributors from several organizations to build a comprehensive map of South African
vegetation using data from individual vegetation studies throughout the region. VEGMAP
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identifies 440 zonal and azonal vegetation types at a working scale of 1:250,000 or better (South
African National Biodiversity Institute, 2006b). It also classifies this vegetation into 11 biomes:
albany thicket, azonal vegetation, desert, forests, fynbos, grassland, Indian Ocean coastal belt,
nama-karoo, savanna, succulent karoo, and water bodies (South African National Biodiversity
Institute, 2010).

Poor habitat data
Hayward et al. (2006) article

Hayward et al. (2006)’s article is a meta-analysis of 29 published and four unpublished
studies of leopard diet that included local prey abundance estimates. The data from these studies
came from 25 conservation areas in 13 countries. Based on these data, Hayward and his
colleagues calculated a mean Jacobs’ index value for every prey species to determine which prey
leopards preferred. The list of leopard prey species used in this analysis is based on this article.
The Jacobs’ index value (D) was calculated using the following formula:

D = r - p / r + p - 2rp

“where r is the proportion of the total kills at a site made up by a species and p is the proportional
abundance of that species for the total prey population” (Jacobs (1974) in Hayward et al. (2006,

130

p. 5)). Jacobs’ index values range from +1 to -1, with +1 indicating maximum preference for a
prey and -1 maximum avoidance.
As part of their study, Hayward et al. (2006) also calculated a mean percentage
abundance for each prey species. These values are used to measure prey abundance for this
analysis.

South African Rain Atlas

The South Africa Rain Atlas provides web users with rainfall-related statistics for South
Africa for every 1 minute of a degree of latitude and longitude in the region (424,646 sites and
about 1.9 km x 1.6 km surface area per site) (Geosystems Global Corporation, 1998; Zucchini &
Nenadic, 2006). The creators of the Atlas, Oleg Nenadic, Gunter Kratz, and Walter Zucchini,
used data from the South African Weather Bureau, the Department of Forestry, the Department
of Agriculture, the South African Sugar Association, and information from farmers and members
of the public to create a model estimating rainfall patterns at each site for any time of year. To
verify the accuracy of their model, the creators compared model rainfall estimates and actual
rainfall data for 5070 locations (Kratz et al., n.d.; Zucchini & Nenadic, 2006).
Besides monthly rainfall projections, the South African Rain Atlas also provides the
estimated number of rain days and storm days for each location, the amount of rain per day, and
the probability of dry runs (consecutive days with no rain) for 5-day increments up to a month
(Kratz et al., n.d.). The data is publicly available on the South Africa Rain Atlas website:
http://wsopuppenkiste.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/rainfall/. This research uses the annual and
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monthly rainfall estimates to determine when poor leopard habitat becomes especially
inhospitable because of low rainfall during the dry season.

Chapter Summary

This research identifies the situational factors that contribute to retaliatory leopard
killings and where they occur in three study locations: the Amboseli and Tsavo West National
Parks area in Kenya, the Heidelberg, Baviaanskloof, and Greater Addo Elephant National Park
regions of South Africa, and India. Three research questions drive the analysis:
1) What is the scope and nature of illegal leopard killings within the study areas?
2) What forms do H-WC driven retaliatory leopard killings take?
3) What geospatial factors contribute to retaliatory leopard killings?
Content analyses of interview data from Kenya and South Africa and 68 media articles
from India are used to determine the human situational factors of H-LC and retaliatory leopard
killings in parts 1-3 of the analysis. Part 4 maps 13 locations of retaliatory leopard killings in the
Heidelberg region of South Africa to better understand their environmental situational factors.
The independent variables for this spatial analysis include river length, prey availability, prey
abundance, road length, main road length, human settlement score, main biome type, park
overlap, and season. Data on these variables come from 6 different academic and NPO sources.
Table 5.1 on page 53 provides a summary of all the analyses.
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Chapter 6: Results

1. Analysis part 1: Kenyan interviews

The results from the first 3 analyses (parts 1, 2, and 3) focus on the human context of HWC and H-LC. The purpose of these analyses is to understand what human situational factors
contribute to these conflicts and to tolerance for leopard killing. As stated in the previous
chapter, the hypotheses for these analyses are:
H1: Individuals who have livestock are vulnerable to H-WC.
H2: Individuals who experience H-WC and its costs are less likely to support conservation.
H3: Support for conservation is low in areas where distrust among actors is high and government
oversight is poor.
H4: If an individual has previous exposure to conservation initiatives, he is more likely to
support conservation.
To understand why a place tolerates leopard killing, one first needs to understand the HWC situation in that area. 87% of respondents in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem reported that
they suffered costs from wildlife, while only 28% received any benefits from wildlife (N = 234).
When asked how they suffered costs from wildlife, respondents stated that wildlife was
destructive.65 Wild animals attacked their livestock, their crops, their property, and sometimes
their neighbors or themselves (see table 6.1 below).

65

All interviewees responded to whether or not they experienced costs or benefits from wildlife
but fewer individuals gave examples of those costs and benefits (Ns ranged from 68 to 208 out of
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Understanding the full impact of H-WC requires putting these numbers in the socioeconomic context of the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem. The majority of respondents, and the
majority of the population, are pastoralists (43%) or agro-pastoralists (30%), with only 27%
depending on agriculture alone (2% cited other livelihood strategies) (N = 234). All local
residents therefore live with the risk of losses from H-WC because of their livelihood strategy.
Table 6.1 shows that pastoralists were actually the most at risk: 41% of those who suffered costs
from wildlife were pastoralists and 30% were agro-pastoralists (H1) (see table 6.1).

Table 6.1. Socio-economic characteristics of respondents living in the Tsavo-Amboseli
ecosystem
Variable

Livelihood strategy*
Suffered costs from
wildlife?

Needs met by
livelihood strategy?

Economic status

Response (in %)
Category of respondent
Pastoralist
Agro-pastoralist
43%
30
41%
30

N
Agriculturist
27
29

234
234

Self-perceived sufficiency of livelihood
Highly sufficient Sufficient
3%
67

Not sufficient
30

234

Self-perceived economic status
High
Medium
8%
69

Low
23

234

*2% of respondents indicated other types of livelihood strategies.
Agriculture and pastoralism, though, are two ways of life that are at odds with each other
in terms of resource consumption. The Kenyan government has been encouraging pastoralists to
sedentarize and convert to agriculture (Poole, 2006). Unfortunately, the region’s semi-arid and
arid climate does not lend itself to high-yield agriculture (Berger, 1993). It is possible to grow
234). Despite this lower sample size, the general themes that come out of these responses can be
useful in understanding the challenges some local residents face from H-WC, especially as these
themes are consistent with H-WC problems described in the literature.
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crops, but they are highly dependent on rainfall and lack of rainfall can have devastating
financial consequences for farmers. Most agriculturalists therefore supplement natural rainfall
with artificial irrigation creating shortages of water and shortages of food when crops fail.
Clearing the land for agriculture also reduces the amount of habitat for grazing livestock,
competing with pastoralists’ livelihood, and reduces the amount of habitat available to wildlife,
increasing the amount of H-WC everyone in the region suffers. Meanwhile, human densities and
settlements in the area are increasing because of population growth and migration of
agriculturalists to the area, only exacerbating the resource competition among pastoralists,
agriculturalists, and wildlife (Berger, 1993).
While most respondents felt that their livelihood strategy met their needs (67%,
compared to 30 % not sufficient and 3% highly sufficient), they ranked their economic status as
“medium” (69%) suggesting they are able to support themselves but are not wealthy (N = 234).
Another 23% ranked their economic status as low, while only 8% thought their economic status
high (N = 234) (see table 6.1). There was no statistically significant difference between the
different livelihood strategies on both these points (X2 = 4.287, df = 6, p = 0.638 for livelihood
strategy meeting their needs and X2 = 3.595, df = 6, p = 0.731 for economic status). These
numbers suggest a socio-economic context where local farmers are able to support themselves
but do not necessarily have an economic cushion to sustain constant financial losses from
carnivore killings of livestock and elephants trampling crops.
The financial difficulties and resource competition described above are among the
reasons why local farmers are not supportive of conservation efforts (H2). In fact, they are the
most common obstacles respondents mention when asked to explain what the biggest challenge
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to conservation was. 66% of respondents believed H-WC was the biggest challenge to wildlife
conservation in this region66 (N = 224). 34% identified H-WC conflict directly while others
talked about the reasons for H-WC, i.e. limited resources (24%) and limited space (8%). Those
that suggested other challenges discussed issues like corruption, lack of knowledge about the
importance of wildlife, and insufficient funding.
The political context and previous conservation attempts in the region are vital to
understanding the current situation. Amboseli National Park was created as part of the fortress
conservation model. Amboseli originated as a game reserve created in 1948 and managed by the
National Park Service (Barrow & Murphee, 1998). “The purpose of game reserves was to protect
wildlife in the areas that could not be established as national parks because they were already
allocated for other purposes” (Viollaz, 2006, p. 5). Both local farmers and wildlife could use the
resources in these multiple-use areas freely (Kameri-Mbote, 2002). In 1961, the reserve’s
management and revenue were handed over to the Kajiado County Council so local group ranch
members could receive direct benefits from wildlife and encourage them to support conservation
(Barrow & Murphee, 1998).
Upon the success of the venture, though, the Kenyan government reclaimed the reserve
and created Amboseli National Park in 1974, forbidding local farmers to use natural resources
within the park (Lange, 2006). The decision strained relations between local farmers and the
KWS, especially when KWS refused to compensate them for the lost resources as promised
66

Surprisingly, 79.1% of respondents said they had never been exposed to wildlife conservation
issues (N = 233). This result is unusual given the prevalence of conservation initiatives in the
area. Furthermore, most interviewees responded coherently to questions requiring an
understanding of what conservation initiatives are, suggesting that they understood the concept
even if they did not know the term for it.
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(Poole, 2006). At the time of the interviews, 2006, Amboseli National Park generated $3.4
million U.S. dollars a year in tourism revenue, but only 2% of this money was returned to local
communities. Talks were ongoing since 2005 to devolve control of the park back to the Kajiado
County Council (Lange, 2006). The presence of such a lucrative conservation venture nearby and
the large number of respondents who suffered costs from wildlife may explain why 74% of
respondents indicated that they would not support wildlife conservation if it were not for
economic benefits (24% would support wildlife conservation without economic benefits while
2% did not know, N = 227) (H3).
Given this context, it comes as no surprise that respondents resented the government for
not sharing the revenue from Amboseli National Park with them and suggested that
conservation-based income generating activities had brought corruption to the area (see table
6.2). Some respondents suggested that wildlife only benefited group ranch officials. 44% of
respondents felt that KWS was mismanaging the park. 27% disagreed and 29% did not know (N
= 233). KWS’ renewed ownership of the park only added to local community members’ anger
when the government failed to protect them from the destruction and injuries “its” wildlife
caused to them, their crops, livestock, and property. Given the large profits generated by the
park, respondents felt they should at least be compensated for their losses, something that
occurred only haphazardly, if at all (H3).
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Table 6.2. The positive and negative aspects of living with wildlife
Negatives

See no benefit from wildlife
Wildlife destructive to:
 Crops
 Livestock
 Property
 People
No compensation for losses
Failure of government to control
wildlife
Corruption

% of
respondents
who cited
point
72%
87%

88%
NA*

Positives

Bursaries
Employment

% of
respondents
who cited
point
54
24

Occasional compensation for losses

12

NA*

* Not applicable here because not quantified in the analysis; simply noted as a recurring concept
during the content analysis.

Although generally frustrated, respondents did identify some benefits they derived from
wildlife conservation. Of those who benefited from wildlife (N = 68), the most common benefit
was bursaries for their children’s education (54%). 24% of respondents also mentioned that
wildlife created opportunities for employment (see table 6.1). 12% cited the compensation they
received for livestock and crop losses. Overall, respondents identified the same benefits and
costs from wildlife for other community members.

H-WC interventions suggested by local stakeholders

Despite 79% of respondents saying they had no experience with conservation (H4, N =
233, see footnote 66), many respondents suggested methods for mitigating H-WCs in keeping
with conservation principles (N = 229). The majority of these responses involved fencing
wildlife in parks or out of human settlements (65%). 38% of respondents felt it was best to erect
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fences around villages to keep wildlife out. 16% supported the idea of compensation for any
damage suffered from wildlife and 3% of those suggested that fences in combination with
compensation would limit damages. Only about 5% suggested killing problem animals; 8%
responded “I don’t know”.
This last finding is perhaps the most important. The results from part 1 of this analysis
suggest that, based on the 4 above-mentioned hypotheses, the residents of the Tsavo-Amboseli
ecosystem are inhospitable to conservation initiatives. The costs from wildlife are high and affect
a large percentage of the population, while local residents’ livelihood strategies increase the
chances of H-WC. The constant and increasing H-WC conflict in the region stokes the public’s
resentment of wildlife. Meanwhile, distrust among government officials, conservationists, and
local residents is longstanding due to historical events, and local residents claim not to have
much exposure to conservation initiatives. They feel let down by local authorities and are
unlikely to call them for help when they suffer H-WCs. Local residents have little direct
experience of the financial benefits of wildlife conservation, such as shared revenue from
national parks, and the long-term environmental benefits of a healthy ecosystem, like better crop
returns. Wildlife is an inconvenience for them, one that the government will do nothing to
protect them from.
This deep resentment and lack of positive associations with wildlife create an
inhospitable environment for wildlife conservation. Yet, despite this, only 5% of respondents
suggested killing problem animals such as leopards (Makonjio Okello, 2005). Local residents
primarily chose non-confrontational measures to handle H-WC, despite increasing conflicts with
wildlife. They chose to co-exist with wildlife rather than eliminate problem species.
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It is possible that more than 5% of respondents would kill problem animals if given the
chance. In this case, though, respondents had few reasons to misrepresent their intentions and
actions since they were not being asked about an illegal behavior, but rather about a possible
solution to H-WC, one common elsewhere. Culling animals in protected areas is legally
practiced in a number of African countries when animal populations become too large for a
habitat and risk damaging it (Fuller & Johnson, 2005; Southern African Legal Information
Institute, 2007). The practice of killing animals is therefore not, in itself, taboo. Although, social
desirability may have led to the underreporting of killing problem animals as a solution to HWC, there were no retaliatory killings reported in the study area during the time of the
interviews, suggesting the practice is not widespread in the region.

To understand what situational factors influenced local farmers’ opinion of wildlife
conservation, a logistic regression was run with attitude towards wildlife conservation-based
income generating activities (negative or positive) as the dependent variable. The interview
question on which the dependent variable is based was worded as “what is your attitude towards
wildlife conservation-based income generating activities?” This choice of words, instead of
simply asking “attitude towards wildlife conservation activities,” is due to the local culture. The
conservation initiatives in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem, Amboseli and Tsavo West National
Parks and a few other small ecotourism ventures, all generate income through ecotourism and
wildlife conservation (Viollaz, 2006). Local residents know of these initiatives and the income
they generate. Since, in their experience, conservation initiatives are always income generating,
they were asked to give their opinion of this particular conservation model. For the residents in
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this community, wildlife conservation-based income generating activities are a proxy for wildlife
conservation.
The 6 independent variables in the regression were wildlife cost (Is wildlife imposing a
cost to you?), wildlife benefit (Do you benefit from wildlife?), economic status, education level,
mismanagement (Is KWS mismanaging Amboseli National Park?), and exposure to conservation
(Have you been exposed to wildlife conservation issues?). Table 6.3 provides frequencies for
each of these variables.

Table 6.3. Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables in the regression
Variable
Wildlife cost
Wildlife benefit
Exposure to
conservation
Mismanagement
Attitude
Economic status
Education

Response (in %)
Yes
87%
28%
21%

No
13
72
79

Don’t know
NA
NA
NA

N
234
234
233

44%
Positive
51%
Low
23%
No education
61%

27
Negative
49
Medium
69
Primary
24

29

233

NA
High
8
Secondary
15

225
234
233

Logistic regression requires that three assumptions be met: 1) the absence of sparse data,
2) no collinearity between independent variables, and 3) no multi-collinearity between variables
(Field, 2005). Sparse data is defined as 5 cases or less in any variable response category (Field,
2005). Crosstabs indicate if poor distribution of cases among coding categories could cause
sparse data problems. Frequencies (see table 6.3) and crosstabs run between the dependent
variable and independent variables (see table 6.4) revealed no sparse data. Only the variable
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economic status was borderline with 6 cases in the category of high economic status but negative
attitude towards wildlife. Correlations between the independent variables (see table 6.5) revealed
only three significant correlations between wildlife benefit and exposure to conservation,
economic status and mismanagement, and exposure to conservation and mismanagement. Since
all three were < 0.9, though, they would not adversely affect the results of the logistic regression
model (Field, 2005). No multi-collinearity was found between the variables.

Table 6.4. Crosstabs between the dependent variable and the independent variables in the logistic
regression model
Variable
Wildlife cost
Yes
No
Wildlife benefit
Yes
No
Exposure to conservation
Yes
No
Mismanagement
Yes
No
Don’t know
Economic status
Low
Medium
High
Education
No education
Primary
Secondary

Attitude
Positive (in %)
48%
69%
85%
37%
63%
47%
45%
64%
48%
43%
52%
65%
44%
57%
71%

N
225
196
29
225
62
163
224
46
178
224
101
58
65
225
51
157
17
224
137
53
34
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Table 6.5. Kendall’s Tau-b correlations between the independent variables of the logistic
regression model
Wild.
Cost

Wild.
Benefit

Eco.
Status

Education

Exposure
cons.

Mismanagement

Wildlife cost
Wildlife benefit
Economic status
Education
Exposure to
conservation

1
-.044
-.084
.013
.006

-0.044
1
.015
.041
.198**

-.084
.015
1
.021
-.039

.013
.041
.021
1
-.022

.006
.198**
-.039
-.022
1

.015
.048
-.229**
.015
.139*

Mismanagement

.015

.048

-.229**

.015

.139*

1

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 (sig. 2-tailed).

The results of the logistic regression suggest that three variables significantly influenced
local farmers’ attitudes towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities:
wildlife cost (p < 0.1), wildlife benefit (p < 0.001), and education (p < 0.05) (see table 6.6).
Based on the Wald Statistic, it appears that wildlife benefit (Wald = 31.674) most influenced
respondents’ attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities.67 The
model was significant at the p < 0.001 level. It is a fairly strong model: its goodness of fit when
including predictors was 33.9% better than for the null model. The model was able to accurately
predict the observed values for 71.6% of the respondents (N= 222 instead of 234 because of 12
cases omitted for missing data).

67

Field (2005, p. 239) suggests using the Wald statistic cautiously because “when the regression
coefficient (b) is large, the standard error tends to become inflated, resulting in the Wald statistic
being underestimated.” Nevertheless, given that this variable is highly significant and its Wald
statistic is much higher than that of the other variables, there is little chance that the variable does
not influence attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities. The
degree to which it influences this attitude, though, should be interpreted with caution.
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Local farmers who suffer costs from wildlife are less likely to have a positive attitude
towards wildlife conservation (H2). Meanwhile, those benefiting from wildlife, economically or
in other ways, are much more likely than people who do not benefit to support wildlife
conservation. Finally, respondents with higher levels of education were more likely to have a
positive attitude towards wildlife conservation.

Table 6.6. Results of the logistic regression measuring what variables influenced respondents’
attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald

Df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Constant

-1.113

.674

2.731

1

.098

.328

Wildlife cost

-.890

.481

3.433

1

.064*

.411

Wildlife benefit

2.382

.423

31.674

1

.000***

10.832

Economic status

.504

.307

2.697

1

.101

1.655

Education

.683

.229

8.919

1

.033**

1.979

1.497

2

.473

1.081

1

.299

Mismanagement
Exposure cons.

.428

.412

1.535

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.001.
Note: R2 = .254 (Cox & Snell), .339 (Nagelkerke). Model X2(7) = 65.021, N = 222, p < .001.

Based on these findings, support for wildlife conservation is primarily dependent on how
much local farmers suffer costs or receive benefits from wildlife. The communities where HWCs occur are often cash-poor, like the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem where income can vary
drastically based on rainfall. Most local residents earn at least 79% of their income from selling
crops and livestock (Kelly, 2010; Minister & Lands, 2010). They are thus unwilling/unable to
suffer costs from wildlife, but respond quite positively to any added income they can obtain from
it.
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As for education, respondents with at least a primary education were more likely to
support wildlife conservation initiatives. Approximately 39% of the respondents had at least a
primary education so there is potential for developing a strong support network for wildlife
conservation in the area. Education did not seem to play a role in whether or not a respondent
had been exposed to conservation initiatives ( = -.022, p = 0.723). Knowledge of how important
conservation is for biodiversity and ecosystem health may therefore not be why more educated
farmers supported conservation initiatives. Perhaps educated respondents simply had a better
grasp of the financial benefits they could receive from ecotourism and wildlife conservationbased income generating activities.

2. Analysis part 2: South African interviews

The Heidelberg area in South Africa is, like the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem in Kenya,
rife with H-WC. The difference between the two is that farmers and NPO personnel in the
Heidelberg area readily admit that retaliatory leopard killings take place locally, while in the
Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem only 5% of respondents suggested this as a solution to H-WC.
Granted, there is a difference between an opinion that killing is a solution and a belief that
killings are taking place. But for a killing to take place, the person committing the killing has to
think of it as a potential solution (Kansky & Knight, 2014). If killing a problem animal is not a
solution to H-WC, there is little reason to kill, especially given the effort required to track an
animal, kill it, and dispose of its body.
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Of the 16 people interviewed in the Heidelberg area, only 1 farmer out of 7 denied the
existence of retaliatory leopard killings in the region. This particular farmer was part of the local
conservancy and thus had a vested interest in denying such illegal behavior or may simply have
been too disconnected from the experience of local, and perhaps poorer, farmers to hear about
these killings. The majority of government officials, on the other hand, openly denied that
leopards were being illegally killed in the area.
The purpose of this analysis is to understand why this location tolerates leopard killing,
especially retaliatory leopard killings. This study passes no judgment on whether or not the
respondents’ claims are truthful. Rather, its purpose is to find the common threads in the actors’
stories and determine how to use this common ground to reverse the tolerance for leopard killing
and reduce H-LC and illegal leopard killings.
Respondents agreed that the main reason why local farmers illegally killed leopards was
in retaliation for livestock predation (H1). NPO and government personnel specified that farmers
sometimes killed leopards out of spite without any proof that they were responsible for attacks
on their livestock. Conversations with farmers yielded a lot of anger at leopards, with several
calling leopards “criminal” for attacking their private property when wild prey was plentiful. The
general feeling was that livestock losses to tick fever and other natural causes were acceptable
but that leopard predation on livestock would not be tolerated. This feeling was exacerbated by
the belief that H-WC had not been a problem in the area until 20 years ago and so farmers felt
that leopards had suddenly invaded what had been pristine livestock farming territory (H2).
Leopards in the area were primarily shot or caught via gin traps and left to die of
dehydration and stress. A government official explained there was no local market for leopard
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skins because farmers preferred to bury any evidence of wrongdoing in the bush. A farmer
explained that one community member had a pack of leopard-hunting dogs68. When a farmer lost
livestock to a leopard, he called this person to hunt the leopard on his property. Reasons given
for shooting “problem leopards” were that permits to legally kill them took too long to obtain,
farmers did not want to risk more losses, and that they feared not being able to catch the leopard
if they waited (H2).
The two main emotions expressed during the interviews were anger and distrust. Anger at
the hardships imposed by leopards, ongoing land tenure and land-use issues, and the lack of
government support. The overarching emotion, though, was distrust. Two levels of distrust were
apparent: 1) general distrust and 2) H-WC solution-specific distrust.
The general distrust stemmed from historical events in the region. Farmers were angry
that they received no support from the South African government. From 1867 to 1947, the
mining industry subsidized farming. Expanding African markets and government protections
turned South Africa into one of the few countries that exported food despite fickle rainfall
(Wilson, 2009). South Africa, though, is no longer the farming superpower it once was,
especially since its economic decline from the 1960s to the mid-1990s and its history of
extractive policies and overgrazing that destroyed farmlands and their topsoil (Wilson, 2009).
Those protectionist measures no longer exist, but farmers still felt that they should receive
subsidies to keep their crops and beef competitive on the world market.

68

These dogs chase the leopard either into the open or up a tree where a farmer can easily shoot

it.
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Farmers also resented the giving of land to black “inexperienced” farmers to diversify
land ownership after apartheid, a practice they felt was doomed to fail because the government
provided land but no training in farming practices. This general distrust is present in the TsavoAmboseli area as well when local residents talk about how the government mismanages
Amboseli National Park and how the profits from it are poorly distributed. In the case of Kenya,
though, it stems from the government’s forceful appropriation of land to create the national park
and the reneging on promises to allow grazing within it and share revenue from it.
Adding to this general distrust is solution-specific distrust because of the failure of
government responses to H-LC. This failure is partly due to the lack of organizational capacity in
government institutions and a weak local government characteristic of post-apartheid South
Africa (Wilson, 2009). The general belief among respondents was that the government’s
response to leopard predation and retaliatory killings was inadequate. The specific complaints
expressed by both farmers, government workers, and NPO personnel were very similar, although
none of the parties recognized this. Everyone’s complaints focused on four main problems: the
government’s response was slow and unwilling, it involved inefficient methods, there were
inadequate resources to respond, and there lacked clear laws or a clear application of those laws
(see table 6.7).

Table 6.7. Respondents’ complaints about the government’s response to leopard predation and
retaliatory killings
Types of complaints

Farmers

Government/NPO personnel
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Using inefficient methods

Feeding meat to leopards during
translocation
Do not relocate far enough
Trapping cages too small

Using ineffective methods
Using “one size fits all”
enforcement
Prevention measures 1 more
burden for farmer
Penalties not a deterrent

Laws inadequate

Unequal application of laws

No national legislation makes
enforcement tough

Not enough resources

No compensation from Cape
Nature

Not enough money to do things
properly
Short of enforcement personnel
Not enough training

Slow & unwilling

Toothless
Corruption
Uninterested in solving problem

Wait too long to act
Corruption
No one will talk to help
investigators and/or wildlife
management personnel

Inconsistent help, slow

Inefficient methods were the main complaint. Farmers cited this as a reason why most of
them would not call Cape Nature for help when they had a problem leopard on their property
(H3). The main difference between the government/NPO personnel’s description of this problem
and that of the farmers is that farmers tended to give more specific examples of how the
government’s response was failing.
For example, farmers complained that government officials used cage traps that were too
small, reducing the chances of capturing problem leopards on their property. With such small
cages, the leopard felt the trap door come down on its tail and ran out of the cage before its door
could fully close. In the event that a problem leopard was caught in a cage trap, farmers argued
that Cape Nature officials did not relocate the animal far enough to prevent it from coming back
to their farm. One farmer described how he had asked a veterinarian to tag a leopard trapped in a
Cape Nature cage on his land. He then called Cape Nature and they assured him they would
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relocate the animal too far away for it to return. A few weeks later, this farmer once again had
leopard predation problems. Cape Nature again set up a cage trap on his land and caught
“another leopard.” The veterinarian confirmed that this “other leopard” was actually the original
animal, which had simply returned to the farm after relocation. Farmers also thought that Cape
Nature was feeding leopards beef during translocations and that this habit was causing them to
eat livestock upon their release.
Although government/NPO personnel disagreed with farmers on the fact that cage traps
were too small69, they did acknowledge broader failures in their response to H-LC. Some
government personnel recognized that the “one size fits all” techniques that they often used (like
trapping or bell collars) did not always prove effective, causing tensions in the community. They
realized that each farm was a unique environment. Recommending one prevention technique
across all locations was ineffective because it was sometimes not suited to the terrain or to the
type of livestock farming there. They empathized, to a certain extent, with the fact that the
predation prevention measures they offered farmers were just one more burden for them. They
understood that livestock farming was a difficult activity and that predation prevention measures
were time consuming to implement effectively. They also realized that the penalties they warned
farmers about should they kill a leopard illegally were no deterrent given the lack of any easy
alternative solutions to H-LC.
Government actors acknowledged struggling to respond fast enough to H-LC complaints.
Their justification was that they were short of enforcement personnel and simply did not have

69

In fact, personnel from the local NPO, The Landmark Foundation, regularly and successfully
trapped leopards using cage traps to fit them with GPS collars.
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enough resources (including vehicles) to send a Cape Nature employee out every time a farmer
reported a leopard had eaten his livestock. Money was tight in the department and personnel
often did not receive adequate training to deal with H-WC. Farmers saw the flip side of these
problems. They rarely received monetary compensation from Cape Nature. The haphazard nature
of Cape Nature’s response left them feeling like the government was toothless and uninterested
in solving their H-LC problems. If they did receive help, it was often inconsistent, breeding even
more distrust between the parties.
This distrust was compounded by an inadequate legislative framework and ongoing
corruption. Farmers and NPO personnel felt that wildlife crime/hunting laws were unequally
enforced. Meanwhile, government personnel found it difficult to know which laws to apply and
when because no unified national legislation exists in South Africa. Each province is free to
enact its own wildlife protection laws. This caused confusion because a farmer caught with an
illegal carcass could claim that the animal had been hunted in a province where it was legal to do
so. Although this is not the case with leopards, this uncertainty in how to apply wildlife crime
laws for other species meant that local farmers had little trust in the local justice system. The fact
that corruption was common, and contributed to the unequal application of laws, also made it
difficult for farmers and NPO personnel to trust government officials and vice versa. It created a
setting were all the actors were pitted against each other. Government personnel described the
deadlock well when they complained that local residents refused to talk with them when leopards
were illegally killed, making any investigation quasi-impossible.
H-LC interventions suggested by local stakeholders
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These failures with the government’s response to H-LC created an atmosphere where
farmers refused to call government/NPO personnel when they had a problem leopard on their
land because they did not trust them to solve the problem. This led them to resort to their own,
sometimes ill-informed methods, to stop leopard predation on livestock. Surprisingly, though,
when asked directly what solutions were helpful in reducing H-LC, all the actors often agreed on
which solutions were most effective, if for different reasons (see table 6.8)70.

Table 6.8. Responses to H-LC cited by interviewees and their perceived effectiveness
Predation prevention method
Translocation

70

Farmers
Leopard comes back
Fed meat = eats livestock

Government/NPO personnel
Stress hurts survival
Inter-leopard conflict

There was also general agreement on why and when leopard predation and H-LC occurred
(see table A4 in the Appendix). Farmers and government/NPO personnel only disagreed on
who/what was to blame for these conditions: farmers tended to blame poor prevention methods
and environmental conditions while government/NPO personnel tended to blame farmers.
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Kill problem leopard

Kill right away

If trapping ineffective, issue kill
permit

Use poison collars
Not dominant male
Trap & release

Hate this!

Trap & release with GPS, hope
for fear of humans

Anatolian sheep dogs
Donkeys

Cause problems by hunting small
prey
Ok, not 100% effective

Good when hunting instinct bred
out
Work well

Wire collars
Bell collars

Ineffective
Ineffective

Ineffective
Good when used randomly

New ideas

Suggest alternative solutions:
 Tourism not an option
 Keep horns on meat cattle to
protect them
 Farming diversification
 Compensation fund that
farmers pay into
 Move livestock to different
pastures regularly
 Leopard-friendly products

 Predator-proof enclosures
 Research what other countries
have done
 Work on a case by case basis
with farmer

Farmers and government/NPO personnel in general agreed that translocation is an
ineffective response, but for different reasons. Farmers argue that translocation methods that
involve feeding leopards beef during transport cause them to develop a taste for livestock and
that translocation is only a temporary solution because leopards return to their original territories.
Government/NPO personnel believe that translocation stresses leopards and sparks inter-leopard
conflict when an animal is moved into another’s existing territory, both of which hurt a leopard’s
chance of survival. Interestingly, inter-leopard conflict can drive leopards to return to their
original territory. So farmers and government/NPO personnel partly agree on why translocation
is ineffective; they just express it differently. Their views on the subject, though, are not entirely
consistent. Some government/NPO personnel advocated that leopards be trapped and released in
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the same location hoping fear of humans would keep them away from livestock, while knowing
this is not the case (as seen with translocations). Farmers, on the other hand, recognized the
similarities and rejected this solution outright.
Farmers and government officials also agree that killing a damage-causing leopard is
sometimes a viable solution, but differ on when this is appropriate (NPO personnel do not agree
with this). Farmers prefer to shoot first to avoid further immediate conflict71 while
government/NPO personnel prefer to try non-lethal methods first before issuing a kill permit. All
actors recognized that alternative predation prevention methods like Anatolian sheep dogs,
donkeys, wire and bell collars, if they worked, were often hit or miss and required careful
implementation and follow-up.
Farmers came up with innovative ideas on how to prevent leopard livestock predation,
shown in the final row of table 6.8. Ideas included farmer-sponsored insurance schemes and
leopard-friendly product designations for farms that used leopard-friendly predation prevention
methods. Farmers also suggested diversifying farming practices to avoid being so vulnerable to
livestock losses and moving livestock around to different pastures to stay one step ahead of
leopards and avoid predation. Meanwhile, government/NPO personnel tended to be less creative
when it came to alternative solutions. Their main solution at the time was to research what other
countries had done to deal with H-WC. Given this, it seems appropriate to harness farmers’
knowledge of the land and husbandry practices to come up with innovative solutions to H-LC.
71

Killing a problem leopard often leaves a territory vacuum that is quickly filled by another
leopard. Killing therefore just delays the H-LC cycle from starting all over again. Some farmers
seem to recognize this issue because they advocate not killing dominant males to prevent this
territorial vacuum (females often share territory with males so they believe killing a female is
less likely to create a vacuum).
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Currently, though, the anger and distrust between farmers and government/NPO personnel is
largely preventing any collaboration or sharing of knowledge between them.
Since both farmers and government/NPO personnel agreed that the government’s
response to H-LC was failing, it is not surprising that conservation initiatives were not well
received in the region. Previous exposure to conservation initiatives likely only encourages
individuals to support conservation if those conservation initiatives have proven benefits for the
community (H4).

3. Analysis part 3: Indian media articles

H-LC conflict in India takes a slightly different form from H-LC in the Tsavo-Amboseli
ecosystem and the Heidelberg area. Studies conducted by Vidya Athreya and her colleagues
found leopards regularly strayed into human settlements in India. For example, they “found one
of [their] radio-collared leopards visited a particular house every few days without ever
disturbing its residents, who sleep in the open” (Gates, 2013). When leopards approach villages,
they often attack livestock (cattle, goats, and sheep) and stray animals (H1). For instance, CCTV
footage from an apartment building in Mulund (northeast of Mumbai) shows a leopard entering
its lobby and capturing a live dog before dragging it off and killing it (Emirates 24/7, 2013).
A large percentage of the H-LC in India, though, is leopard attacks on humans. These
attacks occur both inside and outside of villages, even inside houses (see figure 6.1). The media
articles in this sample described leopard attacks on people as they were collecting firewood and
Mahua fruits in the forest, walking on the road near or going about their daily activities in their
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village, while sleeping inside their houses at night, and while defecating outside. There were
reports of children being dragged away by leopards while playing 500 meters or less from their
houses. A leopard killed one woman less than 50 meters away from forest guards that were
looking for it (Dahat, 2013). These attacks on humans are a departure from the H-LC seen in
either the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem or the Heidelberg area. Although leopard attacks on
humans do occasionally occur in these areas, they are uncommon.

Figure 6.1. Leopard sitting on a store shelf in Sonepur District, Orissa, India in 2012 (picture by
the Associated Press)

In India, the media reports that leopards are killed for a number of reasons. They are
killed by local residents in retaliation for human deaths and livestock losses, shot by forest
department officials to rid communities of man-eaters, they are poached for their hide and parts,
and they are the victims of H-WC when hit by cars or caught in wire snares meant to protect
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crops or hunt bushmeat (Fernandes, 2013). Sometimes, these distinctions are not so clear as in
the case of three tribal men who “poisoned a full-grown male leopard in the forests of Dhar
district of Madhya Pradesh on June 1, 2013 to avenge the killing of a cow” (A. Singh, 2013) but
who made off with the cats’ whiskers, presumably to sell.
Leopards in India are pelted with stones, shot, hunted with dogs, poisoned with
carbofuran (an over-the-counter pesticide), electrocuted, axed, set on fire, and trapped with
snares and speared through the mouth and bludgeoned. Local residents sometimes consume
leopard meat (Goswami, 2013; S. Mishra, 2013). The most common scenarios in cases of H-LC
conflict, though, are the shooting of leopards by community leopard hunters or forest department
officials or the beating to death of leopards by angry mobs of local residents. For the most part,
groups of angry villagers or poaching gangs kill leopards unless the killing is by a state
sanctioned actor. In one case, “a full-grown female leopard was beaten to death by tea garden
workers […] in Jorhat district after four workers, including a woman, sustained severe injuries in
the big cat's attack” (The Times of India, 2013a). In another, “when [a leopard] was trapped in
October, villagers from Lingarasanahalli reportedly pelted stones at the caged animal, killing it
on the spot” (Mendonsa, 2013).

Although expressions of anger and distrust dominate in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem
and the Heidelberg area, the first emotion triggered by H-LC in India is fear. As one reporter
said, “fear looms large on the minds of villagers” (Dahat, 2013). Leopard sightings trigger panic
because villagers feel helpless to protect themselves (Sonawala, 2013). They are afraid to go
about their daily activities, lest a leopard attack them. People move in groups outside villages,
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avoid going out at night, and carry sticks to protect themselves (Dahat, 2013). They also avoid
entering the forest to collect firewood or other forest produce (Nayak, 2013). Yet, the most
troubling change in behavior is that “villagers are reluctant to send their children to school
fearing leopard attacks” according to a local teacher (Baitadi, 2013). The fear of attacks has
literally changed the fabric of society.
The sense of fear and helplessness experienced by local residents also fuels anger at
government officials, much like in South Africa. Local residents suffering from H-LC are angry
at forest department officials’ inaction in the face of leopard attacks on humans (H2, H3). As one
villager put it: “[the] lackadaisical attitude of the wildlife officials has put our lives at stake”
(Aarif, 2013). People feel that the forest department cares more about the wildlife than about the
people. Since their actions are more reactive than preventive, if they act at all, local residents
often say things like “you are waiting for something to happen, and only then you will act”
(Overdorf, 2013).
The feeling that the government is failing them, the lack of official response, and the
panic leopard sightings produce, gives local residents a rational to kill leopards themselves (H3).
Community hunters who kill leopards at local residents’ request, consider their work a public
service (Gusain, 2013). The gratitude they receive from villagers validates their behavior, only
adding to the problem of retaliatory killings.
Furthermore, the Wildlife Protection Act (WPA), which bans the hunting of all animals
on Indian soil without a permit, gives local residents the impression that all wildlife is the
responsibility of the government. As a result, they feel government officials should prevent
attacks by “their leopards” (Rafiq, 2013) and are angry when they fail to do so. This anger is
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compounded by denials from government officials that H-LC is a problem and their attempts to
blame villagers for causing attacks. In one such example, the Deputy Director of the Buffer Zone
of the Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve, called leopard attacks on humans “accidents [and] a result
of casualness on the part of villagers” (Dahat, 2013). In another, the forest department
maintained that 8 human killings had only occurred in the forest when local villagers went to
collect forest produce, when most of the attacks actually occurred within villages or on nearby
roads. One reporter suggested “the culture of denial is so deeply embedded in forest bureaucracy
that most officers refuse to accept that poachers continue to be a threat in their territory”
(Mazoomdaar, 2013), even when newspaper articles regularly report on arrests of poachers and
leopard carcasses found missing paws, claws, and teeth.
This culture of denial has led to general distrust between the forest department officials
and local residents. Communication between actors, already poor to begin with, is now almost
impossible, compromising conservation efforts (H3). Local residents complain that they report
H-LC to forest department officials only to be told by them that they’ve received no reports
(Nayak, 2013). Meanwhile, forest department officials complain that “people don’t cooperate
with the department when it comes to catching these wild animals” (Aarif, 2013) and argue that
they are attempting to solve the problem. Adding to their defensiveness is the fact that some
families of forest department officials are involved in poaching (Shalya, 2013a).
Compared to the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem and the Heidelberg area, the level of
animosity between the actors in India is much stronger. Villagers’ anger and distrust has resulted
in local protests, beatings of forest department officials, and attacks on leopard
rescue/translocation teams sometimes resulting in the death of the leopard before it can be
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removed (H3) (Dahat, 2013; Mendonsa, 2013; Overdorf, 2013; Rafiq, 2013). Even when forest
department officials take steps to prevent H-LC, villagers take action into their own hands. In
one such case, a forest official described the chaos engendered by villager-official animosity:
"We got information about the leopard's appearance in the tea garden […]. Our staff
[was] patrolling the entire tea garden to foil any attacks by the animal but due to the
ruckus created by the locals, the situation turned out of control today. We finally opened
fire in the air, but the garden workers brutally attacked the animal and killed it" (The
Times of India, 2013a).
Meanwhile, official investigations of local residents who take matters into their own hands in
such a way only add to the animosity between the parties.
This animosity also shapes the official response to H-LC in negative ways. Forest
department officials often feel pressured by local residents and politicians to respond to leopard
attacks quickly, without proper strategizing or requesting assistance from other departments that
have implemented successful solutions. This pressure is both the social outcry when leopards kill
humans but also the risk of violence from angry villagers. For instance,
“A forest official requesting anonymity said the department was forced by agitated
villagers to kill leopards. On one occasion, eight of his men were doused with kerosene
and confined to a room by villagers who threatened to set them on fire if the man-eating
leopard wasn’t killed. The official had to deal with the situation with no direction from
his boss who had switched off his phone. With no space for negotiations, the man said he
was forced to sacrifice a leopard. He agreed it was illegal and didn’t solve the problem,
but at least, it appeased the villagers who set his staff free” (Lenin, 2013a).
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Generally speaking, the media reported that the government response to H-LC had failed
for a multitude of reasons. The first is a general tendency among forest department officials to
delegate the problem to others without ever solving it. Such is the case in the above-mentioned
quote where the official’s boss was unavailable to handle villagers’ anger at H-LC. Another
examples is the “standard practice to play the jurisdiction card and disown animals that step out
of park limits” (Mazoomdaar, 2013). Once an animal is no longer part of your jurisdiction, you
are no longer required to find a solution to its problematic behavior or its death.
This “passing the buck” method comes in several other forms. One form is when
“officers shy away from registering a poaching case. Instead a common reason is put forth [for a
leopard death] like ‘killed in territorial war’ to avoid action from their higher-ups” (Naveen,
2013). Another is government officials who are told by their juniors of a H-LC and the need for a
solution, say “yes we will do it,” and never take action (Overdorf, 2013). It seems that at every
point in the chain of command, individuals are afraid to acknowledge that the system is broken,
that there are insufficient resources to address H-LC, and that nobody knows what to do and how
to do it well.
Even when a poaching or retaliatory leopard killing case is recognized as such and forest
department officials investigate, poor investigations by inexperienced and un-resourceful rangers
make prosecutions difficult (Naveen, 2013). Conviction rates in Madhya Pradesh, for example,
are less than 5%. The media regularly publicize arrests of poachers (mainly based on tips), but
rarely report convictions. Meanwhile, there is little official incentive to do better. There is no
initiative to build a motivated, trained and agile workforce and adequately incentivize it for
161

consistent field results (Mazoomdaar, 2013).
Media articles often report mistakes on the part of forest department officials, mistakes
that only add to local residents’ and NPO personnel’s distrust of government actors (H4). They
are seen as less than competent. For example, attempts by forest department officials to
tranquilize problem leopards have resulted in their death from medication overdoses (Mendonsa,
2013). In another case, forest department officials killed a leopard cub and injured another while
trying to hunt a leopard that had attacked humans. Instead of admitting they had shot the wrong
animal, they claimed they had accidentally hit the cubs while driving (The Times of India,
2013b). Attempts to cover up these mistakes, usually revealed by the media, only aggravate the
distrust.
Government officials are struggling to protect wildlife and humans outside protected
areas, but their approach sometimes goes against their own principles. Forest department
officials often do not respect wildlife protection laws (WPA) or their own departmental
guidelines on how to handle H-LC. Fayyaz (2013), for example, explained that one former
wildlife department official told him that, “fearing action from the government and attacks from
the public, wildlife officials rarely observe the law.” Forest department officials will bypass
getting a permit72, and ask the police and security forces to shoot a problem leopard on sight
(Fayyaz, 2013).
Adding to the problem is the general confusion among forest department officials about
what the best practices are to deal with H-LC. There is a belief that one should spare leopards
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Only the Chief Wildlife Warden can declare a predator a man-eater and issue permission to
kill it under the WPA.
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that “accidentally” attack humans, but should shoot man-eaters, but there is neither a clear
definition of what a man-eater is nor a foolproof way to identify one. As one reporter blatantly
put it, “everyone -conservationists, villagers, and the Forest Department- agrees a man-eater has
to be removed, but no one can say how to identify one” (Lenin, 2013a). This confusion only adds
to the distrust, anger, and general animosity among actors as the “wrong” leopards are killed and
human and livestock killings continue.
Throughout the articles in this analysis, man-eaters were described in conflicting terms.
Man-eaters were leopards with abnormal eating patterns that ate when not hungry. At the same
time, they were starving animals that could not catch wild prey because they were either too old,
sick/hurt, or there was simply not enough wild prey around. Man-eaters attacked humans on
purpose while also attacking them accidentally because they either mistook them for prey or
were startled when trying to take cover in patchy forests during the day (First Post, 2013; Lenin,
2013b).
Regularly, media articles describe how the forest department killed a man-eater, only to
have a human attacked near the previous kill sites the next day, presumably by the actual maneater. Meanwhile, the forest department compounds its problems by using questionable local
hunters to kill man-eaters and failing to fire them when they kill the wrong animal (V. J. Singh,
2013a). These hunters, often labeled “trigger-happy” or “reckless” in news articles (First Post,
2013; V. J. Singh, 2013a), described entirely ineffective ways of catching the “right” leopard.
Their methods ranged from killing the leopard whose territory overlapped with the attack sites to
killing any leopard seen next to a livestock carcass/human body to tracking the man-eater using
the paw prints left at the site of an attack. NPO personnel and researchers discounted every
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method. Leopard territories can overlap so the presence of a leopard in a location does not
guarantee it was responsible for the attacks in that area. Leopards are scavengers and will
therefore eat a carcass they have not killed and pugmarks are not accurate to identify a particular
leopard (V. J. Singh, 2013b).

H-LC interventions suggested by local stakeholders

When it comes to solutions to H-LC, translocations and killings of problem leopards
seem to be the most common techniques used, but there is no consensus on their effectiveness or
which local actors prefer. Some want translocations as a last resort when leopards attack people,
others prefer killing problem leopards, and some want neither and prefer removal to captivity.
Translocations seem to be causing more leopard attacks on humans according to Athreya et al.
(2010). Identifying the right leopard to kill is problematic and has met with little success, while
researchers argue that such killings create a territory vacuum that another leopard soon fills
(Balme et al., 2009; Overdorf, 2013). Removal to captivity was successful in one case with no
subsequent leopard attacks on humans when new leopards moved into the area, but this is more a
stop-gap measure than a solution since space in zoos is limited (Lenin, 2013b).
The media and the actors they interviewed suggest a number of other possible solutions
(see table 6.9). They fall into three categories: wildlife patrols, managing H-WC, and
environmental education. Patrols focus on law enforcement efforts to prevent leopard killings
through intelligence gathering and the creation of division-specific legal cells to help in proper
evidence collection and prosecution of poachers. Some patrols would also monitor leopard
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movements to prevent leopard attacks on humans and livestock, but that is not their main focus.

Table 6.9. H-LC solutions suggested in media articles in 2013
Categories of H-LC prevention methods
Kill problem leopards

Methods suggested in media
Use camera traps to identify man-eaters

Translocation

Translocate to wild area
Take into captivity

Patrols

Train forest department officials in anti-poaching
measures
Create legal cell for every forest division
Smart patrol*
Informants
More inter-state cooperation for gathering & analyzing
data

Manage H-WC

Better secure/protect livestock
Floodlights near schools
Round up stray dogs & keep in kennels outside villages
Relocate villagers

Environmental education

Teach how to live with leopards
Awareness programs after leopard sightings

* Patrol using special software combining satellite imagery and GPS to track animals and patrol
where most needed.

Solutions to manage H-WC and environmental education focus on community
empowerment and reducing attacks by teaching communities predation prevention measures.
Lenin (2013b), for example, suggested that forest department official’s efforts are ineffective
because they focus too much on leopards. the focus of forest department officials’ efforts is to
blame for their lack of effectiveness (H4). He felt that the wildlife department should do more to
help local residents and leopards co-exist without incident. “To live alongside leopards, farmers
need help to secure their livestock and know how to avoid leopards. Instead, the well-intentioned
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[forest] department focused its attention on leopards” (Lenin, 2013b). Similarly, leopard
researcher Vidya Athreya suggested that officials provide local residents with better tools to
address H-LC: “Locals are familiar with the area and can keep a good vigil. They should be
given facilities to alert the forest department immediately in case there's anything amiss”
(Shalya, 2013b). Sonawala (2013) also reported that awareness programs, where local residents
were taught about leopards and how to avoid H-LC, were particularly helpful at reducing the
panic common after leopard sightings. These measures reduce local residents’ helplessness in the
face of H-LC and prevent retaliatory leopard killings. They also encourage local residents to
become the eyes and ears of the forest department and report illegal killings.
Ultimately, though, media articles emphasized that the main problem with H-LC in India
stemmed from the government’s civic failures, not leopard behavior (First Post, 2013). Overdorf
(2013) depicts the problem accurately in the following paragraph.
“Local news stories of bloodthirsty man-eaters obscure an all too familiar reality: India's
notorious civic failures, not Mumbai's leopards, are to blame for the killings. […] As
many as a million tribal people and migrant laborers live in and around the urban
wilderness and, because these communities have been ignored and neglected by the
government, their settlements have actually spurred an increase in the leopard population
and drawn the animals into the city, rather than driving them deeper into the forest. […]
There is no garbage pickup and no plans to provide it, so the villages and slums attract
legions of stray dogs. Fat and boisterous, these dogs have replaced the fleet deer and shy
wild pigs to become the leopards' primary food source. There are no street lights, no
sewers, and no toilets, so to relieve themselves children and women […] must squat in
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the dark near the rubbish heap — where leopards mistake them for their dogs, or settle
for them, just the same.”
India’s urban planning, environmental conservation, and population management choices have
created a landscape where human and leopard co-existence is necessary but fraught with
problems, including leopard attacks on livestock and humans (H1). Its wildlife department’s
policies have either aggravated the problem or done nothing to address it. Public resentment
against leopards (and other wildlife) has reached a tipping point and local residents are apathetic
or unwilling to protect leopards or are complicit in illegal leopard killings (the definition of
tolerance for leopard killing). A large overhaul of conservation and wildlife management
practices is necessary to prevent such killings, be they from retaliatory killings or poaching.

4. Analysis part 4: GIS analysis of South African illegal leopard deaths

The last part of this analysis mapped environmental factors that contributed to H-LCs
near Heidelberg (Western Cape Province) and in the areas surrounding Baviaanskloof
conservation area and Greater Addo Elephant National Park (Eastern Cape Province). The
purpose of this analysis was to examine what situational factors contribute to where humans and
leopards conflict.
Two types of environmental situational variables are part of this analysis: 1) variables
relating to where a H-LC incident took place and 2) variables describing when it took place.
Eight variables center on location: main biome, parks overlap, river length, available prey, prey
abundance, road length, main road length, and human settlement score. The latter category
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includes only the variable season. These variables were recorded for three grid cell categories:
(1) grid cells were a H-LC occurred between November 1st, 2005 and April 1st, 2011
(experimental cells), (2) control grid cells adjacent to experimental cells (adjacent cells), and (3)
control grid cells within a 4-grid cell distance of experimental cells (buffer cells).
As stated in the previous chapter, the hypotheses for this last analysis are:

H4.1: Retaliatory leopard killings are more likely to occur where human settlements overlap with
leopard territory or habitat.
H4.2: Retaliatory leopard killings are more likely to occur where human settlements border
leopard territory or habitat.
H4.3: Leopards are more likely to be illegally killed in areas of prime leopard habitat, when
controlling for human settlement and road location.
H4.3b: Leopards are more likely to be killed in areas that provide poor leopard habitat, when
controlling for human settlement and road location73.
H4.4: Leopards are more likely to be killed in areas that provide poor leopard habitat during the
dry season, when controlling for human settlement and road location.

Pre-analysis diagnostics were run to determine if the variables were normally distributed.
Specifically, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that all continuous variables were not
normally distributed (see table 6.10). As a result, non-parametric tests were used for this
73

H3 and H4 discuss the idea that leopard numbers determine the chance of an interaction that
could turn into a H-LC. H5 and H6 have to do with the ease of catching prey and the chance that
a leopard will resort to livestock predation if it cannot feed itself from natural sources.
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analysis. Non-parametric tests were also employed because they require less perfect data than
parametric tests and have fewer assumptions. They are thus better suited to dealing with small
sample sizes (here N = 39), where error could be a major concern when interpreting the results
(Field, 2005). Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests were run on the continuous variables:
river length, available prey, prey abundance, road length, main road length, and human
settlement score.74 Chi-square and non-parametric correlations were used for the nominal and
ordinal variables: season, main biome, and parks overlap. Exact significance was used to
interpret the non-parametric test results because of the small sample size (N = 39).

Table 6.10. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality for continuous variables
Variable

River length
Available prey
Prey abundance
Road length
Main road length
Human settlement score

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test^
Statistic
.211
.247
.340
.163
.324
.219

Sig.
.000*
.000*
.000*
.010*
.000*
.000*

^ df = 39 for all variables.
* p = or < 0.01.

Continuous variables

74

Another option would have been to use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test. This test tends to
have better power than the Mann-Whitney test in cases with sample sizes of less than 25 per
group (Field, 2005). Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z tests were run and the same variable came out
significant as in the Mann-Whitney tests. As the minimum sample size for Mann-Whitney is N =
7, it remained appropriate for this analysis with a sample size of N = 13 per group.
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The differences in environmental factors between grid cell types were calculated in
several stages. First, both types of control grid cells (adjacent and buffer) were grouped together
and compared to the experimental grid cells. At this point, control cells did not seem to
significantly differ from the experimental cells on any of the continuous environmental variables
(see table 6.11). This suggested that locations were H-LC occurred did not have significantly
different environmental characteristics (like river length, road length, prey availability and
abundance, and human settlement score) than places where no H-LC took place (H4.1-H4.4).

Table 6.11. Mann-Whitney test comparing the environmental factors of experimental grid cells
to those of all control grid cells
Variable

MannWhitney U

Z

r75

Exact Sig. (1tailed)

River length

154.000

-.460

-.074

.331

Available prey

159.000

-.307

-.049

.381

Prey abundance

166.500

-.075

-.012

.474

Road length

166.000

-.089

-.014

.471

Main road length

136.000

-1.122

-.180

.136

Human settlement score

144.500

-.730

-.117

.237

75

r is the effect size calculated using the following equation: r = Z / square root (N).
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A Kruskal-Wallis test was then performed to compare the three grid cell types separately.
The rational for testing the control groups separately was that adjacent control cells might have
very similar environmental characteristics to experimental cells because of their proximity and
might thus prevent us from seeing any significant results in the analysis. The Kruskal-Wallis test
revealed that the location of H-LC was significantly affected by only one environmental
determinant: main road length (H(2) = 5.842, p = 0.05) (H4.3 and H4.3b) (see table 6.12). To
explore this relationship further, Mann-Whitney tests were done to compare experimental cells to
adjacent control cells and experimental cells to buffer control cells separately.

Table 6.12. Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the environmental factors of all three cell types
(experimental, adjacent control, and buffer control)
Variable

Kruskal-Wallis H^

Exact Sig. (1-tailed)

River length

.237

.444

Available prey

.099

.476

Prey abundance

.018

.496

Road length

2.150

.171

Main road length

5.842

.027*

Human settlement score

.546

.381

^ df = 2; * p < 0.05.

The Mann-Whitney test comparing the environmental factors of experimental grid cells
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to those of adjacent control grid cells found no significant difference between the two groups for
any variables (see table 6.13). One possible reason for this, as mentioned previously, is that the
adjacent control grid cells have too many similar environmental characteristics because they are
located so close to each other.
The buffer control cells (median = 2.76), though, did significantly differ from the
experimental cells (median = 0) for the length of main road that traversed them (U = 51.000, p <
0.05, r = -.299) (see table 6.14). r = -.299 represents a small to medium effect size; the threshold
for a medium effect size is .3 (Field, 2005). These results suggest that buffer control cells, where
no H-LC took place, had more mileage of main roads in them than experimental cells where a HLC did take place. Although, this seems counter-intuitive because more main roads would mean
more potential for humans and leopards to cross paths and a faster way for humans wishing to
kill leopards to reach them, it is consistent with research by Dickson et al. (2005) and Schwab
and Zandbergen (2011). These researchers found that large cats will rarely cross roads that are 2
lanes or larger (i.e. main roads), but will travel on dirt roads, which are most common in rural
South Africa. More leopards are therefore likely to reside in areas with fewer main roads, so
conflicts with humans would be more likely in such areas.

Table 6.13. Mann-Whitney test comparing the environmental factors of experimental grid cells
to those of the adjacent control grid cells
Variable

Mann-Whitney
U

Z

r

Exact Sig.
(1-tailed)

River length

78.000

-.343

-.055

.372

Available prey

80.000

-.238

-.038

.417
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Prey abundance

82.500

-.103

-.016

.465

Road length

69.000

-.796

-.127

.220

Main road length

84.000

-.035

-.006

.500

Human settlement score

73.500

-.564

-.090

.294

Table 6.14. Mann-Whitney test comparing the environmental factors of experimental grid cells
to those of the buffer control grid cells
Variable

Mann-Whitney
U

Z

r

Exact Sig.
(1-tailed)

River length

76.000

-.453

-.073

.337

Available prey

79.000

-.289

-.046

.393

Prey abundance

84.000

-.026

-.004

.495

Road length

72.000

-.641

-.103

.272

Main road length

51.000

-1.869

-.299

.031*

Human settlement score

71.000

-.692

-.111

.251

* p < 0.05.
Nominal and ordinal variables

There was no statistically significant difference in main biome type, park overlap, or
season for the three types of grid cells (X2 = 2.730, df = 6, exact sig. (2-tailed) p = 1.000 for
main biome type, X2 = 3.398, df = 6, exact sig. (1-tailed) p = 0.396 for park overlap, and X2 =
2.476, df = 2, exact sig. (1-tailed) p = 0.175 for season). Non-parametric correlations run
between these variables and the three grid cell types were also not significant. As such, it appears
that no season, specific biome type, or amount of protected area in a location plays a role in the
location of H-LC conflicts.
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Chapter summary

The results of this analysis paint three different, yet similar pictures of the human and
environmental situational factors that create tolerance for leopard killings and facilitate H-LC
and retaliatory killings in Kenya, South Africa, and India. In each of these locations, H-WCs and
H-LCs are common, but retaliatory leopard killings only occur in South Africa and India. Table
6.15 below provides an overview of the situational factors in each of these places and organizes
the results by research question.

174

Table 6.15. Results summary table organized by research question
Research questions

Part 1: Kenyan interviews

Part 2: South African interviews

Part 3: Google Alert articles







Retaliatory leopard killings for
livestock losses common
Leopards shot or caught in gin
traps, hunted with dogs



Belief that leopard predation
should not occur
Killing rational: permits took
too long, afraid of more
losses/not catching leopard
Anger at costs from leopard &
lack of government support
General distrust of authority
H-WC solution-specific distrust
Failure of government response
to H-LC
o Slow & unwilling
o Inefficient methods
o Inadequate resources
o Inconsistent
application of laws
Stakeholders generally agreed
on best response: predation
prevention methods
Farmers had innovative H-LC
solutions
Most did not support
conservation





What is the scope and
nature of illegal leopard
killings within the study
areas?

No reported illegal leopard
killings






What form does H-WC
driven retaliatory leopard
killings take?


What situational factors
contribute to retaliatory
leopard killings?













Most suffered costs from
H-WC
1/3 received benefits from
wildlife
All risked losses because
pastoralists or crop farmers
Majority’s economic status
is medium
Biggest challenges to
conservation: financial
difficulties & resource
competition
Resentment at government
for corruption & not
sharing revenue from
national parks
Benefited from wildlife
through bursaries,
employment, & some
compensation for losses
Fencing most popular
solution to H-WC
More education & benefits





















Retaliatory leopard killings
for human attacks common
Government shoots maneaters
Leopards mainly shot or
attacked by angry mobs

Leopard sightings trigger
panic
People feel helpless
Fear fuels anger at
government
Failure of government
response to H-LC
o Passing the buck
o Lack of training
o Confusion over best
practices
o Mistakes & coverups
Most common response:
translocation, culling
Killing rational: public
service, lack of official
response, protection
Belief government owns
wildlife & should prevent HLC
Government denial of
problem

Part 4: H-LC GPS
locations
 Retaliatory leopard
killing for livestock
losses common
 Leopards shot or
caught in gin traps,
hunted with dogs

Leopard killings more
likely in locations with
fewer main roads
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from wildlife = support
conservation more
Costs from wildlife =
support conservation less





Blame public for H-LC
Strong distrust of & attacks
on government
Government’s civic failures
exacerbate H-LC
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Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusion

Results summary
Similarities between study locations

The results from chapter 6 provide three different, yet similar pictures of what tolerance
for leopard killing looks like. These locations in Kenya, South Africa, and India share several
human and environmental situational factors that define locations where H-LC turns into
retaliatory leopard killings.
In all three locations, the majority of the population is suffering from H-WC. In Kenya
and South Africa, the conflict is leopard livestock predation, while in India it is a combination of
human and livestock attacks. Local residents live with the daily threat of H-WC and constantly
fear losses, financial or human, from wildlife. They also fear increasing economic and land-use
pressures that jeopardize their livelihoods. Most local residents in Kenya and South Africa earn a
livable income but lack the economic cushion necessary to sustain losses from H-WC. As result,
tolerance for wildlife and its costs is limited.
The analysis of environmental factors that influence retaliatory leopard killings found
that most killings in South Africa took place far from main roads. This is consistent with
research on leopard behavior that found that large cats will rarely cross roads 2 lanes or larger,
but will often travel on dirt roads, which are common in rural South Africa (Dickson et al., 2005;
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Schwab & Zandbergen, 2011). In Kenya and India, where rural infrastructure is limited, the same
pattern would be expected. Government neglect and a lack of access to basic services
exacerbates an already tenuous relationship between humans and wildlife in these areas.
At the same time, local residents fail to consider the natural consequences of cohabitation with wildlife, like H-WC. Increased competition between humans and wildlife for
natural resources is exacerbating these conflicts, yet residents in all three locations refuse to
accept losses from H-WC. These unrealistic expectations leave them frustrated and angry when
the inevitable conflicts occur, brought on by resource shortages and population pressure.
Meanwhile, antagonism between government, conservation, and public actors in the
region continue to foster anti-conservation feelings in Kenya, South Africa, and India. The
government’s general denial that retaliatory killings and H-LC exist in South Africa and India
frustrates local residents who bear the brunt of these problems. In all three locations, a history of
problematic government policies for wildlife conservation has also frayed residents’ relationship
with authority. Through these policies, the government took ownership of wildlife either by
passing laws to protect it or by appropriating public land to create conservation areas. This
created an expectation among local residents that the government is responsible for protecting
them from “its” wildlife. Unfortunately, government actors have invested little in H-WC
prevention, leaving local residents to fend for themselves.
While taking away wildlife ownership and land rights, government actors have also
refused or failed to provide needed financial support to these regions. South African livestock
farmers receive no subsidies for their beef. There is little revenue sharing from successful
conservation initiatives in all three locations. In India, the government is simply failing to
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provide for basic infrastructure, let alone compensation for losses due to H-WC, which can take
16-18 months to process (World Wildlife Fund, 2010, December). Fortress conservation’s failure
has left local residents feeling resentful for this government intrusion that does nothing to solve
their conflicts with wildlife.
When conservation and government actors have tried to address H-WC in Kenya, South
Africa, and India, their responses have generally failed. Local residents therefore associate
conservation efforts with negative rather than positive outcomes (with the exception of bursaries
in Kenya). These failures are two-fold. Some solutions have failed in practice for a variety of
reasons: ineffective methods, general confusion on best practices, lack of resources,
communication breakdowns, poor information/intelligence sharing between agencies and
locations, inadequate application of laws, and low personnel morale or commitment to the job.
Other H-WC solutions, although moderately successful, have failed in the eyes of local
residents because they do not meet their needs or expectations. One such example is bell collars
in South Africa. Although some livestock farmers use bell collars, they report many problems
with their use, while conservation organizations consider them an excellent predation prevention
method. Farmers suggest they are ineffective for leopards but effective for caracal. They note the
difficulty of using them correctly, by taking them on and off livestock regularly, because they
put livestock out to graze several days at a time with limited human contact. Farmers are also
unimpressed that they are not 100% effective against livestock predation, although they do
reduce attack frequency. Regardless of why a solution failed, every failure adds to the negative
view local residents have of conservation.
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In Kenya, South Africa, and India there is deep anger and distrust of wildlife
conservation authorities, both government and NPO. These emotions are the byproduct of
conservation actors’ failure to acknowledge the high costs of H-WC for local residents, the
exclusionary and misleading nature of previous conservation policies, and the failure of proposed
solutions to H-WC. That anger and distrust, though, is mutual. This is especially evident in India
and South Africa when government and NPO personnel blame the victims of H-WC for being
careless and shame local residents that retaliate against wildlife.
In all three locations, there is culture of distrust among the parties that gets in the way of
conservation goals and renders everyone unable to see and acknowledge their common ground,
which is often substantial. Each actor is entrenched in his/her mindset and unwilling to consider
alternate viewpoints. They also have a hard time acknowledging the weaknesses of their
solutions, making it difficult to improve on the status quo. Despite this unfavorable environment,
these locations were also the best places to find solutions because local residents had ideas about
how to deal with H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings. In fact, their solutions had a higher
chance of acceptance and success because they took into account local lifestyles, mindsets, the
physical environment, and were informed by past failures.

Differences between study locations

The reasons why retaliatory leopard killings are more common in India and South Africa,
rather than Kenya, lie in the differences between these three locations. In Kenya, local residents
have had some positive experiences with conservation initiatives, mainly through bursaries, but
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also through employment opportunities and revenue sharing. Most of the conservation initiatives
in this area generate income and are therefore linked with economic opportunities in local
residents’ minds, especially for those with higher levels of education. At the same time, the
government is taking steps to communicate with communities about their conservation strategies
and asking for local input, creating a forum to discuss grievances and problems that arise from
H-WC and conservation initiatives. This area also has small grassroots NPO programs that
involve local residents in protecting the wildlife and natural habitat in which they live (the Lion
Guardians program is one example of this). These programs foster goodwill among local
residents by meeting an ongoing social and/or infrastructure need, like tracking lost livestock or
helping reinforce corrals, while also educating residents about the need to protect carnivores for
the good of the ecosystem.
This combination of open communication, sustainable economic incentives76, and localrun grassroots programming, help residents accept the costs of living with wildlife. It gives them
a stake in protecting the wildlife and natural habitat around them and empowers them to find
non-lethal solutions to H-WC. Although problems of distrust among actors and talk of corruption
among KWS exist, they do not dominate the conservation landscape in the area.
In South Africa, on the other hand, there are few income-generating conservation
initiatives and ecotourism in the area is limited. Livestock/crop farming and game farms are the
main sources of income, all of which suffer from leopard predation. Just like the juxtaposition of
game and livestock farms causes problems when carnivores breed on game farms and feed on
livestock farms, farmers also oppose conservation initiatives because they increase the leopard
76

Even if they remain small incentives compared to the profits KWS makes from National Parks.
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population and thus the frequency of H-LCs. Local residents view carnivore conservation as
detrimental to their livelihoods because it increases the risk of livestock predation and decreases
their ability to get rid of problem leopards.
H-LC is a recent problem in South Africa because rural population density was still low
as of 20 years ago. As a result, local residents believe that H-LC “should not be happening”
because it was not a problem before. This belief exacerbates local resistance to conservation
initiatives, a resistance largely fueled by anger and distrust between government/ NPO actors and
local residents and their shaming and blaming of each other for H-LCs. In contrast to Kenya,
there are no positive incentives for wildlife conservation to counter-balance the antagonism and
no efforts to put aside grievances and communicate openly. In this context, South Africa’s
fragmented and often poorly enforced wildlife protection laws and the corruption that hampers
effective law enforcement only add to the problem.
Although South African government, NPO, and public actors combined have the
knowledge and experience to prevent H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings, they do not trust
each other enough to agree on and implement effective solutions. The lack of economic
incentives only increases livestock farmers’ unwillingness to embrace conservation since they
feel they are being asked to risk financial losses from leopard livestock predation with no way to
recoup those losses.
The gravity of leopard attacks on humans in India, in comparison to livestock predation,
creates a deeper level of fear, anger, and resentment than in either Kenya or South Africa. The
Indian government’s failed response to H-LC and their lack of accountability, with obvious
victim blaming and disinterest in improving, drives retaliatory leopard killings. Local residents
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feel fearful and helpless in the face of a problem that they believe the government is responsible
for solving, yet the government is shirking its obligations and failing to respect its own wildlife
protection laws. Local residents’ desperation and anger at being left to their own devices is
driving assaults on government and NPO personnel as well as retaliatory leopard killings.
When Indian forest department officials do act, their confusion over best practices and
the official H-LC response strategy erodes any trust local residents’ may have in them. This
confusion over best practices is reflected in the quotes officials give journalists and the fact that
many news articles are filled with ecological inaccuracies. Contradictory beliefs about what
leopards are “man-eaters” and how to identify them is just one example of this. Another is the
forest departments’ focus on relocating/culling leopards instead of teaching local residents
predation prevention methods. Forest department officials’ confusion often leads them to act
before they think, resulting in mistakes when handling H-LCs. The subsequent cover-ups and
defensive behavior to avoid public shaming for these mistakes only strain their relationships with
local residents and other conservation actors further.

Each of these locations is at a different step in the process of preventing H-LC and
retaliatory leopard killings. In Kenya, continuing to develop communication channels and smallscale community-driven conservation programs that meet local social and infrastructure needs is
essential for protecting carnivores. In South Africa, the focus should be on beginning that
process of open communication and building bridges between knowledgeable parties before
discussing possible H-LC solutions. In India, education to empower local residents is the first
step, while deciding on best practices for preventing and responding to H-LC comes next. Once
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both those goals are accomplished, working to reverse the anger and distrust between
NPO/government personnel and local populations will be possible.

Recommendations

Solutions to the problem of H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings will require a
coordinated effort between species experts, local populations, national wildlife management
authorities, and NPOs. These solutions should abide by the following principles:


They should be interdisciplinary, multi-pronged, and self-sustaining (Klenke et al.,
2013). No solution is 100% effective, therefore it is best to approach the problem with
multiple strategies. These solutions will also require long-term implementation so
they should not rely on possibly unreliable outside funding to continue to operate.



Local residents with a vested interest in protecting their communities and ecosystem77
should drive and evaluate their implementation, with international actors’ support
(Klenke et al., 2013). Combining the expertise of international conservation actors
and local residents who suffer from H-LC and commit retaliatory killings will result
in more targeted and better designed conservation interventions that local residents
are more likely to support and which are therefore more likely to succeed (Kansky &
Knight, 2014).

77

Generally speaking, this research found that local residents are invested in the future of their
environment, even if their behavior does not always reflect this because they have difficulty
seeing the long-term consequences of their actions.
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Choosing the right type of solution for the right location is key to the success of
conservation interventions.

Governments’ responses to illegal wildlife killings tend to focus on their corrosive effect
on national security and link to other transnational organized crimes like narcotics and human
trafficking. In doing so, they ignore the fact that most killings are linked to social issues rather
than crime (Lin, 2005). Leopards are illegally killed in communities where local residents have
no reason to protect leopards that impose costs on them and add to their struggles to earn a
living. H-LC adds to the existing social strains these individuals face, especially as H-LC is on
the rise because of global population growth and the industrialization of developing countries
(Schaller, 2011). Applying targeted strategies to reduce H-LC is one thing, but, ideally, local
residents also need to receive other forms of social support, like improved access to basic
services or farming subsidies, to reverse tolerance for leopard killings. Solving the social issues
behind illegal leopard killings is beyond the scope of this research, but SCP can provide the tools
to reduce H-LC and its costs to a minimum, as well as some interventions to reduce social strain
(see the “Reduce the provocations” column of table 7.2 below), thereby preventing most
retaliatory leopard killings.
Past solutions have also tended to neglect landscape factors and failed to recognize that
H-WC is not evenly distributed across the landscape (Klenke et al., 2013, p. 2). This research,
identifying what situational factors make H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings more likely in an
area, is meant to help conservation actors focus their limited resources on the most at-risk
locations. Knowing where efforts should be targeted then allows them to come up with locationspecific solutions using frameworks like SCP where the focus is on changing the environment to
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deter the offender. Changing the environment is the fastest solution to prevent H-LC and
retaliatory leopard killings; interventions aimed at changing mindsets and criminal dispositions
take far longer. SCP also provides more specific and practical measures to reduce H-LC and
retaliatory killings than most other theoretical frameworks in criminology. Given the little time
left to prevent leopard extinction, the more targeted, practical, and rapid the solution, the better.

Informal guardians and participatory crime analysis

The first step in designing an SCP-driven intervention to H-LC and retaliatory leopard
killings is to create informal guardians to protect leopards (Pires & Moreto, 2011). One of the
main findings of this research is that formal infrastructure to combat wildlife crimes is failing, be
it legislation or law enforcement efforts. Wildlife authorities everywhere lack the money,
resources, and training to adequately prevent illegal leopard killings. Although efforts to
overhaul law enforcement and legislation are necessary, they could take decades, and other
options, like informal guardians, are readily available now.
Every study area in this research had its own informal infrastructure to deal with H-LC.
In South Africa, livestock farmers had a local farmer with leopard hunting dogs they used to
track and shoot problem leopards. In Kenya, Maasai hunters knew how to track carnivores in the
area and some local residents knew how to build fortified corrals to protect livestock from
predators. In India, specific villagers act as designated hunters for problem leopards; even the
government uses their services. This existing informal infrastructure is not always leopard
conservation friendly or sophisticated, but it exists and communities respect it. It works for them
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where government and law enforcement initiatives have failed. Working within this existing
infrastructure is the first step. The second step is to work with community members to make this
infrastructure more effective and leopard conservation friendly.
Working within this informal infrastructure means empowering local residents to use
their knowledge of the area to find H-LC and retaliatory leopard killing solutions that work for
them, yet also abide by conservation principles. Participatory crime analysis offers a an ideal
framework for this because it is based on the premise that local people know their communities
best and that a collaborative process bringing together analytical skills and local knowledge
produces better solutions (Liebermann & Coulson, 2004). During a participatory crime analysis
workshop, local residents learn about crime prevention principles, draw where they live, and
identify hot spots of crime. A moderator groups these locations onto one detailed map and
residents visit the sites to photograph hot spots and discuss why crimes occur there. They then
analyze the information and work together to find responses, creating a toolkit for preventing
local crimes (Liebermann & Coulson, 2004).
The same approach could be used to brainstorm ways to prevent H-LC and retaliatory
leopard killings. The SCP framework provides a starting point from which local residents, NPO
personnel, and government actors can build a toolkit of predation prevention methods and
retaliatory leopard killing solutions to use in their communities (Table 7.1 shows the SCP
framework with examples of each technique). Combining local knowledge with SCP allies
theoretically tested tools and practical knowledge for a better solution to H-LC and retaliatory
killings, as intended in participatory crime analysis. A combination of techniques is more likely
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to achieve the maximum reduction in H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings. Table 7.2 offers a
range of possible SCP-driven solutions to both problems based on the results of this research.

Table 7.1. Twenty-five techniques of situational crime prevention (Center for Problem-Oriented
Policing, n.d.)
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Table 7.2. Possible SCP solutions to leopard livestock predation and retaliatory leopard killings
Increase the effort
Harden targets:
Bell collars
Donkeys
Smart collars

Control access to
facilities:
Predator-proof corrals
Fence in villages

Screen exits:
Immediately investigate
cases of “missing
collared leopards” and
canvas location of
disappearance to prevent
disposal of body

Increase the risks
Extend guardianship:
Keep livestock about to give
birth in protected enclosures
until they can rejoin the herd

Reduce the rewards
Conceal targets*

Encourage neighborhood
“adoption” of local leopards to
foster willingness to protect

Reduce the provocations
Reduce frustrations:
Subsidize farmers who set aside
part of their land for
conservation
Offer lower beef prices to
communities that ban bushmeat
hunting

Assist natural surveillance:
Create phone app that predicts
likely predation locations
based on environmental
conditions

Remove targets

Reduce anonymity:
Shame individuals who kill
leopards using social media
and elders (only in areas where
distrust is NOT a problem)

Identify property

Avoid disputes:
Roundtables to discuss
grievances and restore trust

Remove the excuses
Set rules:
Empower local residents to
create their own rules
Support local leadership for
conservation projects
Micro-loans for community
conservation initiatives or
local predation prevention
efforts
Post instructions:
Host workshops on how to
live with/near leopards

Build trust through
information-sharing forums
Reduce emotional arousal:
Tick fever prevention efforts to
reduce livestock mortality

Alert conscience:
Provide alternative benefits
Bursaries

Insurance schemes to lessen
economic blow

Revenue sharing from ecotourism
Land restoration projects

Deflect offenders:
Use “lion lights”
(motion-sensitive strobe
lights) that turn on when
predators roam near
corrals

Utilize place managers:
Game-scouts & shepherds to
track leopard movements and
guard livestock when leopards
nearby

Disrupt markets

Neutralize peer pressure:
Harness peer pressure
Develop label for livestock
products recognizing leopardfriendly farms (like “organic”

Assist compliance:
Anonymous cell phone app
to report illegal killings
Community enforcement
liaison
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Trap and neuter stray
dogs, relocate them to a
facility outside of
village
Control tools/weapons:
Stop over-the-counter
sales of pesticide,
specifically carbofuran

Predation response team to
respond to complaints of H-LC
and create a prevention plan

Strengthen formal surveillance:
Equip livestock with cell
phones that track movement
and call farmers when animals
run from predators

label)
Regular visits by wildlife
officials to establish a
relationship
Deny benefits:
Develop livestock feed that
makes animals taste bad to
predators

Discourage imitation:
Randomly move livestock
around to different grazing
areas to prevent recurrence of
predation

Control drugs and alcohol

Immediately dispose of
livestock carcasses to prevent
leopard return to kill

*Techniques in grey are not applicable to the problem of H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings.
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Designing SCP-driven interventions

Only select parts of the 25 techniques are relevant for H-LC and retaliatory leopard
killings, but all 5 main principles apply. Techniques for reducing the rewards of H-LC and
retaliatory killings are limited because you cannot require livestock owners and local residents to
stop raising livestock or move elsewhere (i.e. remove targets, human and livestock). Concealing
targets is also difficult because leopards are expert trackers and can smell prey even if concealed.
Identifying property is impossible since leopards have no sense of ownership and do not abide by
human moral principles. Disrupting markets does not apply since perpetrators of retaliatory
leopard killings rarely resell a leopard’s carcass for fear of being caught. Finally, controlling
drugs and alcohol (under “removing the excuses”) is also irrelevant since these substances do not
play a role in leopard behavior. They also rarely play a role in local residents’ choice to kill a
leopard in retaliation for livestock losses; deep-seated anger is the primary motivator here.
Although alcohol can certainly exacerbate this anger, it is not the cause of it, as explained in
chapter 6.
The remaining techniques offer some innovative and wide-ranging solutions to both HLC and retaliatory leopard killings. There is no need to separate solutions to H-LC and to
retaliatory leopard killings because both stem from the same root causes. It is just a question of
where in the chain of human-leopard interactions you choose to intervene to prevent illegal
leopard killings. In fact, working jointly on these different places in the chain can have a stronger
positive effect on leopard survival then working solely in one place.
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Increasing the effort for H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings

The majority of solutions in the “increase the effort” category of table 7.2 focus on
limiting opportunities for leopard predation. Bell collars and donkeys protect the herd. Donkeys
are already semi-accepted in South Africa and are cheap to buy. Bell collars are ill suited to the
husbandry practices there, where farmers leave their livestock to graze in remote pastures for
multiple days at a time. Nevertheless, they can be useful in Kenya where herders stay with the
flock while grazing and so have the opportunity to take collars on and off regularly. Predatorproof corrals, ideally with wire mesh roofs and fencing at least a foot deep in the ground to
prevent leopards from jumping or digging into enclosures, can be used at both locations. They
will be easier to incorporate into the local lifestyle in Kenya, though, because agro-pastoralists
there already bring their livestock in at night.
Fencing of villages is a possibility in India. Although fences can be difficult to maintain
and pose some problems for migrating animals, they could be a first line of defense in
communities where leopards wander into villages, especially if villages are small and far
between. In India, trap and neuter programs to reduce stray dog populations near villages would
go a long way to reducing leopard attacks on humans. Leopards roam near villages to feed on
stray domestic animals. Limiting the number of stray animals would deplete this leopard food
source and reduce leopard presence near villages. “Lion lights” with motion sensitive sensors
could also deflect predators away from livestock corrals and from houses in both Kenya and
India. Ideally, these methods are all applied in tandem for maximum protection.
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Increasing the effort to commit retaliatory leopards killings can be done in two ways. One
is to make killing tools less accessible. Banning over-the-counter sales of pesticides used to
poison livestock carcasses and the use of wire/snare traps for hunting small game would help
prevent some leopard deaths. They would not prevent shooting deaths in South Africa, but they
would eliminate the more indirect and easy ways of killing leopards. The second method is to
immediately investigate any cases of missing collared leopards to increase the risk that an
offender is caught in the act before he can dispose of the body. If a collar suddenly goes silent
and is far from the end of its battery life, chances are a leopard has been killed and its collar
destroyed. Canvassing this leopard’s last known location might increase the chances of arrest.
This would require partnering with researchers and NPOs that track local leopard populations
and could help wildlife officials build valuable relationships with conservation partners.

Increasing the risks for H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings

Solutions for “increasing the risks” of H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings focus on
teaching livestock farmers and agro-pastoralists how to identify and manage leopard predation
risk factors in their environment. The purpose of these interventions is to make leopard attacks
on livestock and people more difficult so people are less likely to commit retaliatory leopard
killings, thereby reducing both behaviors. South African livestock farmers noticed that leopards
often attacked cows that wandered from the herd to give birth. A simple solution to preventing
these deaths is to keep birthing cows indoors until they can rejoin the herd (Farmer 1, personal
communication, August 17, 2011).
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Technology can play a role in managing these predation risks. A simple cellphone
application that predicts likely predation locations, based on some of the environmental factors
discussed in this research, could allow livestock owners to make better decisions about where to
graze their livestock and when to corral them for safety. This application can be combined with
game-scouts that track leopard movements and warn farmers or selectively guard livestock when
leopards are nearby (similar to the Lion Guardians’ model (Lion Guardians, 2012)). Researchers
that collar leopards might even consider sharing general leopard movement patterns78 with
livestock farmers if they see a risk of leopard predation on a particular farm. In India, where
leopards and humans often live alongside each other without knowing it (Gates, 2013), education
efforts in schools might focus on “adopting” local leopards and tracking their movements as part
of the science curriculum to give families a sense of ownership and a positive connection to the
wildlife around them. This might help create a willingness to protect leopards.
Another technological solution for thwarting leopard predation is equipping livestock
with cellphones that track herd movement (Agence France Presse, 2012b). The cell phones are
attached to sheep’s neck and are set to turn on and call the farmer if the animal runs, often
because a predator startled it. The farmer can then go scare off the leopard and/or bring his
livestock to a protected enclosure until the danger passes. This invention is an example of local
ingenuity: a South African farmer named Erard Louw created it after losing 27 sheep and 13
lambs to livestock thieves (Agence France Presse, 2012b).

78

Sharing too much information with livestock farmers can be detrimental, though, if they
decide to use the information to track a leopard and kill it (which has happened in the Heidelberg
area of South Africa).
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To deter farmers from taking matters into their own hands and killing leopards in
retaliation for livestock losses, communities should consider implementing predation response
teams to immediately address complaints of H-LC and work with livestock farmers to create a
predation prevention plan that works for their farm. These teams do not have to be governmentrun. They can be an informal group of trusted community leaders, senior farmers, NPO
personnel, and even government wildlife officials that choose to support farmers struggling with
H-LC. The team should deploy as quickly as possible after a complaint to offer alternative
solutions to retaliatory killings. The Corbett Foundation created a similar model for tiger
predation near India’s Corbett Tiger Reserve with positive results (World Wildlife Fund, 2010,
December). In their case, they provided immediate financial compensation for losses while
livestock owners waited for government compensation. A similar model might be possible in
Kenya and other parts of India, where government compensation is an option. A better model,
though, would be one where response teams focus on preventing future losses since
compensation for past losses is not always possible and is generally unsustainable. Such a model
could incorporate a farmer-run insurance scheme where each farmer in the community
contributes to the fund and receives compensation based on the extent of his livestock losses.
This could be an alternative to government compensation provided H-WC is not rampant in the
area and all farmers agree to apply basic predation prevention methods on their farms to
minimize livestock losses.
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Reducing provocations for H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings

A possible predation prevention plan for a farm suffering from H-LC could include
several solutions suggested under the “reduce the provocations” column of table 7.2. For
example, the response team could suggest ways to reduce the farm’s livestock losses like
randomly moving livestock around to different grazing areas to avoid repeat predation. Team
members could also work with a farmer to reduce tick fever losses, which account for far more
livestock deaths than leopards (Farmer 4, personal communication, August 18, 2011). If a farmer
suffers less livestock losses overall, he may be more willing to tolerate the occasional leopard
attack. Other predation prevention methods could fall under “reducing the rewards” of predation
for leopards. It might be possible to develop livestock feed that makes their meat taste bad for
predators and so discourages predation. Certain plants already deter herbivore predation by
producing bitter-tasting toxins like caffeine and quinine, so developing this genetic technology is
not impossible (Meadows, 2009). Response team members might also suggest that farmers
monitor their flock regularly and immediately dispose of any carcasses to dissuade leopards from
returning to a kill site and potentially eating more livestock.
Another option to reduce the provocations for both H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings
is to give farmers incentives to conserve leopards. South African farmers complained of the lack
of government subsidies during their interviews. Government wildlife officials could consider
subsidizing famers who set aside part of their land for conservation and agree to implement
certain predation prevention techniques. This would give farmers a financial incentive to tolerate
some leopard livestock predation. Farmers who agreed to these terms could have the option to
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label their meat as “leopard-friendly” and sell it for higher prices to buyers, much like “organic”
foods in the United States. South Africa is a developing economy (United Nations Secretariat,
2011) and the market for “luxury” and “organic” items is on the rise there ("Luxury brands turn
to Africa as the next growth frontier," 2014; Nsehe, 2014). Creating a “leopard-friendly” label
for meat products may provide a lucrative outlet for livestock farmers, one that could counter the
losses they see from H-LC. In places like India, where bushmeat hunting of ungulates and other
leopard prey is exacerbating H-LC, the government could offer lower beef prices to communities
that ban bushmeat hunting, encouraging local residents to buy domesticated instead of wild meat.

Removing the excuses for H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings

Lastly, part of any SCP-based solution to H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings should
include removing the excuses for these behaviors. The five relevant SCP techniques in this
category are “set rules”, “post instructions”, “alert conscience”, and “assist compliance.” Setting
rules and alerting one’s conscience should be modified because of the study area’s human
context. Setting rules is problematic because most local residents resent that NPOs and
government personnel in these areas come in and tell they what they can and cannot do on their
land while failing to offer useful help for H-WC. A better option is to empower local residents to
set their own rules for preventing H-LC and conserving wildlife. Two possible ways to empower
them could be: 1) government wildlife officials and NPO personnel could support local
leadership for conservation projects and 2) they could offer local residents micro-loans to
develop and implement their own predation prevention methods.
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Alerting one’s conscience is also ill suited to these locations because residents are too
focused on their immediate survival and that of their flock and livelihood to consider the longterm consequences of their actions (see footnote 17) (Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland, 1993).
They also do not consider killing leopards that attack humans or livestock to be wrong. Pangs of
conscience are therefore unlikely to move them, but if local residents received some benefits
from wildlife, they might be less willing to kill the reasons why they receive those immediate
benefits. Possible benefits could include bursaries for school fees in Kenya and India or land
restoration projects for farmers in South Africa. Several farmers, government officials, and NPO
personnel mentioned sites where illegal vegetation clearing, soil degradation, and soil erosion
into streams were a problem for crop farming and livestock raising (Farmer 1, personal
communication, August 17, 2011; Government wildlife official 2, personal communication,
August 19, 2011; NPO worker 4, personal communication, August 21, 2011). These sites were
usually the result of unsustainable farming techniques by previous generations of landowners.
Offering to clean up these sites would increase the value of farmer’s land. It would also
encourage farmers to consider the long-term consequences of their farming practices and might
be the start of a discussion on protecting leopards and considering alternative predation
prevention methods to retaliatory killings. In India, such discussions could take place during
workshops on how to live with or near leopards. Several media articles noted that such
awareness workshops, held right after leopard attacks on humans, helped calm local populations
and were welcomed by communities (Singh, 2014; Sonawala, 2013). They provide an avenue for
local people to vent their frustrations and fears, while also learning how to protect themselves
and their livestock from leopard attacks.
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Perhaps one of the most important ways to remove excuses to retaliatory leopard killings
is to assist in the reporting of these events. Communities where these killings occur are often
tight-knit, and local residents, even if they are against retaliatory killings, will probably have a
hard time reporting neighbors without reprisal (Government wildlife official 2, personal
communication, August 19, 2011). In such harsh environments, one must be able to depend on
one’s neighbors for help, which makes reporting them all the more difficult. Government
wildlife officials can help by creating websites and cell phone applications where local residents
can report illegal killings anonymously.
Government wildlife officials also need to establish a neutral and amicable presence in
the community, in the vein of community policing officers. They should make a point to stop by
every farm to introduce themselves and learn about farmers’ struggles with H-WC and other
issues. Alternatively, they could designate a community member to be a law enforcement liaison
and act as a go-between between law enforcement and local residents. This latter option might
work best in communities where elders play a leadership role and could act as impartial and
respected go-betweens. This type of initiative has been helpful in Indonesia where wildlife
officials regularly visit rural communities to monitor their problems with wildlife (Government
wildlife official 4, personal communication, November 26, 2013).

Addressing distrust through conflict resolution techniques

Before any of these solutions and programs can be implemented, though, stakeholders
must address the distrust that exists between local residents, government officials, and
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conservation NPO personnel. Part of creating informal guardians to prevent H-LC and retaliatory
leopard killings requires fostering the willingness to intervene to protect leopards. According to
Reynald (2010), the ultimate test of an informal guardian’s capability, once a guardian is familiar
enough with his or her environment and identifies an offender or crime in commission79, is
whether or not he or she chooses to intervene to disrupt the crime event. Willingness to
intervene, though, is partly based on trust between informal and formal guardians. An informal
guardian intervening to prevent a retaliatory leopard killing must trust that intervening will help
protect the leopard, that local authorities will provide additional help if necessary (including
prosecuting the perpetrator or providing alternative and effective H-LC solutions to retaliatory
killings), and that he or she will not face retaliation from peers. Willingness to intervene also
depends an informal guardians’ sense of ownership of the animal and responsibility to protect it
(Reynald, 2010). These requirements are not met in most of the study areas because of ongoing
distrust between local residents, government wildlife officials, and NPO personnel.
In every study location, some level of distrust between actors hampered conservation and
H-WC prevention efforts. The level of distrust in South Africa and India was crippling to the
point where local residents would rather resort to their own stopgap measures than call in
wildlife officials. Unless these tensions are aired in the open and fences are mended, recruiting
informal guardians and implementing any of the above-mentioned solutions effectively will be
nearly impossible. Lewicki and Tomlinson (2014, p. 104) state that “if individuals or groups trust
each other, they can work through conflict relatively easily. If they do not trust each other,
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These concepts are the two other requirements for informal guardians: availability and
knowledge of context (see chapter 4).
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conflict often becomes destructive, and resolution is more difficult.” Stakeholders in the study
areas are failing to prevent H-LC because of this lack of trust and because they refuse to
acknowledge its existence. By failing to acknowledge the distrust, the conflict continues to
generate animosity and pain, neither of which is easily forgotten and which prevents parties from
listening to each other and believing what each other says. It is a circular problem because
serious conflict often destroys trust and increases distrust, thereby making any conflict resolution
more difficult to achieve (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2014).
Part of the solution for retaliatory leopard killing in the study areas should include
conflict resolution techniques80 to reduce distrust and foster cooperation between local residents,
government wildlife officials, and NPO personnel. In Kenya, the KWS has started holding
community outreach workshops with the help of researchers, where they discuss what they are
doing to prevent H-WC with local residents (Viollaz, 2006). This information-sharing forum
helps local residents understand what solutions government officials are implementing. It also
makes the KWS’s actions seem less arbitrary and allows local residents to give feedback on
whether or not these solutions are making a difference. Similarly, participatory crime analysis
workshops improve relations between people and local law enforcement by empowering local
residents to take an active role in protecting their communities from crime (Liebermann &
Coulson, 2004). These sorts of events can be a place to openly discuss conflicts, but also to
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Conservation conflict transformation offers a similar framework with which to improve the
effectiveness of conservation efforts. According to Madden and McQuinn (2014, p. 97),
“principles and processes from the peace-building field inform conservation conflict
transformation and offer useful guidance for revealing and addressing social conflicts to improve
the effectiveness of conservation efforts.” Its focus is on capacity building and conflict
interventions.
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showcase common ground between parties. Trust can then develop as stakeholders gain
knowledge of each other and the reasons for each other’s behavior (Lewicki & Tomlinson,
2014). These sorts of efforts are part of the SCP principle of reducing provocations by avoiding
disputes.
During these information-sharing forums, there is always a risk that some actors will
resort to shaming others for their beliefs and behavior. This is something that NPOs, like The
Landmark Foundation, have attempted to reduce the anonymity behind and increase the risks of
retaliatory leopard killings. They do so by either by outing illegal leopard hunters on social
media or by reporting offenders to elders in indigenous communities. The Landmark Foundation,
for example, posts pictures and names of local residents who have killed leopards on their
Facebook page. Although this does reduce anonymity and could lead to criminal sanctions, it
also adds to the anger and distrust that exists between stakeholders and reduces the chances of
cooperation between local residents and NPO personnel. Limited shaming of entities, like
governments or corporations, that exacerbate H-LC or fail to protect leopards is sometimes
helpful to encourage a change in behavior, but such shaming should be used strategically and
only in areas where distrust is not a crippling problem to leopard conservation.

Limitations of this research

While this research provides valuable information on the situational factors that influence
where and why H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings take place, it is limited in several ways.
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Data on wildlife crimes, especially illegal killings, are traditionally difficult to obtain and,
if data exist, their quality is often poor (Clyne, 2014). The retaliatory leopard killing data used in
part 4 of this research, although better than average, still suffers from some limitations. The first
is the inevitable problem of observed versus unobserved cases of leopard killings. Like for crime
in general (Maxfield & Babbie, 2008), observed leopard killings are likely only a small
percentage of the actual number of killings that occur. This is especially true 1) for retaliatory
killings because the perpetrator hides the carcass to avoid discovery and 2) for leopards because
few accurate leopard population estimates exist. In an effort to reduce the number of unobserved
killings, this research uses GPS collar and carcass recovery data from a small-scale NPO that is
actively embedded in the life of the community. This NPO tracks the leopard population in the
Heidelberg area and, like community policing officers, engages local residents to solve H-LC
problems. Between their knowledge of local leopards and their ties to the community, NPO
personnel collect some of the most accurate data available on H-LC and retaliatory leopard
killings in the area, but unobserved cases are of course still possible.
The data for the independent variables in part 4 of this analysis come from different
years. This is part of the difficulty with primarily using open-source data. The retaliatory leopard
killing cases date from 2005 to 2011. All of the independent variable data come from a mixture
of those same years, with the majority from 2009 (see table 5.7 for more details). Every effort
was made to get data from the same year whenever possible, since data from 2009 are a fair
middle ground for this range of leopard killing dates. The two most problematic variables were
human settlement (dating from 2005) and prey abundance (dating from 2006). Both these
variables are likely to have changed significantly from 2005-2006 to 2011. Fortunately, they
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change in predictable ways: increases in human settlement and a decrease in prey abundance due
to habitat destruction (Graham et al., 2005; Schaller, 2011) (Woodroffe, 2000 in (Henschel,
Hunter, Breitenmoser, Purchase, et al., 2008)). The influence of these variables on H-LC and
retaliatory killings is thus probably under-represented in this study.
Part 4 was able to examine only a limited number of cases, 15 killings in 13 locations.
The case-control design added 24 units from two control groups. Non-parametric tests were used
because they are better suited to small sample sizes. The Mann-Whitney test, for example, has a
minimum sample size of N = 7 (Field, 2005). Furthermore, the results from part 4 show that the
only variable that was significant, main road length, had a strong exact significance value
compared to other independent variables’ significance values. If anything, this small sample size
could have resulted in false negatives for other variables, but the fact that main road length was
so strongly significant suggests that it plays an important role in the location of retaliatory
leopard killings.
The snowball sampling method for the South African interviews and the small number of
interviews (16 in total) is another potential limit, but snowball sampling was necessary to get
such a tight-knit rural community to talk to a foreign researcher (Goodman, 1961). Being
vouched for by a community member meant that farmers were willing to open up about their
problems with leopards and their conflicts with NPO and government personnel. The amount of
distrust between stakeholders described in chapter 6 might have affected some respondents’
answers. This is more likely in email communications with government personnel where there
was no established rapport. The amount of sensitive and detailed information given during in-
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person interviews and the range of opinions expressed, including controversial ones, suggest that
most interviewees were honest in their responses.
That this researcher was female and young also helped obtain accurate information
during interviews because, in such a male-dominated profession, a young woman was not
considered much of a threat (Government wildlife official 3, personal communication, August
23, 2011). Farmers could therefore share sensitive information with this researcher because, even
if repeated, her credibility among their peers would be limited. The choice not to take notes
during these interviews likewise made interviewees more comfortable and allowed for more
open communication about their problems with leopards. The downside of this method was
possible content error when writing up interviews from memory, but the general points made by
the interviewees would have been hard to forget. Any hesitation on content was noted in the
interview transcripts and that information was excluded from the analysis.
Although the number of South African interviews is small, the diversity of the
respondents and the depth of interviews (sometimes lasting 2-3 hours) helped produce more
detailed information. The livestock and dairy farmers, conservation NPO workers, and
government officials interviewed were chosen because of their varied positions on illegal leopard
killings. Some were friendly towards local conservation efforts, but several others were strongly
opposed to them. A couple of farmers were also actively involved in illegal leopard killings. The
amount of detail discussed in these interviews provided good reference points from which to
crosscheck facts based on data from other locations and scholarly and grey literature. Generally,
the information given by respondents was consistent with known patterns of H-LC and
retaliatory leopard killings.
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The sample of Indian media articles used in part 3 of this research could have been biased
in two ways. Media bias could have resulted in only the more sensational cases of H-LC and
retaliatory leopard killings being included in the sample (Entman & Gross, 2008; Gordon, 2000).
Any cases of H-LC not reported in the press would have gone unnoticed. Using Google Alerts to
collect these articles could also lead to the inclusion of more western world sources because of
Internet access and usage patterns (Strickland, 2014). The latter turned out not to be true, most
articles came from developing countries’ newspapers, especially Indian media, and the cases
cited came from all over the continent, from small villages to large cities. Media bias was present
because leopard attacks on humans rather than livestock received more column inches, but the
range of H-LC scenarios reported, including livestock attacks, was consistent with what the
scholarly and grey literature described (Athreya & Belsare, 2007; Athreya et al., 2010; Chauhan,
2011; Marker & Sivamani, 2009). As such, the articles presented a fairly accurate picture of the
H-LC and retaliatory leopard killing situation in India, as good as possible without doing
fieldwork in country.
Some measurement problems exist with the Kenyan interview data. The use of translators
when conducting interviews adds a potential source of error if the translator mistranslated or
misrepresented the interviewees’ response. Translators were necessary because of the many
dialects spoken in the Kenyan study area. Despite their downside, they were instrumental in
putting local residents at ease and understanding the nuances of local opinions.
A more important measurement problem, though, was the use of the question “what is
your attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities?” to assess
general attitudes toward conservation. This question is problematic because of its complex
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structure and reference to a specific type of conservation initiative. A better question would have
been “How do you feel about wildlife conservation?” with possible answer categories of
negatively, positively or neutral. Responses to other questions about conservation in general,
though, showed that there was some confusion about what “conservation” was (see footnote 65).
Since most respondents were aware of local conservation-based income generating activities,
asking their opinions on such initiatives was the next best alternative.
There are a number of limitations to the spatial analysis performed in part 4 of this
research. The first is that the GPS points given by The Landmark Foundation for leopard killing
locations were not always exact. Sometimes, they simply referred to the location of the farm
where the leopard was killed. This was part of the reason for choosing a grid cell size of 5.4 km x
4.7 km. Since the average subsistence farm size in the Heidelberg area was 8.32 km2 (Vink &
Tregurtha, 2003)81, the impact of an inexact leopard killing location is limited. The advantage of
using a 5.4 km x 4.7 km grid cell as the unit of analysis was that it provided more environmental
context. Unfortunately, this also meant aggregating some spatial data to that level of
measurement. For example, biome type had to be aggregated to this level of measurement even
though an area of 5.4 km x 4.7 km can include multiple biome types. The most common biome
type was chosen when a grid cell had multiple biome types within it, thus introducing some error
into the analysis. Fortunately, this problem only affected the variables biome type and human
settlement (where the cell’s mean value was used). The rational for allowing this type of error is

81

No more recent estimate is available, but given the decline of South African agriculture in the
last 20 years, it is unlikely that subsistence farm sizes have gotten larger (Wilson, 2009).
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that the general environmental context is more important to this analysis than minor variations in
biome or human settlement.
Second, measuring the variables prey availability and prey abundance also posed some
challenges. Due to a lack of prey population counts in the study area, this research made two
assumptions: 1) that if a prey’s habitat overlaps a grid cell, that prey is available there and 2) that
an average prey abundance score from a meta-analysis of all leopard prey studies was
representative of prey abundance in the study area. These measurements are not ideal, but
represent the best available data for the area. Future research might focus on getting proper prey
population estimates in the study location.
Third, one risk of spatial analysis is the propagation of error from one processing stage to
another. According to Burrough and McDonnell (1998), “the quality of outputs from a spatial
analysis is a function of (1) the quality of the data, (2) the quality of the model, and (3)
interactions between the data and the model. When data from different sources are combined, the
effects of many different kinds of uncertainties (i.e. measurement errors, scale differences,
temporal differences, and other factors) may also combine” (Lloyd, 2010, p. 19). Since this
analysis involves data from 6 different sources, it is subject to such propagation of errors. Every
effort was made to reduce the amount of error at each stage, as detailed through chapters 5 and 6.

A notable strength of this research is its use of multiple analytical approaches, study
areas, and data sources. The scarcity of illegal leopard killing data and the poor quality and small
sample sizes of existing data were the reasons for choosing this strategy. Replicating the results
across multiple locations and with different data sources increased the reliability of this
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research’s findings. Using data from 3 different countries also had the added benefit of crosscountry comparisons. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the results of this analysis are
meant to draw broad conclusions about H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings, not specific ones.
The field of H-WC and retaliatory killing research, especially from a criminological perspective,
is still young and more specific conclusions can be drawn as better data is collected. This is a
starting point on which to build future research and conservation initiatives.

Concluding remarks

Despite growing awareness of the problem of H-WC and retaliatory killings, specifically
H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings, NPOs and governments focus on poaching/wildlife
trafficking and law enforcement responses. This focus is detrimental because it fails to recognize
the important role H-WC plays in illegal wildlife killings and the potential local populations have
to prevent them. Oftentimes, researchers discount the value of local contextual knowledge and
practical experience.
This research offers a broad overview of the human and environmental factors that
influence where and why H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings take place. Its major strengths are
its focus on local residents’ opinions on these issues and its application of SCP techniques to find
solutions to both problems.
It emphasizes the importance of participatory crime analysis as a framework for
identifying and implementing solutions to retaliatory leopard killings. It also suggests targeted
SCP-driven interventions to reduce H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings using a combination of
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predation prevention methods and incentives to conserve wildlife. The goal of these responses is
to increase acceptance of predators and the costs they inflict, while also reducing those costs to a
minimum.
Future research should focus on finding effective ways to build trust among stakeholders.
It should also focus on refining predictive models of where H-LC and illegal leopard killings are
likely to take place so prevention efforts can be targeted to the most at-risk areas. Finally,
collecting more quality data on illegal wildlife killings, retaliatory and poaching-related, is key to
continuing research in this area. Isolated datasets exist, but a more concerted effort is necessary
to collect data on a global scale and share it openly between researchers so conservationists have
the tools they need to design effective interventions.
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Appendix


Table A1. Cases of wildlife & wildlife product seizures compiled in the TRAFFIC Bulletin “Seizures & prosecutions March
1997-October 2011”

Date

7/15/96
8/19/96
9/9/96
9/17/96
10/26/96

Date
accuracy

Country of
seizure

Location of seizure

estimated

India
India
India
India
India

Arunachal Pradesh
Ambedkar Nagar, Bihar
Rishikesh, Uttar Pradesh
Delhi
Dangs District, Gujarat

India
India
India
India
India
UK

Delhi
Indore, Madhya Pradesh
Chandigarh
Bomdila, Arunachal Pradesh
New Delhi
Portsmouth

India
India
India
India
India
India
India

Pithorgarh and Uttar Pradesh (UP)
Kohlapur, Maharashtra
Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP)
Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP)
Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP)
Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP)
Andhra Pradesh (AP)

11/1/96
11/3/96
12/9/96
7/11/96
10/31/96
3/13/97

12/30/96
1/20/97
1/31/97
2/1/97
2/2/97
2/10/97
2/11/97

estimated

# arrested

3
2
1

1
1

2
1

1
2
1

1

Items seized

# of
items
seized

Notes

leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard

4
1
1
2
3

leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard head
leopard medicinal
ingredients

1
1
2
4
1

leopard
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin

5

1 leopard and
two cubs
poisoned

taxidermist

3
11
2
5
1
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2/18/97
2/19/97
2/19/97
2/20/97
3/17/97
3/18/97
4/5/97
4/13/97
4/17/97
5/14/97
5/15/97
5/16/97
5/20/97
5/22/97
5/23/97
5/28/97
5/29/97
6/11/97
7/4/97
11/1/96
11/6/97
12/18/97
4/15/98
4/15/1998*
4/15/98
2/6/99
7/7/99
2/15/99
2/24/99

estimated

estimated
estimated
estimated
estimated

India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
South Korea
India
Malaysia
Belgium
India
India
China
China
India

New Delhi
Khatauli (UP)
Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP)
Sundernagar, Himachal Pradesh (HP)
Darjeeling, West Bengal
Corbett National Park (UP)
Calcutta
Kondli, East Delhi
Deeddag village, Sirmour District (HP)
Bhuvaneshwar, Orissa
Bhuvaneshwar, Orissa
Vikas Nagar, Dehradun (UP)
Vikas Nagar, Dehradun (UP)
Dehradun (UP)
Dehradun (UP)
Cuttack, Orissa
Nagpur, Maharashtra
Bijnore District (UP)
Shimla (HP)
Seoul
Meghalaya, Assam
Taman Datuk, Kandan Baru
Zaventem airport
India
India
Yunnan Province
Fuzhou, Fujian Province
Hoshangabad District, Madhya Pradesh (MP)

India

Bilaspur (MP)

2
1
2
2
1
2
3

2
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
2

1
68
68

15
5

leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard bones
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard meat
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin

1
1
2
1
2
2.5 kg
1
4
3
1
3
8
2
3
4
1
3
1
4
2
4
1 kg
1
42
7

3
2
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4/19/99
5/25/99
11/8/99
12/20/99
1/12/00
1/12/00
7/15/1999*

India
estimated

India

Near Kanha Tiger Reserve, Balaghat District
(MP)
Near Melghat Tiger Reserve, Maharashtra

estimated

France
India
India
India
Thailand

Roissy airport, Paris
Ghaziabad
Khaga, Uttar Pradesh
Khaga, Uttar Pradesh
Betong, Yala Province

Thailand
Thailand
Vietnam
UK
India
India

Betong, Yala Province
Betong, Yala Province
Vietnam
London
India
India

Belgium
Djibouti
India
India
India
China

Brussels
Djiboutiville
Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
Baoshan, Yunnan

Taiwan
India
India
India
Nepal
China
France

Chiang Kai-shek airport
Katni, Madhya Pradesh
Matigara, North Bengal
Dharchula
Halchowk, Swayambhu, Kathmandu
Sansan, Angren County
Roissy airport, Paris

7/15/99
7/15/99
9/15/99
1998
6/15/00
6/15/00

estimated
estimated
estimated

10/1/00
6/8/01
4/27/01
4/27/01
4/27/01
8/8/01

estimated

4/9/02
2/15/02
2/12/03
4/1/03
4/4/03
10/8/03
9/15/04

estimated
estimated

estimated

15

leopard skin

6

8

leopard skin

2

3
7
7

1

4

2

2

1
3

leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard claws
Clouded leopard
skin pieces
leopard skull
leopard jaw
leopard
leopard skull
leopard skin
snow leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard claws
leopard skin
(pieces)
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skull

2
50
70
18000
100+

taxidermist
taxidermist

1
1
1
1
86
1
3
9
19
5
10
33

antiquers

1
4
20
15
109
581
1
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9/15/04
2002-7/2004

6/1/04
7/15/04
10/16/04
6/15/04
2/1/05
2/1/05
2/1/05
2/1/05
1/15/05
9/2/05
9/2/05
8/15/05
8/15/05
3/8/05
4/6/05
7/29/05
7/28/05
1/10/06
1/10/06
4/15/07
2/12/07
7/27/07
7/27/07

estimated
estimated

estimated

estimated
estimated

estimated

France
Italy

Roissy airport, Paris
Rome, Prato, Bologna, Reggio Emilia, Milan

leopard skin
leopard medicinal
ingredients

1

Russia

Altai

2

snow leopard skin

15

India
India
India
India
India

Chennai
Rajasthan
Shahdol
Patel Nagar, Delhi
Patel Nagar, Delhi

1
1
2
4
4

leopard skin
leopard claws
leopard skin
leopard skin
snow leopard skin

2

India
India
Ethiopia
Nepal
Nepal
Nepal
Nepal
India
India
India
India
India
India
Taiwan
Nepal
China

Patel Nagar, Delhi
Patel Nagar, Delhi
Addis Ababa
Rasuwa District
Rasuwa District
Kathmandu
Kathmandu
Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi
Delhi
Chhatarpur, Madhya Pradesh
Bhopal
Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh
Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh
Taiwan
Dhangadi, Nepal
Xining, Qinghai

4
4

3
1
3
1

leopard paws
leopard bones
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard bones
leopard skin
leopard bones
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
snow leopard skin

3
45
30
1
14
2
1
5
27

China

Xining, Qinghai

1

snow leopard head

3

66+
3
3

2
3
1
1

7
38
1

36
1
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7/27/07

China

Xining, Qinghai

1

7/27/07

China

Xining, Qinghai

1

10/25/07

India

2

Nepal
Nepal
Thailand

Karaundhi, Sonbhadra District, Varanasi, Uttar
Pradesh
Nepal
Syphru Bensi, Langtang National Park
Khub Pung village of Tambon Nam Kham

1/29/08

Thailand

Khub Pung village of Tambon Nam Kham

3/12/08
3/12/08
4/15/08
3/15/08
1/15/08

France
France
Cameroon
China
China

Paris
Paris
Douala, Littoral Province
Xinjiang
Shanghai

1
1
2
6
1

India
India
India
India
India
India
India
United States
United States
Russia

Almora
Saharanpur
Vikasnagar
Chhattisgarh
Delhi
Vikasnagar, near Dehradun
Dehradun, Uttarakhand
Denver, Colorado
Denver, Colorado
Ussuriisk, Primorsky Province

2
3
1
2
1
1
2
3
3

8/10/07
9/15/05
1/29/08

7/22/08
7/27/08
7/28/08
7/30/08
8/1/08
8/6/08
8/13/08
8/6/08
8/6/08
4/3/09

estimated

estimated
estimated
estimated

estimated

2

snow leopard
skeleton
clouded leopard
skin
leopard skin

10

leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard

2
37
3

clouded leopard
leopard skin
leopard
leopard skin
snow leopard
clouded leopard
skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skull
Amur leopard skin

2
1

2

1

taxidermist
taxidermist

4
1
1
8
1
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
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11/15/08

Kenya, Congo,
Ghana, Uganda,
Zambia

12/13/07
3/20/09
3/20/09
10/15/05
10/15/05
2/24/09
8/20/09

India
India
India
United States
United States
United States
UK

Gujarat
Manas National Park, Barpeta District
Manas National Park, Barpeta District
Minnesota
Minnesota
Smyrna, Georgia
London

11/23/09

UK

7/21/09
10/19/09
7/15/00
7/26/09
9/16/09
10/10/09
9/20/10

2/1/10
10/11/10
3/7/10

estimated
estimated

estimated

estimated

57

leopard skin

1
16
16
1
1
1

leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard bones
clouded leopard
clouded leopard
snow leopard
leopard medicinal
ingredients

Manchester

1

leopard medicinal
ingredients

Cameroon
China
India
India
India
India
UK

Bafoussam
Linchang, Yunnan Province
Pinjore, Haryana
Birhi, Chamoli
Chhattisgarh, Kanker District
Vikasnagar, near Dehradun
Aberystwyth

2
1
1
2
2
2

leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard

2
1
2
3
1
2
1

South Africa
Tanzania
China

North West Province
Tanzania
Manas County, Xinjiang Province

6
3
2

leopard parts
leopard skin
snow leopard

8
1

23

1

zoo owners,
illegal display
of live leopard

herders
protecting
livestock with
traps
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1/15/10
11/15/08
4/14/10
4/14/10
2/26/10
3/18/10
6/28/10
6/28/10
1995
9/15/10
9/15/10

estimated
estimated

China
China
China
China
India
India
India
India
India
India
Vietnam

Luntai
Yining
Dehong State, Yunnan Province
Dehong State, Yunnan Province
Solan, Himachal Pradesh
Basti (UP)
Devgadh Baria Taluka, Dahod District
Devgadh Baria Taluka, Dahod District
Delhi
Chakrata Dehradun district
Hanoi, Hoang Mai District

5
3
2
2
4
3
2
2
1

9/15/10

Vietnam

Hanoi, Hoang Mai District

2

1/19/11
8/20/11

Gabon
Thailand

5/16/11

Malaysia

5/13/11

Thailand

Gabon
Mekong River, Ban Tarn Choom, Ratana Wapi
District
Kampung Ayer Molek, Bukit Ibam, Muadzam
Shah, Pahang
Suvarnabhumi International Airport

Leopard:

Snow leopard:

Clouded
leopard:

Amur leopard:

Panthera pardus

Panthera uncial

Neofelis
nebulosa

Panthera pardus
orientalis

estimated

2

snow leopard
snow leopard
leopard skin
leopard skeleton
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard skin
leopard nails
leopard skin
leopard skin
clouded leopard
skeleton
clouded leopard
skull
leopard skin
leopard

2
4

4
3
4
4
1
2
1
3
12
1

1

leopard parts

5

1

leopard

2

live baby
leopards
drugged and in
suitcase

Key:
*Incidents in bold with the
same date correspond to the
same incident involving
multiple types of seized
objects.
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Table A2. Existing published studies with reliable illegal leopard killing counts

Study (Examples
& excerpts in
Appendix)

Measures

How Data
Was
Gathered

Who Gathered
Data

Area Covered

Time
Period

Reliability
(Poor,
Fair,
Strong)

Reasons for Reliability
Score

Environmental
Investigation
Agency & Wildlife
Protection Society
India (2006)

# of leopards and
leopard products
seized, # of individuals
charged with poaching,
# of people prosecuted
for poaching

Seizure data
compilation

Police, CITES
Management
Authority, WWF,
TRAFFIC, News
outlets

India, Nepal,
China

19992006

Fair

Data gathered from biased
sources like the media but
range of sources may
provide a good selection
of cases, just not
exhaustive.

TRAFFIC Seizures
Bulletin

# of leopards and
leopard products seized

Seizure data
compilation

Departments of
National Parks &
Wildlife, Customs,
law enforcement,
CITES Management
Authority, WWF,
TRAFFIC, News
outlets

Worldwide

19962011

Fair

Data gathered from biased
sources like the media but
range of sources may
provide a good selection
of cases, just not
exhaustive.

Google Alerts

# of leopards poached,
# of leopards and
leopard products
seized, # of humans
killed by leopards

News articles,
internet
content

News outlets

Worldwide

4/28/122/9/13

Fair

Data gathered from biased
sources like the media,
news outlets limited to
those with an internet
interface.

Grey Publications
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TRAFFIC News
Bulletin

# of leopards and
leopard products seized

News articles

Non-profit
personnel

Worldwide

20072013

Poor

Bulletins represent only a
partial list of incidents
based on preferences of
its editor. Provides a good
highlight of mediatized
cases of poaching.

# of leopards poached,
leopard mortality rates,
prey availability &
abundance rates

GPS collaring,
carcass
recovery

Non-profit
researchers,
University
researchers

Phinda Private
Game Reserve
& Mkhuze,
KwaZuluNatal
Province,
South Africa

20022007

Strong

Data primarily taken from
Panthera Munyawana
Leopard Project (see
below).

# of leopards poached,
leopard movements

GPS collaring,
carcass
recovery

Non-profit
researchers

Western &
Eastern Cape
Provinces,
South Africa

20042012

Strong

Researchers are
embedded in communities
where they are gathering
data allowing them to
access far more cases than
those reported to law
enforcement.

Peer-Reviewed
Publications
Balme et al (2010)

On-Going
Research Projects
The Landmark
Foundation
Leopard & Predator
Project
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The Cape Leopard
Trust Leopard
Projects

# of leopards poached,
leopard movements

GPS collaring,
carcass
recovery

Non-profit
researchers

Cederberg,
Boland, &
Gouritz
regions of the
Western Cape
Province,
South Africa

20032012

Strong

Researchers are
embedded in communities
where they are gathering
data allowing them to
access far more cases than
those reported to law
enforcement.

Panthera
Munyawana
Leopard Project

# of leopards poached,
leopard movements

GPS collaring,
carcass
recovery

Non-profit
researchers

Phinda Private
Game Reserve
(and
surroundings),
KwaZuluNatal
Province,
South Africa

20022012

Strong

Researchers are
embedded in communities
where they are gathering
data allowing them to
access far more cases than
those reported to law
enforcement.

KwaZulu-Natal
Wildlife Crime
Incidents Database

# of leopards poached

Law
enforcement
reports

Biodiversity
research unit of
KwaZulu-Natal
Province

KwaZuluNatal
Province,
South Africa

Unknown

Unknown

Data is unavailable to the
public.

Interpol
Environmental
Crime Committee
Ecomessages
Database

# of leopards and
leopard products seized

Law
enforcement
reports

Law enforcement
agencies from
INTERPOL member
countries

Europe

Unknown

Unknown

Data is unavailable to the
public.

Official databases
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Healthmap Wildlife
Trade Database

# of leopards poached,
# of leopards and
leopard products seized

News articles,
internet
content,
seizure data
compilation,
law
enforcement
reports, nonprofit reports,
user-submitted
data

Non-profit
researchers

Worldwide

20102013

Fair

Data gathered from wide
range of sources but
comparison with Google
Alerts and The Landmark
Foundation data suggests
many cases are not
incorporated in database.
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Figure A1. Kenyan interview questions82

1) Date & interview no.
2) Group ranch:
a) Mbirikani, b) Kuku, c) Kimana, d) Rombo
3) Location
4) Sex:
a) Female, b) Male
5) Ethnicity:
a) Maasai, b) Kikuyu, c) Kamba, d) Tanzanian, e) Other
6) Level of education:
a) No education, b) Primary, c) Secondary, d) University
7) Age:
a) < 20, b) 21-30, c) 31-40, d) 41-50, e) 51+
8) Style of proprietorship:
a) Owner, b) Tenant, c) GR member
9) What is your primary livelihood strategy?
a) Agriculture, b) Pastoralism, c) Agro-pastoralism, d) Wildlife conservation,
e) Other
10) List other important strategies:
a) Agriculture, b) Pastoralism, c) Agro-pastoralism, d) Wildlife conservation,
e) Other
11) How do you rate your economic status?
a) High, b) Medium, c) Low, d) N/A
12) How do you rate the appropriateness of your primary livelihood strategy.
To your needs:
a) Not sufficient, b) Sufficient, c) Highly sufficient
To environmental integrity:
82

Please note that the word choice used in this questionnaire is based on the idioms and
expressions commonly used in Kenyan English and may therefore be unfamiliar to an American
or English speaker.
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a) Not appropriate, b) Appropriate, c) Highly appropriate
13) Do you benefit in any way from the presence of wildlife in the area?
a) Yes, b) No
If yes, explain.
If no, what are the hindrances?
14) Is wildlife beneficial to other people?
a) Yes, b) No
If yes, who and how?
15) In what ways would you like to see wildlife utilized? (only give options if participant
cannot give clear answer)
a) Ecotourism lodges, b) Hunting, c) Community sanctuary, d) Revenue sharing from
government-controlled parks, e) Traditional uses, f) Other
16) Are you aware of any initiative involving wildlife utilization?
a) Yes, b) No
If yes, identify the initiatives
17) Is wildlife imposing a cost to you?
a) Yes, b) No
If yes, how?
18) Is there a public/communal cost to wildlife?
a) Yes, b) No
If yes, how?
19) Are there any measures put in place to improve human-wildlife interactions?
a) Yes, b) No
What are the initiatives and who has been responsible?
Have they succeeded?
20) Do you have any suggestions as to how the negative impacts can be reduced?
21) What have been the wildlife population trends?
a) Increased, b) Decreased, c) Stayed the same
22) Have you noticed any differences in ways in which Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) or
other stakeholders react to human-wildlife interactions?
23) Generally, have you been exposed to issues touching on wildlife conservation?
a) Yes, b) No
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24) What is your attitude towards wildlife conservation-based on income generating
activities?
a) Positive, b) Negative
Elaborate on your choice
25) If not for economic benefits/incentives, would you still support wildlife conservation?
a) Yes, b) No
26) Have you heard of the proposal by the government to hand over Amboseli National Park
(ANP) to the Kajiado County Council?
a) Yes, b) No
If yes, from what source?
27) Irrespective, do you support or not support this proposal?
a) Support, b) Not support, c) Ambivalent
Why?
28) Is KWS mismanaging ANP?
a) Yes, b = No
How?
29) If the proposal fails, what would you want KWS to do in regard to ANP to gain your
support?
30) Will the county council improve its management?
a) Yes, b) No
How?
31) If the proposal succeeds, how do you want the Park managed?
32) At a personal level, are you going to benefit from the envisioned change of
management?
a) Yes, b = No
If yes, how?
If not, who will benefit?
33) In your opinion, what has been the biggest challenge to wildlife conservation in this
region?
34) How should it be resolved?
35) What is your overall opinion of wildlife conservation within the area?
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Figure A2. South African interview questions

Questions for farmers with knowledge (first or secondhand) of poaching:
1) Why do you think poaching occurs?
1. What factors make it easier/possible for poachers to operate?
2) What do local residents think about poaching?
1. Are they for it or against it?
2. Do they see the ills or just don’t care much because the consequences of poaching
do not directly affect them?
3. Do they view the land and its resources as theirs to use as they please?
3) Do you know of anyone who poaches? If so, who are they (no names just background
information on the person)?
1. How many are there?
2. Do they work in groups (organizational structure loose or strictly defined)?
3. What are their financial circumstances?
4. Do they have any specific knowledge or experience with wildlife?
4) Why do these people poach? What incentives do these individuals respond to (with an
eye to using that to find an alternative to poaching)?
5) What negative effects have you personally felt in your community from poaching?
1. Are there any indirect effects from poaching that you’ve noticed and that
wouldn’t be evident to the casual observer?
2. Do most people in your community experience any negative effects from
poaching?
3. Is this a topic that comes up among community members?
6) Do you know where poachers unload their products (identify markets)?
1. Who has access to these markets?
2. Ask if possible to see such a market.
7) What do you believe would be the best methods to combat poaching in your area?
1. What would it take to implement these methods?
2. Who should be responsible for these efforts?
8) What obstacles currently exist to effectively combating poaching in your area?
1. Are there any issues of corruption, cultural practices, lack of resources, or lack of
interest from authorities?
2. Are people in your area interested in helping stop poaching?
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3. What perception do community members have of current anti-poaching efforts or
of wildlife management personnel in general?
9) Have there been any previous efforts made to stop poaching in your community?
1. Were they successful?
2. What made them successful/unsuccessful?
3. What would you have done differently than they did?
4. Are they still being implemented? If not, why not?

Questions for law enforcement personnel who deal with poaching:
1) How does law enforcement determine whether or not a product is illegally poached?
2) How do you determine the point-of-origin of illegal wildlife products (apart from
species/habitat location) so that you can combat poaching more effectively in that area?
3) Do you feel you have enough resources to work with?
4) What current policies and strategies do you have in place to stop poaching of local
wildlife?
5) Do you have an idea of the extent of poaching in your area? How do you determine this?
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Table A3. Example of the leopard data collected by The Landmark Foundation

The Landmark Foundation Leopard
Captures
Date
Number
Sex

Age

Location

Status

9-Jun-10

1

Male

Adult

Heidelberg

Collared

8-Jun-10

1

Male

Sub Adult

Winterhoek
Mountains

Died

5-Jun-10

1

Male

Sub Adult

Rheenendal

Uncollared

GPS
Location

Notes
Caught in a water reservoir and released
on site.

33°
24.547'S

23°
41.808'E

Gin trap, between 24 - 36 hours,
exposure and stress.
23kg, good condition. Saw mother as it
recovered and walked away.
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Table A4. South African respondents’ beliefs about when and why leopards kill livestock

Why leopards kill livestock
Lack of prey

Farmers
Anatolian sheep dogs eat small
prey

Government/NGO personnel
Farmers killing all small prey

Natural animal behavior

Grouping behavior of sheep, easy
prey
Cows leave troop for 2-3 days to
give birth

Leopards acclimatizing to
humans

Husbandry

Dairy farmers see cattle more,
cattle bigger
Small farms cannot rotate grazing
locations

Insufficient checks on grazing
livestock
No clear headcount

Landscape & neighbor issues

Buffer farms
Game farm animals escaping, fed
meat
Predators breed on reserves, eat
on farms

Buffer farms
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